Macroeconomics of Investment Dynamics and Financing by Fabio Verona
FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA DO PORTO
MACROECONOMICS OF INVESTMENT DYNAMICS AND
FINANCING
Fabio Verona
Orientador: Manuel M. F. Martins
Co-Orientador: Inês Drumond
TESE DE DOUTORAMENTO EM ECONOMIA
Porto, 2011
To Aurelia and Renato,
my parents
To Silvia and Riccardo,
my sister and brother
Vita
Fabio Verona was born on the 25 of August of 1978, in Brescia, Italy.
He graduated in Engineering from the Facoltá di Ingegneria dell’Universitá degli Studi di
Brescia (Italy) in 2005. He has been a Ph.D. student at the Faculdade de Economia da
Universidade do Porto since 2005. He was a visiting scholar at the Department of Economics
of Columbia University (New York) from August 2009 to July 2010.
iii
Summary
This thesis consists of three essays that share a common goal of analyzing investment deci-
sions and their macroeconomic implications. In particular, the thesis focuses on two distinct
issues building on two alternative theoretical frameworks. Chapter 1 examines the role of dis-
tortions in investment financing in the transmission of monetary policy using a sticky-prices
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Chapters 2 and 3 analyze the role
of information costs in shaping investment dynamics, respectively in a partial equilibrium
framework and in a sticky-information general equilibrium model.
The model developed in chapter 1 adds a microfounded shadow banking sector to a standard
sticky-prices DSGE model. In contrast with the standard retail banking sector, the shadow
banking sector is characterized by optimism and perverse incentives that could lead financial
intermediaries to underwrite bonds at a discounted rate, diverting a fraction of the bank’s
stockholders profits for their own benefits. The model predicts that the combination of a
persistent expansionary monetary policy with such microeconomic distortions in the financial
system causes a boom-bust cycle.
The model developed in chapter 2 provides an alternative explanation for the well-established
fact that microeconomic investment is lumpy. The traditional explanation relies on the as-
sumption that firms face non-convex (fixed) capital adjustment costs. The alternative explana-
tion suggested relies on inattentiveness, whereby firms make infrequent investment decisions
due to the costs of gathering and processing information and making optimal plans. Intro-
ducing such information/planning costs into a frictionless investment model induces lumpy
capital adjustments. The model fits the quantitative facts on plant-level investment rates re-
markably well.
In chapter 3, capital investment decisions with inattentiveness are embedded in a DSGE
model, assuming information costs as the only source of rigidity. The resulting model fea-
tures pervasive inattentiveness, as consumption, wages, prices and capital investment deci-
iv
sions are all based, to some degree, on outdated information sets. The model yields aggregate
dynamics substantially different from those of an otherwise identical model with frictionless
investment, and much closer to the empirical evidence. These results thus strengthen the case
for the relevance of lumpy micro-level investment for the business cycle.
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Chapter 1
Monetary policy shocks in a DSGE model
with a shadow banking system1
This chapter is motivated by the recent financial crisis and addresses whether a “too low for
too long” interest rate policy may generate a boom-bust cycle. We suggest a model in which
a microfounded shadow banking sector is included in an otherwise state-of-the-art DSGE
model. When faced with perverse incentives, financial intermediaries within the shadow
banking sector can divert a fraction of stockholders’ profits for their own benefits and extend
credit at a discounted rate. The model predicts that long periods of accommodative monetary
policy do create the preconditions for, but do not cause per se, a boom-bust cycle. Rather,
it is the combination of a persistent monetary ease with microeconomic distortions in the
financial system that causes a boom-bust.
1 This is a joint work with Manuel M. F. Martins and Inês Drumond. We thank José Peres Jorge, Ricardo
Reis and Michael Woodford for useful comments, as well as seminar participants at the University of Porto and
Columbia University. I am grateful to the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia for financial support (Ph.D.
scholarship).
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN A DSGE MODEL WITH A SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
1.1 Introduction
The Fed funds rate: too low for too long? Some observers have recently criticized the Fed for
helping fuel the credit/house-price boom and thereby the subprime crisis by keeping interest
rates too low for too long. If correct, this criticism would have important implications for the
future conduct of monetary policy. Unfortunately, conventional dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models are not well suited to address this issue because of their rather
simple modelling structure of the financial system and of its relation with the real economy.
In particular, although financial intermediaries have been at the center of the subprime crisis,
they have played so far a relatively passive role in macroeconomic models.
This chapter aims to determine whether long periods of loose monetary policy may have a
part to play in generating a boom-bust cycle. We do so by building a DSGE model with a
two-sector financial system – a retail banking sector and a “shadow” banking sector in which
there may exist optimism and perverse incentives. Such a model, in which we explicitly
model the behavior of financial intermediaries within the shadow banking system, aims at
providing further insights into the transmission of monetary policy.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews the two strands of literature
on which our work builds, one on the causes of the subprime crisis and one on the role of
the financial sector in DSGE models. Section 1.3 provides a general descriptive overview
of our model. Section 1.4 describes the financial system and, in particular, the modelling
of the shadow banking system based on microeconomic foundations. Section 1.5 details the
calibration of the model and presents the impulse responses in both a) a one-period expan-
sionary monetary policy shock and b) a “persistently low interest rate” scenario. Section 1.6
concludes.2
The central result of the chapter is that a “too low for too long” interest rate policy does cre-
ate the preconditions for, but does not cause per se, a boom-bust cycle. In fact, fluctuations
in both real and financial variables are markedly amplified only when a persistently accom-
modative monetary policy environment is coupled with perverse incentives in the financial
sector.
2 Appendix A presents the complete model, while technical details are described in appendices B, C and D.
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1.2 Motivation
1.2.1 The subprime crisis
Following the 2007 collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and the resulting global
financial and economic crisis, several authors have discussed the causes and consequences
of the house price bubble and the boom-bust cycle. These analyses, either coming from the
academia (e.g., Borio, 2008 and Blanchard, 2009) or from policy-makers (e.g., Trichet, 2009,
Bean et al., 2010 and Bernanke, 2010), have overall concluded that the seeds of the crisis lay
in a combination of both micro and macro factors.3
Microeconomic factors are mostly related to recent innovations in financial instruments, in-
stitutions and markets. A non-exhaustive list of these factors includes: the reduced incentives
for lenders to properly screen and monitor borrowers due to pay packages encouraging the
pursuit of short-term returns; the under-estimation of the true risk of complex (and often not
transparent) structured financial products arising from the replacement of sound risk man-
agement practices with mathematical and statistical models of risk; the distorted incentives
faced by ratings agencies; the moral hazard behavior of financial institutions considered too
big or too important to fail; and, additionally, an inadequate regulation and supervision of
individual financial institutions and markets and of the financial system as a whole.
Potential macroeconomic factors include a protracted period of very low (and in some cases
negative) real interest rates and plentiful liquidity; large international payments imbalances
resulting from a “savings glut” in surplus countries; and the benign macroeconomic environ-
ment at the beginning of the 21st century as side effect of the Great Moderation.
Evidence for assigning a central role, as cause of the subprime crisis, to excessively loose
monetary policy is, nevertheless, mixed. To date, the 2010 Jackson Hole Symposium pro-
vides the most recent debate on this issue. On the one hand, Bean et al. (2010) argue that
low policy rates played only a modest direct role. As they state, “although monetary policy
may have played a role in the credit/house-price boom that preceded the crisis, it is rather
more Rosencrantz than Hamlet.” On the other hand, Taylor (2010) disagrees that the role of
monetary policy was only a modest one without implications for future policy.
In this chapter we do not attempt to explicitly model the subprime crisis. First, it is unlikely
that any of the aforementioned factors in isolation could explain the crisis. Second, it would
3 See Borio (2008), Brunnermeier (2009) and FED (2009) for a chronology of the events relating to the
subprime crises.
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be too complex to comprise all of them in a DSGE model. Nevertheless, we do try to capture
some micro factors (related in particular with the behavior of financial intermediaries) rele-
vant to analyzing whether the Fed’s policy to keep interest rates low for a prolonged period
may have played a key role for the run-up of the crisis. To explore this hypothesis, we rely on
a model in which the financial sector, rather than being passive, plays a central role in driving
the boom-bust cycle.
1.2.2 Financial system in DSGE models
The DSGE model, currently the state-of-the-art macroeconomic model, results from a fusion
of the Real Business Cycle models of the 1980s with the New Keynesian sticky-price models
of the early 1990s. In its primordial version, this model incorporated no role for credit and
financial factors at all. Works that followed have continued to assume frictionless financial
markets so that financial intermediaries played a passive role, despite of the increasing aware-
ness about their importance in affecting the performance of the economy, including though
the transmission of monetary policy. For example, in the DSGE models currently used for
monetary policy analysis at the main central banks – e.g., the SIGMA model at the FED
(Erceg et al., 2006), the Smets and Wouters model at the ECB (Smets and Wouters, 2003)
and the Bank of England’s Quarterly Model (Harrison et al., 2005) – the financial sector
hardly plays a prominent role.
A first attempt to introduce a financial sector in a New Keynesian DSGE framework has
been made by Bernanke et al. (1999). In their model, the financial sector is limited to a
banking sector that amplifies the effects of the shocks via the financial accelerator effect.
More recently, some authors have enhanced the structure and role of the financial sector in
DSGE models. Iacoviello (2005) extends the Bernanke et al. (1999) model by introducing
collateral constraints for firms, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Christiano et al. (2003,
2008, 2010) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) consider a perfectly competitive banking
sector that offers agents a variety of financial assets with different returns, while Kobayashi
(2008) and Gerali et al. (2010) consider imperfect competition in the banking sector so as
to model the setting of interest rates by banks. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) also allow for
a time-varying spread between deposits and lending rates. Finally, a number of papers (see,
for instance, Van den Heuvel, 2008, Gertler and Karadi, 2009, de Walque et al., 2010 and
Meh and Moran, 2010) study the role of bank capital in the transmission of macroeconomic
4
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shocks.4,5
While most of the literature focuses on financial frictions that arise from the behavior of bor-
rowers, the subprime crisis has highlighted the need to analyze the behavior of financial inter-
mediaries themselves. In this chapter we take a step toward determining whether the financial
sector plays an active role in the boom-bust cycle. We do so by augmenting the Christiano
et al. (2010) model with a shadow banking system. Our microfounded financial system is
thus composed of two different financial intermediaries (retail and investment banks) that
intermediate funds from households (lenders) to two groups of entrepreneurs (borrowers).
Following the Bernanke et al. (1999) framework, in the retail banking sector there is an
“agency / information” problem between borrowers and lenders. Information is asymmetric,
in that the entrepreneur’s realized return may be observed at no cost only by the entrepreneur,
while it can be observed by the retail bank only after paying a monitoring cost. Thus, the
model is of the costly state verification type.
In the shadow banking sector we introduce an “agency / money” problem, in that the invest-
ment bank manager may pursue his own private objectives, which need not coincide with
those of the stockholders. This problem arises because the manager faces perverse incentives
– in the form of side payments – to boost his private revenue at the expense of stockholders’
profits, i.e. the bank manager can divert a fraction of stockholders’ profits for his own benefit.
We then use the model to address the following questions:
1. How do perverse incentives in the financial sector affect the transmission of monetary
policy shocks through the economy? How different are our findings from those of a
workhorse DSGE model?
2. Does a “too low for too long” interest rate policy cause a boom-bust cycle?
3. What are the effects of perverse incentives in the financial sector when coupled with a
persistently low interest rate environment?
4 Drumond (2009) provides an exhaustive survey on the theoretical literature on the bank capital channel
of propagation of exogenous shocks as well as on the regulatory framework of capital requirements under the
Basel Accords.
5 This brief review only focuses on DSGE models and, in view of the growth of this literature, does not aim
to be exhaustive.
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1.3 An overview of the model
The core of our framework is a simplified version of the Financial Accelerator Model de-
scribed in Christiano et al. (2010), hereafter CMR.6 It essentially corresponds to the models
in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005) enlarged with the financial acceler-
ator mechanism developed by Bernanke et al. (1999). To this we add a shadow banking sys-
tem that intermediates funds between households and an additional set of entrepreneurs. The
model is thus composed of government, households, firms, capital producers, entrepreneurs,
and banks. Figure 1.1 sketches the structure of the model. Agents drawn in black are those
already present in the CMR model, while the “new agents” are drawn in blue.
Government expenditures represent a constant fraction of final output and are financed by
lump-sum taxes imposed to the households. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate.
Households consume, save and supply labor services monopolistically. Two types of finan-
cial instruments, offered by banks, are available to households: time deposits and corporate
bonds. To keep this part of the model as simple as possible, we assume that the rate of re-
turn is the same for both financial instruments, so households are indifferent between holding
deposits or bonds.
On the production side, monopolistically competitive intermediate-good firms use labor (sup-
plied by households) and capital (rented from entrepreneurs) to produce a continuum of
differentiated intermediate goods. Perfectly competitive final-good firms buy intermediate
goods and produce the final output, which is then converted into consumption, investment
and government goods.
Capital producers combine investment goods with undepreciated capital purchased from en-
trepreneurs to produce new capital, which is then sold back to entrepreneurs.
Capital services are supplied by entrepreneurs, who own the stock of physical capital and
choose how intensively to use it. Entrepreneurs purchase capital using their own resources –
net worth, or equity, resulting from net proceeds of their activities from one period to the next
– as well as external finance. In fact, entrepreneurs’ net worth is not enough to finance the
full amount of capital they acquire, so they finance a part of their capital expenditures either
by issuing bonds or by means of bank loans.
6 The simplified version excludes long-run growth, the fixed cost in the production function and distortionary
taxes on capital and labor income and on household consumption. While not changing the model’s dynamic
responses to monetary policy shocks, these simplifications reduce its complexity.
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The setting up of the shadow banking system is paralleled by the division of the entrepreneurial
sector into two groups: the riskier entrepreneurs and the safer entrepreneurs, who have ac-
cess to two different sources of external funding.7 We assume that the riskier entrepreneurs
obtain financing via retail bank loans, while the safer entrepreneurs issue bonds resorting
to investment banks.8 In particular, we consider the entrepreneurs of the CMR model as
riskier because they may default (since they face an idiosyncratic productivity shock), while
we consider the additional set of entrepreneurs as safer because we assume that they always
have enough wealth to repay their debt and thus never default. Accordingly, we calibrate
the model so as to guarantee that, in equilibrium, safer entrepreneurs finance themselves at a
lower interest rate than riskier entrepreneurs.
Lending to riskier entrepreneurs involves an agency/information problem, because they cost-
lessly observe their idiosyncratic shocks, whereas the retail bank must pay a monitoring cost
to observe those shocks. The optimal lending contract is of the costly state verification type.
In particular, a standard debt contract is set up specifying a loan amount and an interest rate to
pay whenever the entrepreneur is solvent. If the entrepreneur cannot pay the required interest
because of an unfavorable realization of his productivity shock, he goes into bankruptcy and
turns over his remaining equity to the retail bank, after being monitored. The rate of return
paid by solvent entrepreneurs must thus be high enough to cover the cost of funds to the bank,
as well as the monitoring costs net of the resources that the bank can recover from bankrupt
entrepreneurs (for further details see Bernanke et al., 1999).
The investment banking sector is the core part of our shadow banking system.9 We assume
that the bond market is populated by a continuum of monopolistic competitive investment
banks, who set the coupon rate on bonds in order to maximize profits, which are then rebated
7 A number of papers (see, among many others, Diamond, 1991, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, Holm-
strom and Tirole, 1997, Berlin and Loeys, 1988, Bolton and Freixas, 2000, 2006, Repullo and Suarez, 2000,
Chakraborty and Ray, 2007, Hale, 2007 and Gerber, 2008) characterize equilibria when bank lending and direct
financing through securities issues are both present. Usually, in equilibrium, firms are segmented by risk classes
in their choice of funding, with safer firms choosing bond financing and riskier firms preferring bank loans.
8 Typically, a firm going public hires an investment bank to sell its securities. The investment bank (the
underwriter) acts as an intermediary between the issuing firm and the ultimate investors. The most common
type of underwriting arrangement is the “firm commitment” underwriting, according to which the underwriter
buys the entire stock of bonds from the firm and resells it to investors at a higher price (i.e., at a lower interest
rate). This spread represents the investment bank’s profits. See Ellis et al. (2000) for an in-depth analysis of the
underwriting process.
9 The expression “shadow banking system” has been suggested originally by Paul McCulley of PIMCO
at the 2007 Jackson Hole conference, where he defined it as “the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-
bank investment conduits, vehicles, and structures” (McCulley, 2007, pag. 2). See Pozsar et al. (2010) for a
comprehensive and up-to-date description of the shadow banking system.
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to the stockholders, i.e. to the households.10 Within each investment bank, the agent that
makes the decision is the investment bank manager, whom we call henceforth the underwriter.
Two distinct mechanisms – optimism and perverse incentives – are at work in the investment
banking sector. First, we consider that an optimistic underwriter is willing to underwrite
bonds at a lower – relatively to its “normal” value – coupon interest rate.11 We assume that
the underwriter turns out to be optimistic when the entrepreneur pledges more collateral and,
accordingly, we model underwriter’s optimism as a positive function of the entrepreneur’s
net worth. An unexpected increase of the entrepreneur’s net worth – as a result of a mone-
tary easing or a favorable productivity shock – triggers optimism and may result in a lower
bond coupon interest rate. Second, we introduce perverse incentives by assuming that the
safer entrepreneur offers side payments to the underwriter in order to borrow at a more fa-
vorable interest rate. In exchange of those side payments, an optimistic underwriter may de
facto facilitate the extension of credit by setting a “discounted” – relatively to the “normal” –
bond coupon rate. Defining how much the coupon rate deviates from the normal rate depends
upon the underwriter’s utility function, in which the trade-off between maximizing his private
revenue and the investment bank’s profits (hence, the stockholders’ profits) is explicitly mod-
eled. An agency conflict between investment bank managers and stockholders arises because
side payments represent a compensation for the underwriter to the sacrifice of stockholders’
profitability.12
Having briefly presented the main features of our model, in the next section we describe the
financial system, with particular emphasis on the shadow banking system. The rest of the
model is standard in the literature and is set out in appendix A.
10 The empirical evidence on the U.S. market of bond underwriting suggests an oligopolistic market structure.
For example, Fang (2005) shows that the largest five investment banks underwrite more than 60% of all deals,
and the largest fifteen banks account for roughly 95% of all deals.
11 There is considerable evidence that economic agents may be too optimistic. See De Bondt and Thaler
(1994) for an exhaustive survey on behavioral finance and Puri and Robinson (2007) for an empirical analysis
on how optimism affects economic decisions.
12 The agency conflict between managers and stockholders is a central theme in the corporate-finance litera-
ture (see Stein, 2003, for a survey). The manager-stockholder agency conflict arises because the managers may
pursue their own private objectives rather than those of outside stockholders. Studies on conflicts of interest
in investment banking industry include, among others, Michaely and Womack (1999) and Mehran and Stulz
(2007).
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the model
1.4 The financial system
We assume that riskier entrepreneurs represent a fraction η of the total population of en-
trepreneurs, while safer entrepreneurs represent the remaining fraction, 1−η . In what fol-
lows, the superscripts “H” and “H,r” (“L” and “L, l”) refer to variables associated with the
riskier (safer) entrepreneurs.
1.4.1 Riskier entrepreneurs and retail banks
Riskier entrepreneurs own a share of the economy’s stock of physical capital. Entrepreneurs’
net worth is enough to finance only a part of their holdings of physical capital, the rest be-
ing financed by loans from a representative retail bank. Entrepreneurial loans are risky be-
cause the returns on their investments are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In particular, en-
trepreneurs who suffer a large unfavorable shock and who therefore cannot pay the required
interest, go bankrupt. Financial frictions arise because the idiosyncratic shock is observed by
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the entrepreneurs at no cost, and by the bank only if it incurs in a fixed monitoring cost. To
mitigate costs stemming from this source of asymmetric information, entrepreneurs and bank
sign a standard debt contract, according to which the entrepreneur commits to pay back the
loan principal and a non-default interest rate, unless he declares default. In case of default,
the bank conducts a verification of the residual value of the entrepreneur’s assets and takes in
all of the entrepreneur’s net worth, net of monitoring costs.
The debt contracts extended by the bank to entrepreneurs are financed by bank’s issuance of
time deposits to households. Although individual entrepreneurs are risky, the bank itself is
not: by lending to a large number of entrepreneurs, the bank can diversify the idiosyncratic
risk and thus can guarantee a safe return on households’ deposits. Nevertheless, financial
frictions – reflecting the costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and the bank
– imply that bank hedges against credit risk by charging a premium over the rate at which it
can borrow from households.
In particular, as shown by Bernanke et al. (1999), the first order conditions of the contracting
problem yield the following relationship linking the expected return on capital (Rk,Ht+1) relative
to the risk-free interest rate (Ret+1) and the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio (
Qk¯′,t K¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
):
Et
(
1+Rk,Ht+1
)
1+Ret+1
=Ψ
(
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
)
, (1.1)
where Qk¯′,t , K¯
H,r
t+1 and N
H,r
t+1 denote, respectively, the price of capital, the entrepreneur’s stock
of capital and the entrepreneur’s net worth and the function Ψ is such that Ψ′ > 0 for NH,rt+1 <
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1. The ratio
Et
(
1+Rk,Ht+1
)
1+Ret+1
, which Bernanke et al. (1999) interpreted as the external
finance premium faced by the entrepreneur, depends positively on the entrepreneur’s leverage
ratio. Intuitively, all else equal, higher leverage means higher exposure, implying a higher
probability of default, hence a higher credit risk, which the bank translates into a higher
required return on lending.
The cost of borrowing fluctuates endogenously with the cycle due to two general equilibrium
mechanisms.
The first one is the Bernanke et al. (1999) “financial accelerator” effect, whereby induced
changes in the asset price alter the value of the collateral that the entrepreneur can pledge and,
hence, the contractual loan rate. Specifically, a positive shock to the asset price – as a result
of a monetary easing or a favorable shock to productivity – increases the entrepreneur’s net
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worth and decreases the external finance premium, which in turn stimulates the demand for
investment. The increase in net worth also reduces the expected default probability and allows
the entrepreneur to take on more debt and to further expand investment. An accelerator effect
arises, since the investment boom raises the asset price, further pushing up the entrepreneur’s
net worth and investment.
The second mechanism – which CMR refer to as the “Fisher deflation” effect – is absent in
Bernanke et al. (1999) and works through a debt-deflation effect.13 This effect arises because
of the assumption that the return received by households on time deposits is nominally non-
state contingent, while loans to entrepreneurs are state-contingent. Therefore, unexpected
movements in the price level alter the ex-post real burden of entrepreneurial debt and, hence,
the entrepreneur’s net worth. Namely, following an unexpected increase in inflation, the
total real resources transferred from the entrepreneur to households are reduced and, as a
consequence, the entrepreneur’s net worth increases.
As CMR point out, the “accelerator” and “Fisher” effect mechanisms reinforce each other
in the case of shocks that move inflation and output in the same direction (e.g., monetary
policy shocks), whereas they dampen the macroeconomic transmission of shocks that move
inflation and output in opposite directions (e.g., technology shocks).
1.4.2 The shadow banking system
1.4.2.1 Safer entrepreneurs
Profit maximization
At the beginning of period t, the representative l-th entrepreneur provides capital services
to intermediate-good firms. Capital services, KL,lt , are related to the entrepreneur’s stock of
physical capital, K¯L,lt , by K
L,l
t = u
L,l
t K¯
L,l
t , where u
L,l
t denotes the level of capital utilization.
In choosing the capital utilization rate, the entrepreneur takes into account the increasing and
convex utilization cost function a
(
uL,lt
)
, that denotes the cost, in units of final goods, of
setting the utilization rate to uL,lt .14
13 Fisher (1933) emphasizes the “debt deflation” effect that arises when debt contracts are set in nominal
terms. Other papers that analize the debt-deflation effect include Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010).
14 The functional form that we use is a
(
uL,lt
)
= r
k,L
σLa
[
expσ
L
a
(
uL,lt −1
)
−1
]
, where rk,L is the steady state value
of the rental rate of capital, a(1) = 0, a
′′
(1)> 0 and σLa = a
′′
(1)/a
′
(1) is a parameter that controls the degree
of convexity of costs.
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Then, at the end of period t, the entrepreneur sells the undepreciated capital to capital pro-
ducers at price Qk¯′,t , pays the nominal coupon rate (R
coupon
t ) on bonds issued and purchases
new capital from capital producers at price Qk¯′,t . The capital acquisition is financed partly by
his net worth, NL,lt+1, and partly by issuing new bonds. The amount of bonds issued, BI
L,l
t+1, is
given by:
BIL,lt+1 = Qk¯′,tK¯
L,l
t+1−NL,lt+1 . (1.2)
The entrepreneur’s time-t profits, ΠL,lt , are given by:
ΠL,lt =
[
uL,lt r
k,L
t −a
(
uL,lt
)]
K¯L,lt Pt +(1−δ )Qk¯′,tK¯L,lt
−Qk¯′,tK¯L,lt+1−Rcoupont
(
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
L,l
t −NL,lt
)
,
where rk,Lt denotes the real rental rate, Pt the price of the final good and δ the depreciation
rate.
In period t the entrepreneur chooses the capital utilization rate and the desired capital to use
in period t+1 so as to maximizeΠL,lt , taking as given the coupon rate to be paid on the bonds
issued. The first order conditions with respect to uL,lt and K¯
L,l
t+1 are, respectively:
rk,Lt = a
′ (
uL,lt
)
(1.3)
Qk¯′,t = βEt
{[
uL,lt+1r
k,L
t+1−a
(
uL,lt+1
)]
Pt+1+(1−δ )Qk¯′,t+1−Rcoupont+1 Qk¯′,t
}
. (1.4)
Equation (1.3) states that the rental rate on capital services equals the marginal cost of pro-
viding those services. As the rental rate increases it becomes more profitable to use capital
more intensively up to the point where the extra profits match the extra utilization costs. The
capital Euler equation (1.4) equates the value of a unit of installed capital at time t to the
expected discounted return of that extra unit of capital in period t+1.
The entrepreneur’s equity at the end of period t, V L,lt , is given by
V L,lt =
{[
uL,lt r
k,L
t −a
(
uL,lt
)]
Pt +(1−δ )Qk¯′,t
}
K¯L,lt −
(
1+Rcoupont
)(
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
L,l
t −NL,lt
)
.
The first term represents the rental income of capital, net of utilization costs, and the pro-
ceeds from selling undepreciated capital to capital producers. The second term represents the
payment (coupon and principal) of the bonds issued in period t−1.
To avoid a situation in which the entrepreneur accumulates enough net worth to become self-
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financed, we assume that there is a constant probability of death. Namely, in each period the
entrepreneur exits the economy with probability 1−γL. In that case, the entrepreneur rebates
his equity to households in a lump-sum way:
trans f er to households =
(
1− γL)V L,lt .
To keep the entrepreneurs’ population constant, a new entrepreneur is born with probability
1− γL.
The total entrepreneur’s net worth NL,lt+1 combines total equity and a transfer, W
e,L,l
t , received
from households, which corresponds to the initial net worth necessary for the entrepreneur’s
activity to start. The law of motion for the entrepreneur’s net worth is:
NL,lt+1 = γ
LV L,lt +W
e,L,l
t .
Financing cost minimization problem and funds demand curve
We assume that each investment bank z has some market power in conducting its intermedia-
tion services. An entrepreneur seeking an amount of borrowing for period t+1 equal to BIL,lt+1,
defined by (1.2), would therefore allocate his borrowing among different investment banks,
BIL,lt+1 (z), so as to minimize the total repayment due. At the end of period t, the entrepreneur
chooses how much to borrow from bank z by solving the following problem:
min
BIL,lt+1(z)
ˆ 1
0
[
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)
]
BIL,lt+1 (z)dz
subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
BIL,lt+1 =

ˆ 1
0
[
BIL,lt+1 (z)
] εcoupont+1 −1
εcoupont+1 dz

εcoupont+1
εcoupont+1 −1
,
where Rcoupont+1 (z) is the interest rate charged by the z-th bank and ε
coupon
t+1 > 1 is the time-
varying interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds. The first order condition yields the
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following entrepreneur’s demand for funds:
BIL,lt+1 (z) =
(
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)
1+Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1
BIL,lt+1 ,
where Rcoupont+1 is the nominal average coupon rate prevailing in the market at time t + 1,
defined as:
1+Rcoupont+1 =
{ˆ 1
0
[
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)
]1−εcoupont+1 dz} 11−εcoupont+1 .
As expected, the funds demand curve has a negative slope: when the interest rate that the
z-th bank sets increases relatively to the average rate, the entrepreneur decides to borrow less
funds from that bank.
1.4.2.2 Investment banks
The investment banking sector comprises a continuum of monopolistic competitive invest-
ment banks, indexed by z ∈ [0,1] , owned by households. To keep the analysis as simple as
possible, we follow the recent DSGE banking literature and assume perfect competition in
the market for households’ deposits in these banks.15 We also rule out the entry and exit of
investment banks. The investment bank therefore maximizes its profits, taking as given the
return to pay to the households. The appendix A shows that the required return on bonds by
households is equal to the risk-free rate, i.e. the central bank nominal interest rate Ret (see
equations A.10 and A.11).
At the end of period t, the z-th investment bank thus solves the following profit maximization
problem:
max
Rcoupont+1 (z)
ΠIBt+1 (z) =
{[
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)
]
BIL,lt+1 (z)−
[
1+Ret+1
]
BIL,lt+1 (z)
}
(1.5)
sub ject to BIL,lt+1 (z) =
(
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)
1+Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1
BIL,lt+1 .
15 See, for instance, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2007), Andrés and Arce (2009), Kobayashi (2008) and Teran-
ishi (2008).
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The first order condition is(
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)
1+Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1
−
εcoupont+1
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)−
(
1+Ret+1
)
1+Rcoupont+1
(
1+Rcoupont+1 (z)
1+Rcoupont+1
)−εcoupont+1 −1
= 0 .
Imposing a symmetric equilibrium and rearranging yields
1+Rcoupont+1 =
εcoupont+1
εcoupont+1 −1
(
1+Ret+1
)
, (1.6)
that is, the coupon rate is set as a markup,
εcoupont+1
εcoupont+1 −1
, over the policy interest rate. The profits
of the investment banking sector in period t+1 are given by
ΠIBt+1 =
(
Rcoupont+1 −Ret+1
)
(1−η)BIL,lt+1 , (1.7)
and are rebated to households.
Assuming that the interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds is constant, εcoupont+1 =
εcoupon,a, the coupon rate becomes a constant markup applied to the required return by house-
holds:
1+Rcoupon,at+1 =
εcoupon,a
εcoupon,a−1
(
1+Ret+1
)
. (1.8)
In what follows, we consider Rcoupon,at+1 as the “normal” interest rate on bonds.
1.4.2.3 Optimism and perverse incentives in the shadow banking sector
In this subsection we extend the model presented in the previous subsection in two respects.
First, we introduce optimism among underwriters in the investment banking sector by con-
sidering that an optimistic underwriter is willing to underwrite bonds at a lower – than the
normal – coupon interest rate. Second, we introduce perverse incentives by assuming that the
representative safer entrepreneur offers side payments to the underwriter in order to borrow
at a more favorable interest rate. In exchange of those side payments, an optimistic under-
writer may de facto facilitate the extension of credit by setting a “discounted” – relatively to
its normal value – bond coupon rate.
We do so by endogenizing the choice of the interest rate elasticity underlying the demand for
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funds, εcoupont+1 . Note, from (1.6), that an increase in the interest rate elasticity leads to, ceteris
paribus, a lower coupon rate. This relation between the elasticity and the coupon rate allows
us to separate and solve the investment bank’s profit maximization problem in two steps.
First, the underwriter chooses the interest rate elasticity according to his preferences. Second,
he solves the maximization problem (1.5), which leads to equation (1.6). In practice, after
determining εcoupont+1 , the underwriter has implicitly determined the coupon rate that solves
the investment bank’s profit maximization problem (1.5).
Optimism
First, we assume that the underwriter becomes optimistic if the entrepreneur pledges a higher
value as collateral. We thus model underwriter’s optimism, χt , as a positive function of the
entrepreneur’s net worth. To take into account the fact that human beliefs are highly corre-
lated and persistent (Carlson, 2007), we furthermore model optimism as an AR(1) process
with high persistence. Accordingly, the law of motion for optimism is given by
χt = ρχχt−1+
(
1−ρχ
)[
χ¯+α3
(
NL,lt+1−NL,l
)]
, (1.9)
where χ¯ , χ¯ = 0, is the steady state level of optimism, ρχ captures the degree of persistence
in optimism and α3 > 0 the sensitivity of optimism with respect to the deviation of the en-
trepreneur’s net worth from its steady state value (NL,l).
Second, we assume that the interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds is computed as
follows:
εcoupon,biasedt+1 = ε
coupon,a (1+χt) , (1.10)
which means that positive deviations of optimism from its steady state level increase the
interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds, relatively to its normal value of εcoupon,a. The
biased elasticity results in a lower coupon rate, which may be seen substituting (1.10) into
(1.6), yielding the following expression
1+Rcoupon,biasedt+1 =
εcoupon,biasedt+1
εcoupon,biasedt+1 −1
(
1+Ret+1
)
, (1.11)
where Rcoupon,biasedt+1 is the biased coupon rate that an optimistic underwriter would set on the
bonds issued. Comparing (1.11) and (1.8), it is clear that the optimistic underwriter would
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underwrite bonds at a lower than the normal interest rate.
The coupon rate set by the underwriter (Rcoupont+1 in 1.6) thus varies from a maximum of
Rcoupon,at+1 (corresponding to ε
coupon,a
t+1 ) to a minimum of R
coupon,biased
t+1 (corresponding to
εcoupon,biasedt+1 ). In between these extremes, the value of the coupon rate chosen corresponds
to a specific value of εcoupont+1 . In the next subsection we thus describe how such interest rate
elasticity and, as a consequence, the bond coupon rate, are determined.
Perverse incentives and the optimal choice of the coupon rate
Suppose that the entrepreneur offers side payments to the underwriter in order to borrow at a
more favorable coupon rate, i.e. at an interest rate lower than the normal rate Rcoupon,at+1 defined
by (1.8). Suppose also that households are not aware of this possibility. We assume that the
amount of side payments paid to the underwriter at the end of period t+1 is given by
side paymentst+1 =Ω
(
Rcoupon,at+1 −Rcoupont+1
)
V L,lt+1 , (1.12)
that is, side payments represent a fixed share, Ω, of the entrepreneurial equity and are propor-
tional to the difference between Rcoupon,at+1 and R
coupon
t+1 . In principle, the underwriter should
ignore these side payments and protect stockholders’ interests, that is, the underwriter should
maximize the bank’s profits setting Rcoupont+1 =R
coupon,a
t+1 . In that case, as equation (1.12) shows,
he would not receive any side payments. However, the underwriter may alternatively choose
to underwrite a bond at a lower rate (Rcoupont+1 < R
coupon,a
t+1 ) benefitting from those side pay-
ments. Clearly, side payments lead to an agency conflict within the investment bank, between
its stockholders (i.e., households) and its staff (i.e., the underwriters). Note that the lower the
Rcoupont+1 (compared to R
coupon,a
t+1 ), the higher will be the side payments that the underwriter
receives and the lower will be the stockholders’ return for a given level of BIL,lt+1 (as given by
equation 1.7).16
16 If there are side payments, before knowing whether exiting the economy, the entrepreneur transfers a share
Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont
)
of his equity to the underwriter as side payments. After that, with probability 1− γL the
entrepreneur exits the economy and rebates his equity to households in a lump-sum way:
trans f er to households =
(
1− γL)[1−Ω(Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )]V L,lt .
Entrepreneurial net worth is thus given by
NL,lt+1 = γ
L [1−Ω(Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )]V L,lt +W e,L,lt .
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The top part of figure 1.2 sketches the trade-off faced by the underwriter – maximization of
his own benefit versus maximization of stockholders’ profits. To endogenize the choice of
εcoupont+1 , we model this trade-off considering the following quadratic utility function for the
underwriter:
u
(
εcoupont+1
)
=−r2
(
εcoupon,biasedt+1 − εcoupont+1
)2− (1− r2)(εcoupont+1 − εcoupon,a)2 , 0≤ r2 ≤ 1 .
(1.13)
The first part mirrors the underwriter’s private objective to maximize the amount of side
payments received. Recall that, from equation (1.12), side payments are maximized when
Rcoupont+1 is as low as possible, that is, when R
coupon
t+1 = R
coupon,biased
t+1 . This happens when
εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,biased
t+1 . Parameter r2 represents the importance the underwriter attaches to
his private objective. The second part displays the underwriter’s objective to maximize stock-
holders’ profits by setting an εcoupont+1 that is as close as possible to ε
coupon,a. This objective
enters the underwriter’s utility function with a weight of (1− r2).
Figure 1.2: The underwriter’s trade-off
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The underwriter chooses εcoupont+1 so as to maximize (1.13). The first order condition is:
2r2
(
εcoupon,biasedt+1 − εcoupont+1
)
−2(1− r2)
(
εcoupont+1 − εcoupon,a
)
= 0 .
Using (1.10) and rearranging, the first order condition then becomes
εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,a (1+ r2χt) . (1.14)
Substituting (1.14) into (1.6) yields the following expression for the coupon interest rate
1+Rcoupont+1 =
εcoupon,a (1+ r2χt)
εcoupon,a (1+ r2χt)−1
(
1+Ret+1
)
. (1.15)
The coupon rate is therefore a time-varying markup, ε
coupon,a(1+r2χt)
εcoupon,a(1+r2χt)−1 , over the policy rate and
is influenced both by the level of optimism and by the weight that the underwriter attaches
to his private benefit. As a result, the optimistic underwriter may de facto set a coupon
rate for the issued bonds that is lower than the rate that maximizes the bank’s profits in the
context of no optimism and no side payments. Note, in particular, that it is the combination
of underwriter’s optimism and his willingness to receive side payments (χt > 0 and r2 > 0)
that leads to a discounted coupon rate.
The bottom part of figure 1.2 shows that the exact value of the coupon rate that is chosen –
corresponding to a unique value of εcoupon – depends upon the value of r2 and the degree of
optimism.
1.5 The response to monetary policy shocks
Having presented the model, we now analyze its dynamics. We first describe the calibration
of the model and then present the impulse responses to two types of monetary policy shocks.
The central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate, Ret , following a Taylor-type interest
rate rule. Specifically, the monetary policy rule allows for interest rate smoothing and interest
rate responses to deviations of expected inflation (Etpit+1) and current output (Yt) from their
steady states:
Ret =
(
Ret−1
)ρ˜ [Re(Etpit+1
p¯i
)αpi (Yt
Y¯
)αy](1−ρ˜)
εMPt , (1.16)
where Re, p¯i and Y¯ are the steady state values of Ret , pit and Yt , respectively, αpi and αy are
19
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN A DSGE MODEL WITH A SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
the weights assigned to expected inflation and output, ρ˜ captures interest rate smoothing and
εMPt is a white noise monetary policy shock.
We first solve numerically the model, for the steady state, using the computational procedure
described in appendix C. We then compute the first-order Taylor series approximation to the
equilibrium conditions in the neighborhood of the steady state.17
We compare the responses to monetary impulses under three different variants of the above-
described model:
• variant 1: the simplified version of the Financial Accelerator Model of CMR, which
corresponds to setting the share of riskier entrepreneurs η equal to 1;
• variant 2: our model including the shadow banking system but excluding optimism and
side payments, which is obtained setting r2 = 0;
• variant 3: our model including optimism and side payments in the shadow banking
system, assuming r2 = 1, i.e. the version in which the underwriter only cares about his
own benefit and maximizes the amount of side payments received.
Recall from subsection 1.4.1 that the transmission mechanism in variant 1 is affected by
two general equilibrium mechanisms. The first one is the Bernanke et al. (1999) “financial
accelerator” effect, whereby induced changes in asset prices alter the value of the collateral
that the entrepreneur can pledge and, hence, the contractual loan rate. The second mechanism
is a CMR-type “Fisher deflation” effect, whereby unexpected movements in the price level
alter the ex-post real burden of entrepreneurial debt and, hence, the entrepreneur’s net worth.
To these two channels, variant 2 adds a new set of monopolistic investment banks. The mo-
nopolistic power in setting bond interest rates affects the credit supply conditions of a set of
entrepreneurs through the introduction of a constant interest rate spread. Hence, this variant
allows us to analyze whether the interest-rate-setting by banks interacts with the aforemen-
tioned channels and to what extent it does modify the monetary transmission mechanism.18
17 All simulations in this chapter have been conducted with Dynare.
18 We should note that, as far as we know, at most two out of these three effects – “financial accelerator”,
“Fisher deflation” and “monopolistic banking competition” – have been analyzed within a single model. As
regards studies that address only one of the effects, when compared to standard models with frictionless financial
markets, CMR show that the “financial accelerator” effect, as well as the “Fisher deflation” effect, amplify and
propagate the transmission of monetary policy shocks, while Andrés and Arce (2009) find that monopolistic
competition in the banking sector dampens the macroeconomic transmission of policy shocks. As regards
studies that combine two of these effects, Iacoviello (2005) and CMR show that the “accelerator” and the
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Finally, variant 3 adds optimism and perverse incentives to the “monopolistic banking com-
petition” effect. In this variant, the underwriter diverts a fraction of stockholders’ profits for
his own benefit and extends credit at a lower interest rate. In this framework, the behavior
of the underwriter influences the credit supply conditions of a set of borrowers, which in
turn influences the real economy through a countercyclical time-varying interest rate spread.
This variant allows us to study the importance of the bank manager’s behavior in shaping the
monetary transmission mechanism, which has been virtually ignored in the literature so far.
We conduct two policy experiments. The first experiment is a one-period expansionary mon-
etary policy shock. It allows us to assess whether (and how) the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy is affected by the presence of a shadow banking system using as a benchmark
the impulse responses of a workhorse DSGE model (variant 1).
In the second experiment, we create a “persistently low interest rate” scenario by forcing the
nominal interest rate to be 25 basis points lower than its steady state value during 8 quarters.
This experiment allows for a) determining if an extended period of loose monetary policy
generates per se a boom-bust cycle and b) analyzing whether the interaction between long
periods of accommodative monetary policy and perverse incentives in the financial sector
causes and/or amplifies fluctuations in real and financial activity.
The next subsection briefly describes the calibration, before turning to the analysis of the
impulse response functions in subsections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3.
1.5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy, assuming that a period is a quarter. The values
are chosen so that the model’s steady state reproduces some key features in the U.S. data. In
this subsection we only describe the calibration of the parameters related with the shadow
banking system. The values of the remaining parameters are calibrated within the range
usually considered in the New Keynesian literature.19 Table 1.1 reports the values of the
“Fisher” effect reinforce each other in what concerns the response of the economy to monetary policy shocks,
whereas Mandelman (2010) finds that the assumption of an imperfectly competitive banking system in the
Bernanke et al. (1999) framework magnifies the propagation and amplification of policy shocks to the economy.
19 The values of the parameters related with the riskier entrepreneurial sector are primarily chosen to match
the cost of external finance, i.e., the contractual, no-default interest rate on entrepreneurial debt (Zt resulting
from A.7). Setting the fraction of realized payoffs lost in bankruptcy, µ , to 0.15 and the standard deviation of
the entrepreneur idiosyncratic productivity shock, σ , to 0.55 yields Z = 6.8%/year, which is close to observed
data. This in turn also guarantees that, in equilibrium, bond financing is cheaper than bank financing (safer
entrepreneurs finance themselves at a more favorable interest rate). To match the observed leverage ratio, we
21
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN A DSGE MODEL WITH A SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
calibrated parameters, and tables 1.2 and 1.3 report the steady state implications of the model
and their empirical counterparts.
To match the return on time deposits (which is also equal to the steady state central bank
nominal interest rate), we set the discount factor β to 0.9875. Equation (1.6) shows that the
steady state spread between the coupon rate and the risk-free rate (the yield spread) depends
on the interest rate elasticity εcoupon. Chen et al. (2007) report an average annual yield spread
of AAA bonds of 84 basis points. Accordingly, we set εcoupon to 510 so that the annual yield
spread is around 80 basis points. As a result, the coupon rate paid by safer entrepreneurs is
5.9%/year.
To match the observed average leverage ratio, we set the survival probability of safer en-
trepreneurs γL to 0.96. In the law of motion for optimism (1.9), we set the persistence param-
eter ρχ to 0.9 and the sensitivity to entrepreneur’s net worth α3 to 40.20
The parameter Ω (the fraction of equity that the entrepreneur is willing to pay as side pay-
ments) is chosen so as to guarantee that the entrepreneur is always better off when he pays
side payments. In principle, the safer entrepreneur may choose between two options. He
can either pay the coupon rate Rcoupon,at+1 given by equation 1.8 or he can offer side payments
and obtain a lower coupon rate (Rcoupont+1 given by equation 1.15). This choice depends on
the value of Ω. Given our baseline calibration, in appendix D we show that, in the steady
state, the entrepreneur is better off whenever Ω is smaller than a threshold level Ω¯ = 0.25.
Accordingly, we set Ω to 0.1, thus assuming that the entrepreneur gives away 10% of his
equity as side payments to obtain a lower coupon rate.
Finally, we calibrate the parameter η (the share of riskier entrepreneurs in the economy) by
replicating the ratio of bond finance to bank finance in the U.S. economy which, according to
De Fiore and Uhlig (2005), is equal to 1.34. We closely match this ratio by setting η to 0.3.
As tables 1.2 and 1.3 show, the model is successful in reproducing most of the salient features
of the U.S. economy: key macroeconomic and leverage ratios, interest rates and, importantly,
its financial market structure.
set the survival rate γH to 0.97.
20 This calibration guarantees that εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,a (1+ r2χt)> 1 ∀t.
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1.5.2 The economy’s response to an unanticipated one-period expan-
sionary monetary policy shock
In this subsection we study the transmission of a monetary policy shock by analyzing the
impulse responses to a one-period innovation in the short-term nominal interest rate (εMPt in
1.16), corresponding to a 25 basis points reduction of the annualized nominal interest rate.
Figures 1.3-1.5 illustrate the impulse responses of the key variables under the three variants
of the model (variant 1: blue solid line; variant 2: red crossed line; and variant 3: black
circled line).
In all figures presented, variables are expressed in percent deviation from their steady state
values, except for inflation, that is expressed as annualized percent deviation from its steady
state, and interest rates, that are expressed in percentage points at annual rate. The horizontal
axis represents time on a quarterly scale.
The responses of aggregate variables in variant 1 are qualitatively standard. After the initial
drop, the nominal interest rate gradually returns to its steady state value. Aggregate quantities
– output, consumption and investment – as well as inflation display a hump-shaped response
and peak after about three to six quarters. The price of capital shows maximum upward
reactions at impact before returning to its steady state. The effects on aggregate variables are
long-lived despite the fact that the effects on the nominal interest rate only last for roughly
two years.
Overall, the response of lending activity is weak at the aggregate level: although entrepreneurs
accumulate more capital (stock o f capital ↑), the sharp increase in the aggregate net worth
(N ↑) leads to a decrease of total credit (qK¯−N) below its steady state level.
While in most cases the responses in variant 2 are pretty similar to those in variant 1, it
is notable that the impact of the monetary policy shock is somewhat dampened under this
variant. We find, in line with other studies, that the introduction of market power in banking
results in smoother effects. A striking difference is evident, however, when we compare the
responses in variant 3 with those in the other two variants of the model. First, the business
cycle is amplified – in particular, the peak in investment is two times greater than under
variant 2. Second, at its height, the response of investment is roughly twice as big, in percent
terms, as the response of output (while it is nearly the same in the other variants). Finally, and
in contrast with the other two variants of the model, total credit increases: the rise in aggregate
entrepreneurial capital purchases more than compensates the more pronounced (compared to
the other variants) increase in the aggregate net worth, so that the net effect is an increase
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of total credit above its steady state value. This can be explained by analyzing each type of
entrepreneur separately.
Therefore, turning to the variables specific to the entrepreneurial sector, we conclude that
under the three variants of the model the riskier entrepreneur’s net worth increases in response
to the shock because of both the “accelerator” and the “Fisher” effects. The rise in the price of
capital leads to a boost in the value of the assets of the entrepreneur, which in turn reduces the
probability of bankruptcy (ω¯ ↓). Moreover, because of the drop in entrepreneur’s leverage,
retail bank charges a lower interest rate on loans (Z ↓). This reflects the fact that the cost of
external financing depends on the borrower’s leverage: as predicted by equation (1.1), all else
equal, the lower the leverage, the lower the external finance premium, hence the lower the
interest rate on loans. This “accelerator” effect is then reinforced by the “Fisher” effect: the
ex-post value of existing entrepreneurial debt decreases as inflation rises. As a consequence,
the entrepreneur’s net worth increases further.
In both variants 2 and 3, the monetary policy shock leads to a lower coupon rate paid by the
safer entrepreneur. Under variant 2 the coupon rate is set as a constant markup over the policy
rate (recall equation 1.8), therefore Rcoupon follows the nominal interest rate path. In variant
3, however, the coupon rate also depends on the underwriter’s behavior (equation 1.15). In
particular, the rise in the price of capital increases the value of the collateral held by the
entrepreneur (net worth ↑), which in turn triggers optimism (equation 1.9). The underwriter’s
optimism, combined with his willingness to receive side payments (r2 = 1), leads to a drop
in the bond coupon rate larger than that in variant 2. As figure 1.5 shows, Rcoupon |variant 3 is
smaller than Rcoupon |variant 2 for about 20 quarters, that is, the underwriter persistently extends
credit at a lower interest rate in exchange of side payments.
Thus, in both variants 2 and 3, the monetary policy shock leads to a lower borrowing cost
for both types of entrepreneurs – both Z and Rcoupon decrease. However, note that the under-
writer’s behavior and preferences influence the spread between the cost of financing for the
riskier entrepreneur and the coupon rate on bonds for the safer entrepreneur (Z−Rcoupon, in
figure 1.5). This spread in turn strongly influences the allocation of funds between safer and
riskier entrepreneurs and, consequently, total capital and total credit dynamics.
In fact, in variant 2 the drop in Z is larger than the drop in Rcoupon (Z−Rcoupon ↓). That is,
financing in the loan market becomes relatively cheaper than funding in the bond market.
As a result, there is an increase in the amount of borrowing from retail banks (loans ↑) and
a reduction in the flow of funds to the safer entrepreneur (bond amount ↓). Differently, in
variant 3, Z−Rcoupon increases, i.e. given the marked reduction in the coupon rate due to
24
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN A DSGE MODEL WITH A SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
optimistic behavior, bond financing becomes relatively cheaper than bank financing, leading
safer entrepreneurs to invest more (bond amount ↑), while the amount of borrowing from
retail banks drops (loans ↓). Riskier entrepreneur thus prefer to use capital more intensively
(when compared with variant 2). Overall, the increase in capital stock is higher than under
variant 2 since the increase in bonds issued more than offsets the decrease of loan amount.
These findings suggest that financial market frictions alone – in the form of monopolistic
competition in banking system – do not change significantly the model’s dynamics, whereas
the behavior of the financial intermediary – driven by optimism and perverse incentives –
does play a role in the transmission of the monetary policy shock: the effects of monetary
policy on real and financial activity are in fact amplified in the variant of the model in which
the financial intermediary plays a more active role.
1.5.3 The economy’s response in a “persistently low interest rate” sce-
nario
At the macroeconomic level, it has been recognized that accommodative monetary policies
have historically been a key factor in driving boom-bust cycles of all types.21 Although the
low level of the federal funds rate in the early 2000s is generally considered to have helped
fuel the housing bubble that burst in 2007, it is still an open debate whether lax monetary
policies played a key role in generating the boom-bust cycle.22
In addition to and interacting with the low interest rate environment prevailing at the begin-
ning of the 2000s, microeconomic factors related to recent innovations in the financial market
structure and products may have also contributed to the subprime crisis. Even though the in-
teraction between microeconomic distortions in the financial sector and a persistently loose
monetary policy environment seems to have been relevant in generating and/or amplifying
the boom-bust cycle, the relative importance of each of these factors is still open to debate.
Our model is well-suited to analyze the interaction between long periods of accommodative
monetary policy and financial market distortions, as well as to disentangle their relative im-
portance. To do so, in this subsection we create a “persistently low interest rate” scenario
and analyze the model’s dynamics. We reproduce such a scenario by combining the right
21 See, for instance, Bordo (2008) and Calomiris (2008).
22 The Fed funds rate was gradually reduced from around 6.50% in November 2000 to around 1.75% in
December 2001 and was kept at that level until December 2002. Then, after two policy interventions (November
2002 and June 2003), it was reduced and kept to 1% until June 2004.
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sequence of monetary policy innovations (εMPt in equation 1.16) in order to hold the nom-
inal interest rate 25 basis points lower than its steady state value during 8 quarters. There
are thus eight consecutive monetary policy shocks, each coming as a surprise to the agents.
The overall impulse responses are then obtained by summing up the responses to each of the
successive monetary policy shocks.
Figures 1.6-1.8 display the impulse responses of several variables under the three variants of
the model. By construction, the nominal interest rate deviates from its steady-state value by
25 basis points during 8 quarters. Then, from period 9 onwards, its dynamics is governed by
the Taylor rule with response to deviations of expected inflation and current output from their
respective steady states. In period 8, inflation and output are well above their steady state
values. Hence, starting from period 9, the nominal interest rate rises and gradually reverts to
its steady state value.
The dynamic responses of aggregate variables are qualitatively similar across the three vari-
ants of the model. Output, investment, consumption, inflation and the price of capital rise
until period 8. The subsequent monetary tightening leads to a contraction of output, con-
sumption and investment and a rapid decline in the price of capital.
Nevertheless, variant 3 exhibits responses that are quantitatively different. The effects of
monetary policy shocks on the real economy are considerably amplified – the peak in output
is about 35% higher and the response in investment is about twice as large as that in the
other variants of the model. The effects on financial variables are magnified as well. The
percentage increase in the price of capital, at its peak, is roughly the double of the increase
that occurs in the other variants. Moreover, after the initial jump, the price of capital rises
60% during the boom phase, which is more than four (eleven) times the increase in variant
1 (2) during the same period. Note also that the pattern of the price of capital mimics the
typical shape of an asset price bubble: the large and rapid asset price increase is followed by
a burst and then a collapse.
The most striking difference which, of course, underlies the dynamics of the other aggregate
variables, is that, whereas lending activity is weak at the aggregate level under variants 1 and
2, the persistent monetary easing leads to a lending boom in variant 3 that lasts well after the
roughly 4 years it takes for the effects on the nominal interest rate to die away. Looking at
the entrepreneurial variables, it is evident that the boom in total credit is driven by the safer
entrepreneur’s demand for funds (bond amount ↑).
Figure 1.8 allows us to trace the monetary transmission mechanism in variant 3. The rise
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in the price of capital leads to a boost in the safer entrepreneur’s net worth, which in turn
triggers an optimistic sentiment by the underwriter. This optimism, when combined with
the underwriter’s willingness to receive side payments – as well as with the increase in the
amount of these payments induced by the increase in the entrepeneur’s net worth (equation
1.12) – leads the underwriter to set a significantly lower coupon rate on the bonds issued. In
particular, the discount relative to the “normal” rate occurs on impact and continues further
during the period of persistently low interest rate, as Rcoupon is well below the normal coupon
rate Rcoupon,a and further declines as time goes on. The protracted opportunity for the safer
entrepreneur to have access to an abnormally cheap source of funds – both in absolute terms
(Rcoupon ↓) and relatively to the cost of borrowing in the loan market (Z−Rcoupon ↑) – leads
him to accumulate capital aggressively. As a result, the safer entrepreneur’s demand for
capital rises, pushing up aggregate demand and causing a boom in the price of capital. The
rise in safer entrepreneur’s capital purchases more than compensates the increase in his net
worth, so that the net effect is an increase of bond issued much above its steady state value.
Finally, in general equilibrium, relatively higher borrowing cost for the riskier entrepreneur
(when compared to bond coupon rate) induces him to cut capital expenditures and to use his
capital more intensively.
Overall, these findings indicate that a persistently loose monetary policy does not cause per
se a boom-bust cycle. In fact, neither in the CMR model, nor in its augmented version with
monopolistic banking competition, a “too low for too long” interest rate policy generates a
boom-bust cycle. However, monetary policy does create the preconditions for a boom-bust:
optimism and perverse incentives in the financial sector, when coupled with a persistently low
interest rate environment, result in greatly amplified fluctuations in both real and financial
variables.23
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed whether long periods of loose monetary policy play a key role
in generating a boom-bust cycle, as well as the role of perverse incentives in the financial
23 We have checked the sensitivity of our results to changes in the values of parameters η and Ω. We have
considered three different values of η , namely 0.368, 0.45 and 0.81, which imply a bond to bank finance
ratio of, respectively, 1, 0.7 and 0.13 (the latter value reproduces the financial market structure of the Euro
Area). Although the qualitative responses are quite similar to those of the baseline calibration, quantitatively
the effects on both real and financial variables become dampened as bank financing becomes more important.
Finally, changing the value of parameter Ω does not affect the overall dynamics of the model, as long as Ω< Ω¯.
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sector in causing and/or amplifying fluctuations in real and financial activity during periods
of accommodative monetary policy.
Starting from a model that nests most contemporary DSGE monetary models, we have intro-
duced a microfounded bond market comprised of a monopolistically competitive investment
banking sector. The underwriter within the investment bank, who sets the coupon rate on the
bonds issued either as a constant markup over the nominal interest rate, or at a discounted
rate due to the likelihood of receiving side payments, is the pivotal agent in our model.
We have first analyzed the responses to a one-period expansionary monetary policy shock.
The results show that financial market frictions alone – in the form of monopolistic com-
petition in the banking sector – do not change significantly the model’s dynamics (when
compared with a workhorse DSGE model). Yet, the effects of monetary policy on economic
activity are amplified in the model in which the underwriter facilitates the extension of credit
when optimism and perverse incentives are taken into account.
We have then simulated a “persistently low interest rate” scenario by keeping the central
bank nominal interest rate 25 basis points below its steady state value for 8 quarters. Our
main result is that a “too low for too long” interest rate policy does create the preconditions
for, but does not cause per se, a boom-bust cycle. In fact, fluctuations in both real and
financial variables are markedly amplified only when optimism and perverse incentives in
the financial sector are coupled with such a persistently accommodative monetary policy
environment. These findings suggest that, to reduce the odds of future booms, busts and asset
price bubbles, policymakers should focus on tuning the financial architecture and reinforcing
the financial supervision to restrain optimistic behaviors and perverse incentives. In doing so,
policymakers will protect the financial system and the economy as a whole from the negative
and often disruptive effects associated with economic booms and busts.
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Appendix A - The complete model
Final-good firms
Perfectly competitive firms produce the final good that is converted into household consump-
tion goods, investment goods, government goods, goods used up in capital utilization and in
bank monitoring as well as for underwriter consumption goods.
The representative firm produces the final good Yt , using the intermediate goods Yi,t , and the
production technology
Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λ f
i,t di
]λ f
,
where λ f , ∞> λ f ≥ 1, is the markup for the intermediate-good firms. The representative firm
chooses Yi,t to maximize its profits, taking the output price, Pt , and the input prices, Pi,t , as
given. The maximization problem of the representative firm is thus given by:
max
Yi,t
PtYt−
ˆ 1
0
Pi,tYi,tdi
sub ject to Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λ f
i,t di
]λ f
.
Solving the profit maximization problem yields the following demand function for the inter-
mediate good i
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
) λ f
1−λ f
Yt .
Perfect competition in the final goods market implies that he price of the final good can be
written as:
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
P
1
1−λ f
i,t di
]1−λ f
. (A.1)
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Intermediate-good firms
Monopolistic competitive firms, indexed by i ∈ [0,1], produce differentiated intermediate
goods using the following production function:
Yi,t = (Ki,t)
α (Li,t)
1−α , (A.2)
where 0 < α < 1 and Ki,t and Li,t denote, respectively, the capital and labor input for the
production of good i.
The capital input is assumed to be a composite of two entrepreneur-specific bundles of capital
services, KHi,t and K
L
i,t which in turn combine the capital services of the individual members
of the two entrepreneur sectors, KH,ri,t and K
L,l
i,t . Formally,
Ki,t =
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+(1−η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ , (A.3)
where ρ denotes the degree of substitutability between the two entrepreneur-specific bundles
of capital services and, since all entrepreneurs are identical within each group, KHi,t = ηK
H,r
i,t
and KLi,t = (1−η)KL,li,t .
The i-th firm hires labor and rents capital in competitive markets by minimizing its production
costs, taking as given the nominal wage rate, Wt , and the real rental rates of capital, r
k,H
t and
rk,Lt . The firm i’s optimal demand for capital and labor services must thus solve the following
cost minimization problem:
min
{Li,t ,KHi,t ,KLi,t}
C (·) = WtLi,t
Pt
+KHi,t r
k,H
t +K
L
i,tr
k,L
t (A.4)
subject to (A.2) and (A.3).
Since all firms i face the same input prices and since they all have access to the same produc-
tion technology, real marginal costs st are identical across firms and are given by
st =
[
w˜t
1−α
]1− αρ+α(1−ρ) [ α
rk,Ht
(
KH,rt
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+α (1−ρ) ,
where w˜t denotes the real wage.
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Price setting
Prices are determined through a variant of the Calvo’s (1983) mechanism. In particular, every
firm faces a constant probability, 1−ξp, of reoptimizing its price in any given period, whereas
the non-reoptimizing firms set their prices according to the indexation rule
Pi,t = Pi,t−1 (p¯i)ι1 (pit−1)1−ι1 ,
where p¯i represents the steady state inflation rate, pit−1 = Pt−1/Pt−2 is the inflation rate from
t− 2 to t− 1 and the parameter ι1, 0 ≤ ι1 ≤ 1, represents the degree of price indexation to
steady state inflation. The i-th firm that optimizes its price at time t chooses Pi,t = P˜i,t that
maximizes the present value of future expected nominal profits:
max
Pi,t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξp)τ λt+τ [(Pi,t+τ −St+τ)Yi,t+τ ]
sub ject to Yi,t+τ =
(
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
) λ f
1−λ f
Yt+τ ,
where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able at time t, λt+τ the multiplier in the households’ budget constraint, St+τ the firm’s nominal
marginal cost and β ∈ (0 , 1) the discount factor. At the end of each time period, profits are
rebated to households.
We consider only the symmetric equilibrium at which all firms choose the same P˜t = P˜i,t .
Thus, from (A.1), the law of motion for the aggregate price index is
Pt =
{
(1−ξp) P˜
1
1−λ f
t +ξp
[
Pt−1 (p¯i)ι1 (pit−1)1−ι1
] 1
1−λ f
}1−λ f
.
Capital producers
A continuum of competitive capital producers produce the aggregate stock of capital K¯t . New
capital produced in period t can be used in productive activities in period t+1. At the end of
period t, capital producers purchase existing capital, xK,t , from entrepreneurs and investment
goods in the final good market, It , and combine them to produce new capital, x
′
K,t , using the
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following technology:
x
′
K,t = xK,t +A(It , It−1) .
Old capital can be converted one-to-one into new capital, while the transformation of the
investment good is subject to quadratic adjustment costs. The function A(·) summarizes the
technology that transforms current and past investment into installed capital.
Investment goods are purchased in the final good market at price Pt . Let Qk¯′,t be the nominal
price of new capital. Since the marginal rate of transformation between new and old capital
is unity, the price of old capital is also Qk¯′,t . The representative capital producer’s period-t
profit maximization problem is thus given by
max
{It+τ ,xK,t+τ}
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
β τλt+τ
{
Qk¯′,t+τ [xK,t+τ +A(It+τ , It+τ−1)]
−Qk¯′,t+τxK,t+τ −Pt+τ It+τ
}
. (A.5)
Let δ denote the depreciation rate and note that, from (A.5), any value of xK,t+τ is profit max-
imizing. Thus considering xK,t+τ = (1−δ ) K¯t+τ is consistent with both profit maximization
and market clearing.
The first order condition with respect to It is:
Et
[
λt
(
Qk¯′,tA1,t−Pt
)
+βλt+1Qk¯′,t+1A2,t+1
]
= 0 ,
where
A1,t =
∂A(It , It−1)
∂ It
; A2,t+1 =
∂A(It+1, It)
∂ It
.
This is the standard Tobin’s Q equation that relates the price of capital to the marginal costs
of producing investment goods.24
24 We adopt the following investment adjustment costs function:
A(It , It−1) =
[
1−S
(
It
It−1
)]
It , S
(
It
It−1
)
=
S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
−1
)2
so that S (1) = S
′
(1) = 0 and S
′′
(1) = S
′′
> 0 in steady state. Therefore
A1,t =
∂A(It , It−1)
∂ It
= 1− S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
−1
)2
−S′′ It
It−1
(
It
It−1
−1
)
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The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
K¯t+1 = ηK¯H,rt+1+(1−η) K¯L,lt+1 = (1−δ )
[
ηK¯H,rt +(1−η) K¯L,lt
]
+A(It , It−1) .
Riskier entrepreneurs and retail banks
The role of the representative retail bank in the model is to collect time deposits from house-
holds in order to finance riskier entrepreneur’s investment project. The bank hedges against
credit risk by charging a premium over the risk-free rate at which it can borrow from house-
holds. The risk-free rate that the bank views as its opportunity cost to lending is a contractual
nominal interest rate that is determined at the time the bank liability to households is issued.
Unlike in Bernanke et al. (1999), this rate is not contingent on the shocks that intervene before
the entrepreneurial loan matures.
At each point in time there is a continuum of heterogeneous entrepreneurs of total measure η ,
indexed by (H,r). At the end of time t, each entrepreneur is characterized by his net worth,
NH,rt+1, which is used, in combination with a bank loan, to purchase the time-(t+1) stock of
capital, K¯H,rt+1. After the purchase, the entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity
shock, ωH,rt+1, which transforms the purchased capital K¯
H,r
t+1 into ω
H,r
t+1 K¯
H,r
t+1. By assumption,
ωH,r is independently and identically distributed over time and across entrepreneurs and fol-
lows a log-normal distribution,
ln
(
ωH,r
)∼ N (−1
2
σ2 , σ2
)
,
where σ is the standard deviation of ln
(
ωH,r
)
.
Capital utilization decision
At the beginning of period t, the representative entrepreneur provides capital services to
intermediate-good firms. Capital services, KH,rt , are related to the entrepreneur’s stock of
physical capital, K¯H,rt , by K
H,r
t = u
H,r
t K¯
H,r
t , where u
H,r
t denotes the level of capital utilization.
In choosing the capital utilization rate, the entrepreneur takes into account the increasing and
and
A2,t+1 =
∂A(It+1, It)
∂ It
= S
′′
(
It+1
It
)2( It+1
It
−1
)
.
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convex utilization cost function a
(
uH,rt
)
, that denotes the cost, in units of final goods, of
setting the utilization rate to uH,rt .25
The entrepreneur chooses uH,rt solving the following maximization problem:
max
uH,rt
[
uH,rt r
k,H
t −a
(
uH,rt
)]
ωH,rK¯H,rt Pt .
After determining the utilization rate of capital and earning rent on it, the entrepreneur sells
the undepreciated part to capital producers at price Qk¯′,t . The entrepreneur’s nominal gross
rate of return on capital purchased at time t−1, 1+Rk,H,rt , is given by
1+Rk,H,rt =
[
uH,rt r
k,H
t −a
(
uH,rt
)]
Pt +(1−δ )Qk¯′,t
Qk¯′,t−1
ωH,r .
Because the mean of ωH,r across entrepreneurs is unity, we may define the average nominal
gross rate of return on capital across all entrepreneurs as follows
1+Rk,Ht =
[
uH,rt r
k,H
t −a
(
uH,rt
)]
Pt +(1−δ )Qk¯′,t
Qk¯′,t−1
. (A.6)
Loan decision and the standard debt contract
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur has available net worth, NH,rt+1, which he uses to finance
his capital expenditures, Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1. To finance the difference between expenditures and net
worth, he borrows an amount BH,rt+1 = Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1−NH,rt+1 from the retail bank.
After the purchase, the entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic productivity shock, ωH,rt+1,
which transforms the purchased capital K¯H,rt+1 into ω
H,r
t+1K¯
H,r
t+1. Financial frictions arise from
asymmetric information between entrepreneur and bank. In particular, the entrepreneur cost-
lessly observes his idiosyncratic shock, whereas the bank must pay a monitoring cost – which
represent a fraction µ , 0 < µ < 1, of the entrepreneur’s gross return – to observe it. The op-
timal financing mechanism is a standard debt contract which gives the lender the right to all
liquidation proceeds in the event of an entrepreneur’s default.
25 The functional form that we use is a
(
uH,rt
)
= r
k,H
σHa
[
expσ
H
a
(
uH,rt −1
)
−1
]
, where rk,H is the steady state value
of the rental rate of capital, a(1) = 0, a
′′
(1)> 0 and σHa = a
′′
(1)/a
′
(1) is a parameter that controls the degree
of convexity of costs.
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At the end of time t, the bank offers a debt contract to the entrepreneur, which specifies the
loan amount, BH,rt+1, and the gross interest rate on the loan, Z
H,r
t+1. At time t+1, the entrepreneur
declares bankruptcy if ωH,rt+1 is smaller than the default threshold level, ω¯
H,r
t+1, defined by
ω¯H,rt+1
(
1+Rk,H,rt+1
)
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 = Z
H,r
t+1B
H,r
t+1 . (A.7)
Therefore, if ωH,rt+1 > ω¯
H,r
t+1, the entrepreneur pays the lender the amount Z
H,r
t+1B
H,r
t+1 and keeps
the remaining
(
ωH,rt+1− ω¯H,rt+1
)(
1+Rk,H,rt+1
)
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1. On the other hand, if ω
H,r
t+1 < ω¯
H,r
t+1, the
entrepreneur defaults and receives nothing, while the bank monitors the entrepreneur at cost
µ
(
1+Rk,H,rt+1
)
ωH,rt+1Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1 and receives all of the residual net worth
(1−µ)
(
1+Rk,H,rt+1
)
ωH,rt+1Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1.
The bank raises the funds that are necessary to finance the entrepreneurs activities issuing
time deposits to households, and pays them a nominal rate of return Ret+1. Perfect competition
in the banking sector implies that the following bank’s zero profit condition holds in each
period:
[
1−Ft
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
ZH,rt+1B
H,r
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue f rom non−bankrupt entrepreneurs
+(1−µ)
ˆ ω¯H,rt+1
0
ωH,rdF
(
ωH,r
)(
1+Rk,H,rt+1
)
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue,a f ter monitoringcost, f rombankrupt entrepreneurs
=
(
1+Ret+1
)
BH,rt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
payment to households
, (A.8)
where Ft
(
ωH,r
)
is the cumulative distribution function of ωH,r.
Let kH,rt+1 =
Qk¯′,t K¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
denote the ratio of capital expenditures to net worth. Combining (A.7)
with (A.8) and using the definition of kt+1 yields
[
Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
−µGt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
kH,rt+1
1+Rk,Ht+1
1+Ret+1
= kH,rt+1−1 ,
where Gt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
=
´ ω¯H,rt+1
0 ω
H,rdF
(
ωH,r
)
and Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
= ω¯H,rt+1
[
1−Ft
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
+Gt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
.
The term Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
represents the share of entrepreneurial earnings received by the bank and
µGt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
the expected monitoring costs. Therefore 1−Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
is the share of profits
going to the entrepreneur.
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The contract determines the division of the expected profits between borrower and lender.
In particular, the optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return at time t+1
subject to the zero profit condition on banks. The optimal contracting problem may be written
in the following way:
max{
kH,rt+1,ω¯
H,r
t+1
} Et
{[
1−Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
1+Rk,Ht+1
1+Ret+1
kH,rt+1
}
sub ject to
[
Γt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)
−µGt
(
ω¯H,rt+1
)]
kH,rt+1
1+Rk,Ht+1
1+Ret+1
= kH,rt+1−1 .
The first order conditions of the contracting problem yield the following relationship between
the leverage ratio,
Qk¯′,t K¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
, and the expected discounted return to capital (see Bernanke et al.,
1999 for details):
Et
(
1+Rk,Ht+1
)
1+Ret+1
=Ψ
(
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
)
,
where Ψ′ > 0 for NH,rt+1 < Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1. The ratio
Et
(
1+Rk,Ht+1
)
1+Ret+1
, which Bernanke et al. (1999) in-
terpreted as the external finance premium faced by entrepreneur, depends positively on the
entrepreneur’s leverage ratio. Intuitively, all else equal, lower leverage means lower exposure,
implying a lower probability of default, hence a lower credit risk, which the bank translates
into a lower required return on lending.
Entrepreneurial net worth
After the loan contract received in t− 1 is settled, the entrepreneurial equity, V H,rt , is given
by
V H,rt =
(
1+Rk,Ht
)
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
H,r
t −1+Ret + µ
´ ω¯H,rt
0 ω
H,rdFt−1
(
ωH,r
)(
1+Rk,Ht
)
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
H,r
t
Qk¯′,t−1K¯
H,r
t −NH,rt
(Qk¯′,t−1K¯H,rt −NH,rt ) .
Equity depends on the profits accumulated from the entrepreneur’s activities. The first term
represents the proceeds from selling undepreciated capital to capital producers, plus the rental
income of capital, net of the costs of utilization (see equation A.6). The term in squared
brackets represents the gross rate of return paid by entrepreneur on time-(t−1) loans.
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At this point, to ensure that entrepreneur does not accumulate enough net worth to be fully
self-financed, CMR assume that there is a constant probability of death. Namely, in each
period entrepreneur exits the economy with probability 1− γH . In this case, entrepreneur
rebates his equity to households in a lump-sum way:
trans f er to households =
(
1− γH)V H,rt .
To keep the population constant, 1− γH entrepreneurs are born each period.
Entrepreneurial net worth, NH,rt+1, combines the total equity and a transfer received from house-
holds, W e,H,rt , and is given by
NH,rt+1 = γ
HV Ht +W
e,H,r
t .
A feature of the debt contract is that entrepreneurs with no net worth receive no loans. Thus,
if newborn entrepreneurs receive no transfers, they would have zero net worth and would
therefore not be able to purchase any capital. The same happens with the fraction of en-
trepreneurs who are bankrupt due to a low realization of ω . To avoid this situation, the
1− γH entrepreneurs who are born and the γH who survive receive the subsidy W e,H,rt from
households.
Households
There is a continuum of infinitely lived risk averse households, indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Each
household consumes, supplies a differentiated labor input and allocates his savings between
riskless time deposit and corporate bonds. As households differ in hours worked and in in-
come, one would expect that they would also differ in consumption and asset allocations.
However, each household j is assumed to hold state-contingent securities that provide insur-
ance against household-specific wage-income risk. As a result, households are homogeneous
with respect to consumption and asset holdings in equilibrium. Therefore, in what follows,
consumption and saving decisions are not indexed by j.26
26 See Erceg et al. (2000) for a discussion about the existence of state-contingent securities.
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Consumption and saving decisions
The instantaneous utility function of a given household is separable in consumption and hours
worked and given by:
u(·) = log(Ct+τ −bCt+τ−1)−ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1+σL
, (A.9)
where Ct denotes the household consumption at time t and h j,t denotes its hours worked in
period t. The parameter b > 0 measures the degree of external habit formation in consump-
tion, σL > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and ψL > 0 is a preference
parameter that affects the disutility of supplying labor.
At the end of period t, household allocates his savings into time deposits, Tt , and corporate
bonds, CBt . At the end of period t + 1, time deposits pay a riskless rate of return equal to
Ret+1, while the rate of return on corporate bonds is R
F
t+1. We assume that both rates are
known when household makes his saving decision and are not contingent on the realization
of period-(t+1) monetary policy shock.
The household budget constraint at time t, written in nominal terms, is given by
(1+Ret )Tt−1+
(
1+RFt
)
CBt−1+Wj,th j,t
+
(
1− γL)[1−Ω(Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )](1−η)V L,lt + (1− γH)ηV H,rt
+ΠIGFt +ΠIBt +NCSt−CBt−Tt−PtCt−W et −Lumpt ≥ 0 ,
where Wj,t is the wage earned by the household j, NCS j,t represents the net payoff of the state
contingent securities that the jth household purchases to insulate itself from the uncertainty
associated with the ability to re-optimize its wage,ΠIGFt andΠIBt are the profits received from,
respectively, intermediate-good firms and investment banks,
(
1− γH)ηV H,rt are the lump-
sum transfers received from riskier entrepreneurs who exit the economy,(
1− γL)[1−Ω(Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )](1−η)V L,lt are the lump-sum transfers (net of side
payments) received from safer entrepreneurs who exit the economy, W et is the total trans-
fer payment to entrepreneurs and Lumpt are lump-sum taxes paid to finance government
expenditures.
The representative household takes its consumption and saving decisions so as to maximize
the expected lifetime utility subject to its intertemporal budget constraint. The optimization
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problem is given by
max
{Ct+τ ,Tt+τ ,CBt+τ}
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
β τ
[
log(Ct+τ −bCt+τ−1)−ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1+σL
]
sub ject to
(
1+Ret+τ
)
Tt−1+τ +
(
1+RFt+τ
)
CBt−1+τ +Wj,t+τh j,t+τ
+
(
1− γL)[1−Ω(Rcoupon,at+τ −Rcoupont+τ )]V Lt+τ + (1− γH)V Ht+τ
+ΠIGFt+τ +Π
IB
t+τ +NCSt+τ −CBt+τ −Tt+τ
−Pt+τCt+τ −W et+τ −Lumpt+τ ≥ 0 .
The first order conditions with respect to Tt , CBt and Ct are, respectively,
λt = β
(
1+Ret+1
)
Et (λt+1) (A.10)
λt = β
(
1+RFt+1
)
Et (λt+1) (A.11)
Ptλt =
1
(Ct−bCt−1) −βb
1
(Ct+1−bCt) , (A.12)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the households’ budget constraint. Equation
(A.10) represents the standard Euler equation. The right hand side of (A.12) is the marginal
utility of consumption, taking into account habit persistence. Comparing (A.10) and (A.11),
it must hold that RFt+1 = R
e
t+1∀t, i.e. the return on corporate bonds equals the return on time
deposits, which in turn is equal to the central bank nominal interest rate. This result is due to
the assumption that both interest rates are known when household makes his optimal decision
and are not contingent on the realization of period-(t+1) monetary policy shock.
Labor supply and wage setting
Each household is a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labor service, h j,t , to the pro-
duction sector. Labor services are bundled together using the aggregator function
Li,t =
[ˆ 1
0
(
h j,t
) 1
λw d j
]λw
, (A.13)
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where λw, ∞> λw ≥ 1, represents the wage markup. The demand curve for the jth household
specialized labor services is
h j,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
) λw
1−λw
Li,t ,
and the aggregate nominal wage, Wt , is given by
Wt =
[ˆ 1
o
(
Wj,t
) 1
1−λw d j
]1−λw
. (A.14)
In each period, a fraction ξw of households cannot reoptimize their wages and, therefore, set
their wages according to the indexation rule
Wj,t =Wj,t−1 (p¯i)ιw1 (pit−1)1−ιw1 ,
where iw1, 0≤ ιw1 ≤ 1, represents the degree of wage indexation to steady state inflation rate.
The fraction 1−ξw of reoptimizing households set their wages by maximizing
max
W j,t
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξw)τ
[
−ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1+σL
+λt+τWj,t+τh j,t+τ
]
sub ject to h j,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
) λw
1−λw
Li,t .
We only consider the symmetric equilibrium in which all households choose the same W˜t =
Wj,t . Thus, given (A.14), the law of motion of the aggregate wage index is given by
Wt =
{
(1−ξw)W˜
1
1−λw
t +ξw
[
Wt−1 (p¯i)ιw1 (pit−1)1−ιw1
] 1
1−λw
}1−λw
.
Resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is
Ct + It +GCt +ηµ
´ ω¯t
0 ωdF (ω)
(
1+Rk,Ht
) Qk¯′,t−1K¯H,rt
Pt
+UCt +ηa
(
uH,rt
)
K¯H,rt +(1−η)a
(
uL,lt
)
K¯L,lt = Yt .
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Government expenditures, GCt , are determined exogenously as a constant fraction, ηg, of
final output: GCt = ηgYt and are financed by lump-sum taxes to the households. The fourth
term represents final output used by banks in monitoring riskier entrepreneurs, and UCt =
Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont
)
(1−η)V L,lt represents the underwriter’s consumption in period t. Fi-
nally, the last two terms on the left hand side capture capital utilization costs.
Aggregate variables and market clearing conditions
Aggregate net worth (NTOTt+1 ) and aggregate leverage (lev
TOT
t+1 ) are defined, respectively, as
NTOTt+1 = ηN
H,r
t+1+(1−η)NL,lt+1
and
levTOTt+1 = η lev
H,r
t+1+(1−η) levL,lt+1 = η
Qk¯′,tK¯
H,r
t+1
NH,rt+1
+(1−η) Qk¯′,tK¯
L,l
t+1
NL,lt+1
.
Total credit (BTOTt+1 ) is defined as the sum of bank loans and bonds issued and is given by:
BTOTt+1 = ηB
H,r
t+1+(1−η)BIL,lt+1 .
The capital rental market clearing conditions are:
ˆ 1
0
KHi,t di = K
H
t = ηK
H,r
t = ηu
H,r
t K¯
H,r
t
and ˆ 1
0
KLi,tdi = K
L
t = (1−η)KL,lt = (1−η)uL,lt K¯L,lt .
Loan and bond market clearing conditions are, respectively, Tt = ηBH,rt+1 and
CBt = (1−η)BIL,lt+1.
The market clearing condition in the labor market is: Lt =
´ 1
0
{[´ 1
0
(
h j,t
) 1
λw d j
]λw}
di.
Finally, the total transfer from households (W et ) to entrepreneurs must satisfy
W et = ηW
e,H,r
t +(1−η)W e,L,lt .
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Appendix B - Technical details
Final-good firms
The maximization problem solved by the representative final-good firm is the following:
max
Yi,t
ΠFGFt = PtYt−
ˆ 1
0
Pi,tYi,tdi
sub ject to Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λ f
i,t di
]λ f
.
The first order condition is:
∂ΠFGFt
∂Yi,t
= 0⇔ Ptλ f
[ˆ 1
0
Y
1
λ f
i,t di
]λ f−1
1
λ f
Y
1
λ f
−1
i,t −Pi,t = 0 .
A simple algebra shows that the demand function for the intermediate good i is given by
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
) λ f
1−λ f
Yt . (B.1)
Substituting (B.1) into the expression for ΠFGFt yields
ΠFGFt = PtYt−
ˆ 1
0
Pi,t
(
Pi,t
Pt
) λ f
1−λ f
Ytdi . (B.2)
Perfect competition in the final-good market implies that ΠFGFt = 0. Imposing this condition
in (B.2) gives the following expression for the price of the final good:
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
P
1
1−λ f
i,t di
]1−λ f
. (B.3)
42
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN A DSGE MODEL WITH A SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
Intermediate-good firms
Cost minimization problem
The i-th firm’s cost minimization problem, in real terms, is given by
min
{Li,t ,KHi,t ,KLi,t}
C (·) = WtLi,tPt +KHi,t r
k,H
t +KLi,tr
k,L
t (B.4)
sub ject to Yi,t = (Ki,t)
α (Li,t)
1−α (B.5)
Ki,t =
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+(1−η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ . (B.6)
Solving (B.5) for Lt and using (B.6), the minimization problem may be rewritten as
min
{KHi,t ,KLi,t}
C (·) = WtPt (Yi,t)
1
1−α
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+(1−η)1−ρ
(
KLi,t
)ρ]− αρ(1−α)
+KHi,t r
k,H
t +KLi,tr
k,L
t .
The first order conditions with respect to KHi,t and K
L
i,t are, respectively,
rk,Ht =
Wt
Pt
(Yi,t)
1
1−α
α
1−αη
1−ρ
[
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ
+(1−η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ]− αρ(1−α)−1 (KHi,t)ρ−1 (B.7)
rk,Lt =
Wt
Pt
(Yi,t)
1
1−α
α
1−α (1−η)
1−ρ [η1−ρ (KHi,t)ρ +(1−η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ]− αρ(1−α)−1 (KLi,t)ρ−1 . (B.8)
Taking the ratio of (B.7) and (B.8), the following arbitrage condition for the choice of capital
services may be derived:
rk,Ht
rk,Lt
=
(
η
1−η
)1−ρ(KHi,t
KLi,t
)ρ−1
. (B.9)
Since
KHi,t = ηK
H,r
i,t = η
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
i,t
)
, (B.10)
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then the arbitrage condition may be rewritten in terms of entrepreneur-specific capital services
as
rk,Ht
rk,Lt
=
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
i,t
uL,lt K¯
L,l
i,t
)ρ−1
.
From (B.7) we can derive the following expression for Ki,t :
Ki,t =
[
Wt
Pt
1
rk,Ht
α
1−αη
1−ρ (KHi,t)ρ−1
] 1−α
ρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yi,t)
1
ρ+α(1−ρ) . (B.11)
Now compute rk,Lt from (B.9) and KLi,t from (B.6). Using these results and equation (B.11) to
substitute in (B.4), it takes a few steps to obtain the following expression for the cost function
C (·):
C (·) =
[
Wt
Pt
1
1−α
]1− αρ+α(1−ρ) [αη1−ρ
rk,Ht
(
KHi,t
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yi,t)
ρ
ρ+α(1−ρ) .
Real marginal costs are thus given by
si,t =
∂C (·)
∂Yi,t
=
[
Wt
Pt
1
1−α
]1− αρ+α(1−ρ) [αη1−ρ
rk,Ht
(
KHi,t
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yi,t)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+α (1−ρ) .
Efficient input choice by firm i also implies that real marginal costs must be equal to the cost
of renting one unit of capital divided by the marginal product of capital (∂Y/∂K). Since
∂Yi,t
∂KHi,t
= α
(
Li,t
Ki,t
)1−α
η1−ρ
(
KHi,t
)ρ−1 [η1−ρ (KHi,t)ρ +(1−η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ−1
and
∂Yi,t
∂KLi,t
= α
(
Li,t
Ki,t
)1−α
(1−η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ−1 [η1−ρ (KHi,t)ρ +(1−η)1−ρ (KLi,t)ρ] 1ρ−1 ,
then
si,t =
rk,Ht
∂Yi,t
∂KHi,t
=
rk,Lt
∂Yi,t
∂KLi,t
.
44
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN A DSGE MODEL WITH A SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
Since all firms i face the same input prices and since they all have access to the same produc-
tion technology, real marginal costs si,t are identical across firms, i.e., si,t = st with
st =
[
Wt
Pt
1
1−α
]1− αρ+α(1−ρ) [αη1−ρ
rk,Ht
(
KHt
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+α (1−ρ) ,
or, using equation (B.10),
st =
[
Wt
Pt
1
1−α
]1− αρ+α(1−ρ) [ α
rk,Ht
(
KH,rt
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ+α (1−ρ) .
Price setting
Every firm faces a constant probability, 1−ξp, of reoptimizing its price in any given period,
whereas the non-reoptimizing firms set their prices according to the indexation rule Pi,t =
Pi,t−1 (p¯i)ι1 (pit−1)1−ι1 . The i-th firm that optimizes its price at time t chooses Pi,t = P˜i,t that
maximizes the present value of future expected nominal profits. The maximization problem
is given by:
max
Pi,t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξp)τ λt+τ [(Pi,t+τ −St+τ)Yi,t+τ ]
sub ject to Yi,t+τ =
(
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
) λ f
1−λ f
Yt+τ .
Substituting the demand function and rearranging yields
max
Pi,t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξp)τ λt+τYt+τPt+τ
(Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
)1+ λ f1−λ f − st+τ(Pi,t+τPt+τ
) λ f
1−λ f
 . (B.12)
We make use of the following definitions:
p˜t+τ =
P˜t+τ
Pt+τ
, pi,t+τ =
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
, λn,t+τ = λt+τPt+τ .
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Then
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
=
p˜it+τ . . . p˜it+1P˜t
pit+τ . . .pit+1Pt
= Xt,τ p˜t , (B.13)
where
Xt,τ =

p˜it+τ ...p˜it+1
pit+τ ...pit+1 τ > 0
1 τ = 0
and p˜it+τ = (p¯i)ι1 (pit+τ−1)1−ι1 . Using (B.13) to substitute out
Pi,t+τ
Pt+τ
in (B.12), then the profit
maximization problem may be rewritten as
max
p˜t
ΠIGFt = Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξp)τ Jt+τ
[
Xt,τ (p˜t)
1+
λ f
1−λ f − st+τ (p˜t)
λ f
1−λ f
]
,
where Jt+τ = λn,t+τYt+τ (Xt,τ)
λ f
1−λ f is exogenous from the point of view of the firm. The first
order condition is
∂ΠIGFt
∂ p˜t
= 0⇔ Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξp)τ
Jt+τ
1−λ f (p˜t)
λ f
1−λ f −1 [Xt,τ p˜t−λ f st+τ]= 0 .
After rearranging, the first order condition becomes
p˜t =
Et∑∞τ=0 (βξp)
τ Jt+τλ f st+τ
Et∑∞τ=0 (βξp)
τ Jt+τXt,τ
=
Kp,t
Fp,t
. (B.14)
For computational tractability, it is crucial to write the infinite sums, Kp,t and Fp,t , in a recur-
sive representations. After some manipulations, one can show that
Kp,t = λn,tYtλ f st +βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
)− λ fλ f−1
Kp,t+1
and
Fp,t = λn,tYt +βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
) 1
1−λ f
Fp,t+1 .
Note that, when prices are fully flexible (ξp = 0), then Kp,t = Fp,t and st = 1/λ f , that is, the
real marginal cost is the reciprocal of the markup.
We have derived the optimum price from the firm’s first order condition. We now identify a
consistency condition that must hold across all firm prices, which allows us to express p˜t in
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terms of aggregate variables only. Expanding (B.3) yields
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
P
1
1−λ f
i,t di
]1−λ f
=
[ˆ
1−ξp
(Pi,t)
1
1−λ f +
ˆ
ξp
(Pi,t)
1
1−λ f
]1−λ f
.
Regarding the limits of integration, 1−ξp refers to the firms that reoptimize prices in period
t, while ξp refers to the firms that do not. Making use of the fact that whether firms are
selected to reoptimize or not is determined randomly, we can rewrite the previous expression
as follows:
Pt =
{
(1−ξp) P˜
1
1−λ f
t +ξp [Pt−1p˜it ]
1
1−λ f
}1−λ f
.
Dividing both sides by Pt , it takes a few step to obtain
p˜t =
1−ξp
(
p˜it
pit
) 1
1−λ f
1−ξp

1−λ f
. (B.15)
Finally, combining (B.15) with (B.14) we obtain
Kp,t
Fp,t
=
1−ξp
(
p˜it
pit
) 1
1−λ f
1−ξp

1−λ f
.
This expression relates the inflation rate to aggregate variables only.
Households
The wage decision
Each household j supplies a differentiated labor input to the production sector. Following
Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that there is a representative employment agency that com-
bines households’ specialized labor, h j,t , into homogeneous labor employed by firm i, Li,t ,
using the following constant returns to scale technology:
Li,t =
[ˆ 1
0
(
h j,t
) 1
λw d j
]λw
,
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where ∞> λw ≥ 1 represents the wage markup. The representative employment agency hires
h j,t in order to maximize its time-t profits:
max
h j,t
WtLi,t−
ˆ 1
0
Wj,th j,td j
sub ject to Li,t =
[ˆ 1
0
(
h j,t
) 1
λw d j
]λw
.
The first order condition leads to the following demand curve for the jth household special-
ized labor services:
h j,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
) λw
1−λw
Li,t .
Zero profit condition for the perfectly competitive employment agencies gives the following
relation between the aggregate nominal wage and the wage earned by the household j:
Wt =
[ˆ 1
o
(
Wj,t
) 1
1−λw d j
]1−λw
. (B.16)
In each period, a fraction ξw of households cannot reoptimize their wages and, by assumption,
set their wages according to the indexation rule Wj,t =Wj,t−1 (p¯i)ιw1 (pit−1)1−ιw1 . The fraction
1−ξw of reoptimizing households set their wages solving the following problem
max
W j,t
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξw)τ
[
−ψL
h1+σLj,t+τ
1+σL
+λt+τWj,t+τh j,t+τ
]
sub ject to h j,t+τ =
(
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ .
Substituting out for h j,t using the labor demand curve yields:
max
W j,t
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξw)τ
− ψL1+σL
(Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
1+σL +λt+τWj,t+τ(Wj,t+τWt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
 .
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This equation can be rewritten as:
max
W j,t
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξw)τ
− ψL1+σL
(Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
1+σL
+λt+τ
Pt+τ
Pt+τ
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
Wj,t+τ
(
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
) λw
1−λw+1
Li,t+τ
 . (B.17)
We adopt the following definitions:
Wj,t+τ = W˜t+τ , w˜t+τ =
Wt+τ
Pt+τ
, wt+τ =
W˜t+τ
Wt+τ
,
λn,t+τ = λt+τPt+τ , w˜t+τwt+τ =
W˜t+τ
Pt+τ
.
Then
Wj,t+τ
Wt+τ
= Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
, (B.18)
where
Xt,τ =

p˜iw,t+τ ...p˜iw,t+1
pit+τ ...pit+1 τ > 0
1 τ = 0
and p˜iw,t+τ = (p¯i)ιw1 (pit+τ−1)1−ιw1 . Substituting (B.18) in (B.17), we obtain
max
W j,t
Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξw)τ
− ψL1+σL
(Xt,τ w˜twtw˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
Li,t+τ
1+σL
+λn,t+τ w˜t+τLi,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜twt
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw+1
 . (B.19)
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Maximizing (B.19) with respect to wt yields27
Et∑∞τ=0 (βξw)
τ
{
−ψL
[(
Xt,τ w˜twtw˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw Li,t+τ
]σL
λw
1−λw Li,t+τ
(
Xt,τ w˜twtw˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw−1 Xt,τ w˜tw˜t+τ
+λn,t+τ w˜t+τLi,t+τ 11−λw
(
Xt,τ w˜twtw˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw Xt,τ w˜tw˜t+τ
}
= 0 .
or, after rearranging,
Et∑∞τ=0 (βξw)
τ Li,t+τ
(
Xt,τ w˜tw˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw λw
1−λw w
λw
1−λw−1
t
{
−ψL
[(
Xt,τ w˜twtw˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw Li,t+τ
]σL
+λn,t+τ w˜twtλw Xt,τ
}
= 0 .
Multiplying this expression by w
− λwσL1−λw
t we obtain, after some manipulations,
Et∑∞τ=0 (βξw)
τ Li,t+τ
(
Xt,τ w˜tw˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw λn,t+τ w˜tλw w
1−λw(1+σL)
1−λw
t Xt,τ =
(B.20)
Et∑∞τ=0 (βξw)
τ L1+σLi,t+τ
(
Xt,τ w˜tw˜t+τ
) λw(1+σL)
1−λw ψL .
Equation (B.20) can be rewritten as
Fw,tw˜tw
1−λw(1+σL)
1−λw
t = ψLKw,t ,
where
Kw,t = Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξw)τ L1+σLi,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
) λw(1+σL)
1−λw
and
Fw,t = Et
∞
∑
τ=0
(βξw)τ Li,t+τ
(
Xt,τ
w˜t
w˜t+τ
) λw
1−λw
λn,t+τ
Xt,τ
λw
.
27 Whether the household chooses wt or W˜t =Wj,t makes no difference, since wt is W˜t scaled by a variable
over which the household has no control.
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Therefore the optimal wage rate results
wt =
[
ψL
w˜t
Kw,t
Fw,t
] λw−1
λw(1+σL)−1
. (B.21)
We have derived the wage rate from the household’s first order condition. We now derive an
expression for the aggregate real wage, w˜t , just in terms of aggregate variables.
Expanding equation (B.16) yields
Wt =
[ˆ 1
o
(
Wj,t
) 1
1−λw d j
]1−λw
=
[ˆ
1−ξw
(
Wj,t
) 1
1−λw +
ˆ
ξw
(
Wj,t
) 1
1−λw
]1−λw
.
Regarding the limits of integration, 1−ξw refers to the households that reoptimize in period t,
while ξw refers to the households that do not. Making use of the fact that whether households
are selected to optimize or not is determined randomly, we can rewrite the previous expression
as follows:
Wt =
[
(1−ξw)
(
W˜t
) 1
1−λw +ξw (Wt−1p˜iw,t)
1
1−λw
]1−λw
.
After dividing both sides by Wt , it takes few steps to obtain
wt =
1−ξw
(
p˜iw,t
piw,t
) 1
1−λw
1−ξw

1−λw
, (B.22)
where piw,t =Wt/Wt−1 = pitw˜t/w˜t−1. Equating expressions (B.21) and (B.22) yields
Kw,t =
Fw,tw˜t
ψL
1−ξw
(
p˜iw,t
piw,t
) 1
1−λw
1−ξw

λw(1+σL)−1
.
This expression relates the real wage to aggregate variables only. Note that, when wages are
fully flexible (ξw = 0), the last expression becomes
w˜t = λw
ψLLσLt
λn,t
,
that is, the real wage in units of the consumption good, w˜t , is a markup, λw, over the house-
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hold’s marginal cost of leisure, ψLLσLt /λn,t , also expressed in terms of the consumption good.
For computational tractability, it is crucial to write the infinite sums, Kw,t and Fw,t , in a recur-
sive representations. After some manipulations, one can show that
Kw,t = h
1+σL
t +βξw
[
pi1−ιw1t
pit+1 w˜t+1w˜t
] λw(1+σL)
1−λw
Kw,t+1
and
Fw,t = ht
λn,t
λw
+βξw
(
1
pit+1 w˜t+1w˜t
) λw
1−λw
(
pi1−ιw1t
) 1
1−λw
pit+1
Fw,t+1 .
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Appendix C - Model solution
This appendix reports the details on how we solved the model. The solution strategy involves
linearization around the model’s nonstochastic steady state. We first solve numerically the
model, for the steady state, using the computational procedure described later in this ap-
pendix. We then employ the Dynare software package to compute the first-order Taylor
series approximation of the equilibrium conditions in the neighborhood of the steady state.
In what follows, we adopt the following scaling notation:
qt =
Qk¯′
Pt
, λn,t = λtPt , we,L,lt =
W e,L,lt
Pt
, we,H,rt =
W e,H,rt
Pt
,
nH,rt+1 =
NH,rt+1
Pt
, nL,lt+1 =
NL,lt+1
Pt
.
The equations that characterize the model’s equilibrium, expressed in scaled form, are listed
below.
• Investment bank
– coupon rate (constant markup over the nominal interest rate)
1+Rcoupon,at+1 =
εcoupon,a
εcoupon,a−1
(
1+Ret+1
)
(C.1)
– law of motion for optimism
χt = ρχχt−1+
(
1−ρχ
)
α3
(
nL,lt+1−nL,l
)
(C.2)
– coupon interest rate elasticity (with optimism)
εcoupon,biasedt+1 = ε
coupon,a (1+χt) (C.3)
– coupon rate (with optimism)
1+Rcoupon,biasedt+1 =
εcoupon,biasedt+1
εcoupon,biasedt+1 −1
(
1+Ret+1
)
(C.4)
53
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS IN A DSGE MODEL WITH A SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
– coupon interest rate elasticity (with optimism and side payments)
εcoupont+1 = ε
coupon,a (1+ r2χt) (C.5)
– coupon rate (with optimism and side payments)
1+Rcoupont+1 =
εcoupont+1
εcoupont+1 −1
(
1+Ret+1
)
(C.6)
• Intermediate-good firms
– arbitrage condition for the choice of capital services
rk,Ht
rk,Lt
=
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
uL,lt K¯
L,l
t
)ρ−1
(C.7)
– two measure of marginal costs
st =
ρ
ρ+α (1−ρ)
[
w˜t
1−α
]1− αρ+α(1−ρ)
[
α
rk,Ht
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ−1]− αρ+α(1−ρ)
(Yt)
α(ρ−1)
ρ+α(1−ρ) (C.8)
st =
rk,Ht
α
(
ht
Kt
)1−α (
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ−1 [
η
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ
+(1−η)
(
uL,lt K¯
L,l
t
)ρ] 1ρ−1
(C.9)
where
Kt =
[
η
(
uH,rt K¯
H,r
t
)ρ
+(1−η)
(
uL,lt K¯
L,l
t
)ρ] 1ρ
(C.10)
• Capital producers
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– first order condition with respect to investment
λn,tqt
[
1− S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
−1
)2
−S′′ It
It−1
(
It
It−1
−1
)]
−λn,t
+βλn,t+1qt+1S
′′
(
It+1
It
)2( It+1
It
−1
)
= 0 (C.11)
– law of motion for aggregate stock of physical capital
ηK¯H,rt+1+(1−η) K¯L,lt+1 = (1−δ )
[
ηK¯H,rt +(1−η) K¯L,lt
]
+
[
1− S
′′
2
(
It
It−1
−1
)2]
It (C.12)
• Riskier entrepreneur and retail bank
– first order condition with respect to capital utilization
rk,Ht = a
′ (
uH,rt
)
(C.13)
– definition of rate of return on capital
1+Rk,Ht =
pit
qt−1
{[
uH,rt r
k,H
t −a
(
uH,rt
)]
+(1−δ )qt
}
(C.14)
– standard debt contract
Et
{
[1−Γt (ω¯t+1)]
1+Rk,Ht+1
1+Ret+1
+
Γ′t (ω¯t+1)
Γ′t (ω¯t+1)−µG′t (ω¯t+1)[
[Γt (ω¯t+1)−µGt (ω¯t+1)]
1+Rk,Ht+1
1+Ret+1
−1
]}
= 0 (C.15)
– zero profit condition for bank
[Γt (ω¯t)−µGt (ω¯t)] qt−1K¯
H,r
t
nH,rt
1+Rk,Ht
1+Ret
=
qt−1K¯H,rt
nH,rt
−1 (C.16)
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– law of motion for net worth
nH,rt+1 = γ
H qt−1
pit
K¯H,rt
[
Rk,Ht −Ret −µ
ˆ ω¯t
0
ωdFt−1 (ω)
(
1+Rk,Ht
)]
+γH
nH,rt
pit
(1+Ret )+w
e,H,r
t (C.17)
• Safer entrepreneur
– first order condition with respect to capital utilization
rk,Lt = a
′ (
uL,lt
)
(C.18)
– definition of rate of return on capital
1+Rk,Lt =
pit
qt−1
{[
uL,lt r
k,L
t −a
(
uL,lt
)]
+(1−δ )qt
}
(C.19)
– first order condition with respect to capital (using the definition of rate of return
on capital)
Rcoupont+1 −Rk,Lt+1−1+
1
β
= 0 (C.20)
– law of motion for net worth
nL,lt+1 = γ
L [1−Ω(Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )] qt−1pit K¯L,lt
(
Rk,Lt −Rcoupont
)
+
[
1−Ω(Rcoupon,at −Rcoupont )] γLpit (1+Rcoupont )nL,lt +we,L,lt (C.21)
• Households
– first order condition with respect to time deposits
λn,t =
β
pit+1
(
1+Ret+1
)
λn,t+1 (C.22)
– first order condition with respect to consumption
λn,t =
1
(Ct−bCt−1) −βb
1
(Ct+1−bCt) (C.23)
• Aggregate resource constraint and production function
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Ct + It +η
[
µ
´ ω¯t
0 ωdF (ω)
(
1+Rk,Ht
)
qt−1K¯H,rt
pit
]
+UCt
+ηa
(
uH,rt
)
K¯H,rt +(1−η)a
(
uL,lt
)
K¯L,lt = (1−ηg)Yt (C.24)
Yt = Kαt h
1−α
t (C.25)
• Conditions associated with Calvo sticky prices and wages
λn,tYt +βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
) 1
1−λ f
Fp,t+1−Fp,t = 0 (C.26)
λn,tYtλ f st +βξp
(
pi1−ι1t
pit+1
)− λ fλ f−1
Kp,t+1−Kp,t = 0 (C.27)
ht
λn,t
λw
+βξw
(
1
pit+1 wt+1wt
) λw
1−λw
(
pi1−ιw1t
) 1
1−λw
pit+1
Fw,t+1−Fw,t = 0 (C.28)
h1+σLt +βξw
[
pi1−ιw1t
pit+1 wt+1wt
] λw(1+σL)
1−λw
Kw,t+1−Kw,t = 0 (C.29)
Kp,t = Fp,t

1−ξp
(
pi1−ι1t−1
pit
) 1
1−λ f
1−ξp

1−λ f
(C.30)
Kw,t = Fw,t
w˜t
ψL

1−ξw
[
pi1−ιw1t−1
pit wtwt−1
] 1
1−λw
1−ξw

1−λw(1+σL)
(C.31)
• Other variables
– External finance premium
Pet = ω¯t+1
(
1+Rk,Ht+1
) qtK¯H,rt+1
qtK¯
H,r
t+1−nH,rt+1
− (1+Ret+1) (C.32)
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– Contractual, no-default interest rate on entrepreneurial debt
Zt = ω¯t+1
(
1+Rk,Ht+1
) qtK¯H,rt+1
qtK¯
H,r
t+1−nH,rt+1
(C.33)
– Aggregate net worth
nTOTt+1 = ηn
H,r
t+1+(1−η)nL,lt+1 (C.34)
– Bond amount
BIL,lt+1 = qtK¯
L,l
t+1−nL,lt+1 (C.35)
– Bank loans
BH,rt+1 = qtK¯
H,r
t+1−nH,rt+1 (C.36)
– Safer entrepreneur’s leverage
levL,lt+1 =
qtK¯
L,l
t+1
nL,lt+1
(C.37)
– Riskier entrepreneur’s leverage
levH,rt+1 =
qtK¯
H,r
t+1
nH,rt+1
(C.38)
– Aggregate leverage
levTOTt+1 = η lev
H,r
t+1+(1−η) levL,lt+1 (C.39)
– Total credit (bank loans + bonds)
BTOTt+1 = ηB
H,r
t+1+(1−η)BIL,lt+1 (C.40)
• Monetary policy rule
Ret =
(
Ret−1
)ρ˜ [Re(Etpit+1
p¯i
)αpi (Yt
Y¯
)αy](1−ρ˜)
εMPt (C.41)
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Steady state
The strategy used for computing the steady state in this model follows the approach used
by Christiano et al. (2003). We set one of the endogenous variables of the model to a value
that seems reasonable based on empirical evidence, making this variable exogenous in the
steady state calculation. We then move a model’s exogenous variable into the list of variables
that are endogenous in the steady state calculation. This approach allows us to simplify the
problem of computing the steady state.
We set the steady state rental rate of capital of the riskier entrepreneur, rk,H , to 0.0504, in
line with the value used by CMR, and we choose the parameter ψL in (A.9) as endogenous
variable. The set of endogenous variables is:
pit , st , It , ω¯t , Rk,Ht , R
k,L
t , K¯
H,r
t , K¯
L,l
t , Kt , n
H,r
t , n
L,l
t ,qt , λn,t ,Ct , w˜t , ht ,
rk,Lt , Ret , Fp,t , Fw,t ,Kp,t , Kw,t , Yt , ψL ,u
H,r
t , u
L,l
t ,
εcoupont , ε
coupon,biased
t , R
coupon
t , R
coupon,a
t , R
coupon,biased
t , χt ,
Pextt , Zt , B
H,r
t , BI
L,l
t , BTOTt , lev
H,r
t , lev
L,l
t , levTOTt , n
TOT
t ,
and the equations available for computing the steady state value for these variables are (C.1)-
(C.41).
As in Woodford (2003), steady state inflation is set to zero, that is, p¯i = 1. By assumption,
uH,r = uL,l = 1 and χ = 0. Solve for Re and q using (C.22) and (C.11). Use (C.5) and (C.3) to
compute εcoupon and εcoupon,biased . Solve for the steady state interest rates Rcoupon, Rcoupon,a
and Rcoupon,biased using, respectively, (C.6), (C.1) and (C.4). Take the ratio of (C.26) and
(C.27) to obtain the value for s. Equations (C.20) and (C.19) can be used to obtain Rk,L and
rk,L. Now we set rk,H = 0.0504 and solve for Rk,H using (C.14). Then solve the non-linear
system composed by equations (C.15)-(C.17) to obtain the values for nH,r, ω¯ and K¯H,r. From
(C.7) we get the value for K¯L,l . Solve for nL,l , K and I using (C.21), (C.10) and (C.12),
respectively. Solve (C.9) for h and then (C.25) for Y . Then use (C.8) and (C.24) to solve for
w˜ and C. Get λn using (C.23). Equations (C.26), (C.28) and (C.29) can be used to obtain Fp,
Fw and Kw. It then follows from (C.30) that Kp = Fp. Finally, solve for ψL using (C.31). The
remaining variables are trivial functions of the structural parameters and other steady state
values and are computed using equations (C.32)-(C.40).
In these calculations, all variables must be positive, and K¯H,r > nH,r > 0, K¯L,l > nL,l > 0 and
Z > Rcoupon.
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Appendix D - Calibration: threshold level for side payments
In this appendix we define the threshold for Ω below which the entrepreneur would always
be better off when offering side payments.
The entrepreneur has two options. He can:
1. issue bonds at the “normal” coupon rate Rcoupon,at+1 (equation 1.8);
2. offer side payments and obtain a lower coupon rate (Rcoupon,biasedt+1 , in equation 1.11).
In the first case, Rcoupont = R
coupon,a
t , so entrepreneur’s equity and net worth are given by,
respectively,
V L,l,at = revenues−
(
1+Rcoupon,at
)
BIL,lt
NL,l,at+1 = γ
LV L,l,at +W
e,L,l
t ,
where revenues=
{[
uL,lt r
k,L
t −a
(
uL,lt
)]
Pt +(1−δ )Qk¯′,t
}
K¯L,lt and BI
L,l
t =Qk¯′,t−1K¯
L,l
t −NL,lt .
In the second case, Rcoupont = R
coupon,biased
t , so entrepreneur’s equity and net worth are now
given by, respectively,
V L,l,bt = revenues−
(
1+Rcoupon,biasedt
)
BIL,lt
NL,l,bt+1 = γ
L
[
1−Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)]
V L,l,bt +W
e,L,l
t .
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The entrepreneur is therefore better off offering side payments whenever
NL,l,bt+1 ≥ NL,l,at+1
⇔
[
1−Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)]
V L,l,bt ≥V L,l,at
⇔ V L,l,bt −V L,l,at ≥Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)
V L,l,bt
⇔
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)
BIL,lt ≥Ω
(
Rcoupon,at −Rcoupon,biasedt
)
V L,l,bt
⇔ BIL,lt ≥ΩV L,l,bt
⇔ Ω≤ BI
L,l
t
V L,l,bt
.
Given the calibration in table 1.1, in the steady state it results that
Ω≤ BI
L,l
V L,l,b
=
K¯L,l−nL,l(
rk,L−δ −Rcoupon,biased) K¯L,l + (1+Rcoupon,biased)nL,l = 0.25 = Ω¯ .
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Table 1.1: Model parameters (time unit of model: quarterly)
Households Value Source Description
β 0.9875 our calibration discount factor
ψL (36) (endogenous) weight on disutility of labor
σL 1 CMR curvature of disutility of labor
b 0.63 CMR habit persistence in consumption
ξw 0.75 Erceg et al. (2000) fraction of households that cannot reoptimize wage
λw 1.05 CMR markup, workers
ιw1 0.29 CMR weight of wage indexation to steady state inflation
Firms
α 0.36 Levin et al. (2005) capital share in the production function
ξp 0.75 Erceg et al. (2000) fraction of firms that cannot reoptimize price
ι1 0.16 CMR weight of price indexation to steady state inflation
λ f 1.2 CMR markup, intermediate good firms
S
′′
29.3 CMR curvature of investment adjustment cost function
δ 0.03 CMR depreciation rate on capital
ρ 0.6 our calibration degree of substitutability between capital services
Entrepreneurs
σHa , σLa 18.9 CMR curvature of capital utilization cost functions
µ 0.15 our calibration fraction of realized profits lost in bankruptcy
σH
√
0.3 our calibration standard deviation of productivity shock
ωe,H,r, ωe,L,l 0.02 CMR transfer from households
γL 0.96 our calibration survival probability of safer entrepreneurs
γH 0.97 our calibration survival probability of riskier entrepreneurs
η 0.3 our calibration share of riskier entrepreneurs
Ω 0.1 our calibration percentage of equity paid as side payments
Bond Market
εcoupon,a 510 Chen et al. (2007) interest rate elasticity of the demand for funds
ρx 0.9 our calibration degree of persistence in optimism
α3 40 our calibration sensitivity of optimism to entrepreneur’s net worth
χ¯ 0 our calibration steady state level of optimism
Policy
ρ˜ 0.88 CMR interest rate smoothing
αpi 1.82 CMR weight of expected inflation in Taylor rule
αy 0.11 CMR weight of output gap in Taylor rule
ηg 0.2 CMR share of government consumption
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Table 1.2: Steady State Properties, Model vs U.S. Data
Variable Model U.S. data
K/Y 5.48 10.7
C/Y 0.63 0.56
I/Y 0.17 0.25
G/Y 0.2 0.2
leverage ratio = QK¯/N 1
sa f er 1.26
riskier 1.35
[1.21 ; 1.77]
bond to bank finance ratio 2 1.36 1.34
When not specified, the source for U.S. data is CMR and the sample period is 1998Q4-2003Q4. 1 CMR compute
the leverage as N/(QK¯−N). We compute the leverage as in Bernanke et al. (1999). 2 Source: De Fiore and
Uhlig (2005).
Table 1.3: Interest Rates, Model vs U.S. Data
Variable Model U.S. data
Rate of return on capital, Rk
sa f er 11.38%
riskier 8.40%
10.32%
Cost of external finance, Z 6.81% [7.1; 8.1]%
Time deposit, Re 5.16% 5.12%
Cost of bond finance, Rcoupon 5.99% 5.96% 1
When not specified, the source for U.S. data is CMR and the sample period is 1987Q1-2003Q4. 1 Chen et al.
(2007) find an average yield spread of AAA bonds over the period 1995-2003 of 84 basis points. Adding this
spread to the risk-free rate (Re) gives the value displayed in the table.
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Chapter 2
Inattentiveness: an alternative
explanation of investment gulps1
This chapter provides an alternative explanation for the microeconomic lumpiness of capital
adjustment. Previous research has argued that capital adjustment is lumpy because firms
face fixed capital adjustment costs. The new explanation proposed here is inattentiveness,
whereby firms make infrequent investment decisions due to a cost of gathering and processing
information. Introducing such information costs into an otherwise frictionless investment
model induces infrequent and lumpy capital adjustments. The model fits the quantitative
facts on plant-level investment rates remarkably well, and it also matches some higher order
moments of aggregate investment rates. Moreover, inattentiveness enhances the cash flow
sensitivity of investment.
1 I am extremely grateful to Ricardo Reis for his invaluable guidance and to Emi Nakamura, Jón Steinsson,
Luminita Stevens and Michael Woodford for helpful comments. This research was conducted while I was
visiting Columbia University, whose hospitality I gratefully acknowledge. I thank the Fundação para a Ciência
e a Tecnologia for financial support (Ph.D. scholarship). Any errors are my own.
CHAPTER 2. INATTENTIVENESS: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF
INVESTMENT GULPS
2.1 Introduction
Two key facts about aggregate and micro-level investment adjustment have been emphasized
in the literature (Caballero, 1999). On the one hand, at the aggregate level, investment series
exhibit gradual and smooth adjustment. On the other hand, adjustment at the plant-level is
occasional and large, or lumpy. That is, investment at the micro level is characterized by
periods of relative low activity interrupted by sporadic episodes of large adjustments, which
have usually been denoted as investment gulps or spikes.
To reproduce these behaviors, two different specifications of physical capital adjustment costs
have traditionally been considered. While a simple neoclassical model with convex adjust-
ment costs provides a good description for the smooth behavior observed at the macro level,
the lumpy micro-level capital adjustment has been interpreted as evidence supporting (S,s)
adjustment policy rules generated by non-convex adjustment costs. Over the past 20 years,
substantial improvements in analytical techniques which could handle these types of non-
linear adjustments have led to an extensive use of models with lumpy investment. Notwith-
standing, it has been difficult to get a model that was able to reproduce both investment gulps
and periods of inactivity of the frequency found in the data. In fact, after numerous attempts
and refinements, only the most recent generation of lumpy investment models – Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) and Khan and Thomas (2008) – has been successful in fitting the micro
data well.
An alternative (and to some extent complementary) explanation for such micro lumpy be-
havior that has been recently pointed out – although not yet analyzed – is that investment
planning and information processing can be costly activities in terms of required time, ef-
fort and expenses (Basu and Kimball, 2005 and Iacoviello and Pavan, 2007). That is, both
costs of planning and costs of acquiring information might make investment lumpy at the
micro level, even in absence of non-convex adjustment costs. Motivated by this argument,
this chapter develops a new model of capital adjustment and tests whether it is able to fit the
aforementioned facts about investment. We do so by drawing on recent behavioral models
based on the assumption that agents update their information and plans infrequently.
This chapter is related to two strands of literature, which are reviewed in section 2.2. The
first is the literature on investment in physical capital, and the second one is on informational
frictions in macroeconomics. After briefly describing two standard capital adjustment costs
models, section 2.3 presents a specific model based on the inattentiveness model of limited
information à la Reis (2006b). Section 2.4 tests the implications of these models with both
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plant-level and aggregate data. The inattentiveness model is also contrasted with two leading
lumpy investment models. Beyond the empirical findings on capital adjustment behavior,
this chapter has a contribution to the empirical Q literature. In particular, section 2.5 analyzes
whether and to what extent inattentiveness affects the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q
and cash flow. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Motivation
This research combines the works from two literatures – one on adjustment costs and invest-
ment dynamics and one on the inattentiveness approach of limited information. We therefore
start the analysis with an overview of these two broad literatures.
Adjustment costs and investment dynamics2
Ever since the pioneer analysis of Eisner and Strotz (1963), the workhorse model of the
investment literature has been, partly for analytical tractability, a neoclassical model with
strictly convex – most often quadratic – costs of adjustment. This model provided a theo-
retical microfoundation to justify the inclusion of lagged dependent variables into empirical
models of (otherwise static) factor demand (the flexible accelerator model of Clark, 1944, or
the flexible user-cost model of Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). Convex costs of adjusting capital
induce firms to spread their investment out over time, since a series of small adjustments is
cheaper than a single large adjustment. Despite the relative success in reproducing the smooth
adjustment of investment in physical capital observed at the aggregate level, empirical mod-
els based on convex adjustment costs have not performed so well along other dimensions
(Abel and Blanchard, 1986 and Caballero, 1999). For example, estimations of such models
have generally yielded unreasonably large adjustment costs coefficients, suggesting implau-
sibly slow adjustment speeds.3 Moreover, there is mounting empirical evidence confirming
that capital adjustment at the micro level is sporadic and large. As several studies in many
different countries have documented, investment at the plant-level is characterized by long
2 See Chirinko (1993) and Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for excellent surveys of traditional investment
models, and Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for a more general survey on factor adjustment costs.
3 Summers (1981) reports that 20 years after an unexpected economic shock, the capital stock would have
only reached about 75% of its long-run steady-state level. Moreover, as Chirinko (1993) points out, most studies
using panel data indicate much slower convergence rate.
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periods of relative low activity broken by infrequent and possibly large adjustments in capital
stocks.4
This very different picture of investment adjustment has led economists to question even
more strongly the convex adjustment costs assumption. The micro evidence suggests that the
predominant adjustment frictions at the micro level may be non-convex, rather than convex,
in nature. Scarf (1960) shows that this type of nonlinear microeconomic adjustment can arise
when firms face non-convex adjustment technologies. In Scarf’s model, the adjustment cost
is a fixed cost incurred at any time a firm wants to adjust her stock of inventories. To avoid
the payment of such lump-sum cost, the firm only invests when capital’s deviation from a
target level exceeds a certain threshold. The optimal adjustment policy in the presence of
fixed adjustment costs thus implies periods of inaction interrupted by infrequent episodes of
large capital adjustments.
Beginning with Scarf, researchers have studied richer forms of adjustment costs structures
to achieve greater consistency with the lumpy micro evidence.5 The main difficulty among
quantitative models of lumpy investment has been in reproducing the empirical observations
of investment spikes versus inaction. In fact, after numerous attempts and refinements, only
two (to the best of our knowledge) recent lumpy investment models – Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2006) and Khan and Thomas (2008) – have been successful in matching the moments
from the cross-sectional distribution of plant-level investment rates. Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) estimate a model which nests alternative specifications of adjustment costs. They find
that a model which combines both convex and non-convex components of adjustment costs
(as well as irreversible investment) fits the data reasonably well. Khan and Thomas (2008) in-
stead solve the problem in reproducing observations of both spikes and inaction by assuming
that plants may undertake low levels of investment without incurring any adjustment costs.
4 Evidence for U.S. comes from Caballero et al. (1995), Doms and Dunne (1998), Cooper et al. (1999),
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Gourio and Kashyap (2007) (LRD database), Bayraktar (2002) and Bayrak-
tar and Sakellaris (2006) (S&P’s Compustat database) and Becker et al. (2006) (Census Bureau’s Annual Survey
of Manufactures data). For the U.K. see Attanasio et al. (2003) and Bayer (2006b); for Norway see Nilsen and
Schiantarelli (2003); for Spain see Alonso-Borrego and Sánchez-Mangas (2008); for Germany see Bayraktar
et al. (2005) and Bayer (2008); for Italy see Del Boca et al. (2008); for Sweden see Carlsson and Laséen (2005);
for the Netherlands see Letterie and Pfann (2007); for Hungary see Reiff (2010); for Chile see Fuentes et al.
(2006) and Gourio and Kashyap (2007); for Mexico see Gelos and Isgut (2001); for Colombia see Gelos and
Isgut (2001) and Contreras (2008); for Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe see Bigsten et al.
(2005); finally, for Ethiopia see Gebreeyesus (2009).
5 Some recent lumpy investment models with a single component of adjustment costs include Caballero and
Engel (1999), Thomas (2002) and Veracierto (2002). Bertola and Caballero (1990), Abel and Eberly (1994),
Cooper et al. (1999), Le and Jones (2005), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Bloom et al. (2007), among
many others, consider combinations of convex and non-convex adjustment costs and/or irreversible investment.
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Inattentiveness as a microfoundation for lumpy investment adjustment
Within the literature on informational frictions in macroeconomics, a strand called the inat-
tentiveness approach has emerged recently. The term inattentiveness, coined by Reis (2006b),
describes a particular type of learning mechanism. It analyzes the infrequent adjustment of
choice variables that arises because gathering and processing information and making deci-
sions and plans are costly activities.6 The inattentiveness literature interprets the concept of
“menu cost” introduced by Mankiw (1985) as a fixed cost of acquiring, absorbing and pro-
cessing information and making decisions based on that information. Inattentiveness is the
optimal response to such information/planning costs: agents rationally choose to update their
information sets and plans only sporadically at optimally chosen dates, and to be inattentive
to new information in between adjustment dates.
The inattentiveness literature is expanding rapidly and this approach has been successfully
applied in several contexts, including the behavior of price-setting firms (Mankiw and Reis,
2002, Reis, 2006b and Alvarez et al., 2010b), workers (Mankiw and Reis, 2003), consumers
(Reis, 2006a) and investors in financial markets (Gabaix and Laibson, 2002, Abel et al.,
2007, 2009 and Alvarez et al., 2010a).7 However, so far, the behavior of inattentive firms
accumulating physical capital has not been studied.
Rather than relying on fixed physical costs of adjustment, the key assumption in this chapter
(which also represents the only departure from an otherwise frictionless model) is that it is
costly for the firm to acquire, absorb and process information and make plans for capital ad-
justment. Such costs lead the firm to make infrequent investment decisions. On the one hand,
in between adjustment dates, the firm is “inactive” and only undertakes planned maintenance
investment. On the other hand, when the firm does update her information and plan, the stock
of capital immediately jumps to its optimal level. That is, at those planning dates it is likely
to observe an investment gulp.
6 A related strand of the literature, introduced by Sims (2003) and known as “rational inattention”, analyzes
infrequent adjustments that arise because of the limited ability of agents to absorb information. That is, agents
cannot observe and process all available information when making economic decisions. Although rational
inattention and inattentiveness sound almost the same, they are completely different learning technologies.
Under rational inattention, agents receive a flow of noisy information every period. Consequently, agents update
their plans frequently but incompletely. With inattentiveness instead, agents get no information almost all of the
time and then occasionally observe the entire history of event perfectly. Plans are thus updated infrequently but
completely.
7 The aforementioned papers analyze the consequences of inattentiveness in partial equilibrium frameworks.
Examples of general equilibrium models with inattentiveness are Ball et al. (2005), Mankiw and Reis (2006,
2007) and Reis (2009a,b).
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Inattentiveness – because of either costs of acquiring information or costs of recomputing
optimal plans – provides an alternative microfoundation for the lumpiness of capital adjust-
ments at the plant-level.
2.3 A tale of three dynamic models of capital adjustment
We begin this section by describing a neoclassical investment model without capital adjust-
ment costs of any form. This model serves as a reference for building more realistic in-
vestment models. Next, we describe a model with convex (i.e., quadratic) and one with
non-convex (i.e., fixed) adjustment costs.8 Finally, we introduce the model with informa-
tion/planning costs and derive some theoretical results describing the firm’s capital adjust-
ment behavior. In the last subsection we compare the capital adjustment dynamics implied
by these models.
2.3.1 The frictionless neoclassical investment model
Here we describe a simplified version of the model presented in Abel and Eberly (2008). Let
Π˜t = Z1−αt Kαt be a reduced form revenue function obtained from the firm’s optimization over
freely adjustable factors of production. Kt denotes the current capital stock, Zt the current
period profitability shock and 0 < α < 1 the degree of monopoly power.9
The firm can purchase or sell capital instantaneously and frictionlessly, without any adjust-
ment costs, at a constant price normalized to one. Hence the Jorgensonian user cost of capital
equals the discount rate of the firm, r, and the depreciation rate, δ .10 Operating profits, which
8 We do not model combinations of convex with fixed costs of adjustment as well as irreversible investment.
For a unified approach see references in footnote 5.
9 Let Pt = htY
− 1ε
t be the demand curve where ht > 0 is a demand shock and ε > 1 is the price elastic-
ity of demand. Let Yt = At
(
Kγt N
1−γ
t
)s
be the production function where γ is the capital share in a Cobb-
Douglas production function and s the degree of returns to scale. Maximization of profit over the flexible
labor factor, Nt , leads to a reduced form revenue function, Π˜t = Z1−αt Kαt , where Zt reflects productivity, the
demand for the firm’s output and/or the wage rate as well as structural parameters. The exponent on capital is
α ≡ γs(1− 1ε )/[1− (1− γ)s(1− 1ε )]. See Abel and Eberly (2008) for further details.
10 Jorgenson (1963) shows that, if the level of capital inputs can be freely adjusted, the firm should invest
until the marginal profit from an extra unit of capital is equal to the user cost of capital. The user cost represents
the opportunity cost of holding one unit of capital for a period. It is usually defined as the sum of three terms:
the firm’s required rate of return, the depreciation rate and the expected rate of change in the price of capital
goods. Here the latter term is zero since, by assumption, the price of capital is constant.
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are revenue minus the user cost of physical capital, are given by
Πt = Z1−αt K
α
t − (r+δ )Kt . (2.1)
Since there are no capital adjustment costs and investment is completely reversible, the opti-
mal capital stock at each point in time is determined by maximizing static operating profits
in equation (2.1) with respect to Kt . The first order condition yields the firm’s optimal stock
of capital
K∗t = M
1
α Zt , (2.2)
where M ≡
(
r+δ
α
)− α1−α . Throughout this chapter, we will refer to K∗t as the “desired” or
“frictionless” stock of capital interchangeably. According to the model, the frictionless stock
of capital will tend to be as volatile as the profitability shock, and the response of capital stock
mimics that of the shock. These two predictions are at odds with the conventional wisdom
that capital stock adjusts either continuously and slowly (macro level), or infrequently and in
a lumpy fashion (micro level).
2.3.2 The models with capital adjustment costs
Given the mismatch between the frictionless model’s predictions and the data, researchers
have introduced different forms of capital adjustment costs. Beyond other costs associated
with the purchase of capital (i.e., the user cost), the very act of adjusting the capital stock
entails real costs. Ideally, the optimizing firm would choose a stochastic process for Kt , such
that Kt = K∗t ∀t. However, if altering the level of capital is costly, the firm has to trade off the
benefits of tracking K∗t more closely and the costs of doing so.
To make the analysis consistent with that of the inattentiveness model, an assumption that
we maintain in this subsection is that, at the beginning of each period, the firm chooses the
stock of capital to use in the current period. That is, after paying the adjustment cost, firm’s
investment instantly yields usable capital (there is no time-to-build aspect of investment).11
11 The models we describe in this subsection are slightly different versions of commonly used investment
models. For instance, we could assume instead that investment becomes productive with a lag of one period
(that is, a one period time-to-build lag). This would require some straightforward modifications to the analysis
but it would not affect the adjustment dynamics or the empirical results.
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2.3.2.1 Convex adjustment costs and partial adjustment
The traditional investment models have assumed that adjustment costs are convex, and quadratic
cost functions have been by far the most extensively used specification. For purposes of ex-
position, let us assume that the firm faces two types of costs – a cost of departing from the
target stock level and a transaction cost incurred when changing the level of capital stock.
Because of these costs, the firm will tend to adjust her capital stock slowly over time rather
than instantaneously. Putting these two costs together in a loss function and using a discrete
time setup, the dynamic programming problem is given by
Vˆ (Kt−1,K∗t ) = minKt
(Kt−K∗t )2
2
+
ϕ
2
(Kt−Kt−1)2+βEtVˆ
(
Kt ,K∗t+1
)
,
where ϕ > 0 is the capital adjustment costs parameter and β ≡ 11+r . The firm’s optimal policy
consists in reducing the gap between the desired and the previous period level of capital stock
by a fraction ν , ν ≤ 1, each period.12 In particular, capital accumulates according to the
following equation:
Kt−Kt−1 = ν (K∗t −Kt−1) .
The change in capital, Kt −Kt−1, is thus proportional to the difference between the previous
level of capital and the target, where ν parameterizes how quickly the gap is closed. The
firm faces a trade-off between the speed at which she adjusts and the cost of making such
adjustment: everything else equal, the larger is the adjustment cost (ϕ), the smaller is the size
of adjustment (ν), and the slower is the speed of adjustment. Finally, investment in period t
is given by
It = Kt− (1−δ )Kt−1 = δKt−1+ν (K∗t −Kt−1) .
2.3.2.2 Non-convex adjustment costs and state-dependent (lumpy) adjustment
As first shown by Scarf (1960), lumpy behavior arises naturally when adjusting the stock of
capital entails a fixed cost. Here we outline a simple model of this nature.
Let the adjustment cost incurred when changing the capital stock at any given time T be
proportional to the current capital stock (before adjustment): Φ¯KT− . At any normalized time
12 See appendix F for details of the solution of the dynamic programming problem as well as for the analytical
relationship between ν and the structural parameters (ϕ and β ).
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0, the firm’s problem is
V (K0,Z0)= max
{Kt}Tt=0 ,T
E0
{ˆ T
0
e−rt
[
Z1−αt K
α
t − (r+δ )Kt
]
dt+ e−rT
[
Φ¯KT−+V (KT ,ZT)
]}
.
(2.3)
We describe the adjustment policy in terms of two trigger levels, L and U , where L < U .13
Let κt− be the deviation between the desired and the current capital before adjustment takes
place: κt− = K∗t −Kt− . If κt− is smaller (larger) than or equal to the trigger level L (U), the
firm will increase (decrease) her capital stock such that κt+ = 0 after adjustment.14 There is
therefore an investment gulp every time κt− reaches these trigger levels. On the other hand,
if the value of κt− is between these trigger levels, the firm keeps the level of the capital stock
constant by undertaking maintenance investment.15 That is, the firm may undertake some
small maintenance investment without incurring any adjustment costs. The optimal policy
may thus be described by the following rule
KSst =
K∗t i f κt− ≥U or κt− ≤ LKt−1 i f L < κt− <U .
Consequently investment is given by
It =
K∗t − (1−δ )Kt−1 i f κt ≥U or κt ≤ LδKt−1 i f L < κt <U .
Note that, in (2.3), the optimal stopping time for adjustment, T , depends on the evolution of
the variable Zt . Adjustment is therefore state-dependent: the firm observes the state of the
economy every instant and, according to it, decides whether it is optimal to adjust or to stay
inactive. Once the decision to act has been taken, adjustment is instantaneous and capital
reaches the optimal frictionless level. The optimal adjustment policy in the presence of fixed
13 The problem in (2.3) has an explicit analytical solution. See appendix F for the corresponding differential
equation, value matching, and smooth pasting conditions.
14 Here we assume κt+ = 0 for the sake of simplicity. However, as Caballero (1999) points out, the optimal
dynamic target is generally different from the frictionless one. That is, in general the value after adjustment κt+
is different from 0.
15 Khan and Thomas (2008) extend the Khan and Thomas (2003) model to allow, among other things, for
low-level capital adjustments that are exempt from adjustment costs. They find that the extended model fits the
plant-level data much better than the previous one. Bachmann et al. (2010) also make a similar assumption. An
alternative approach (taken, for instance, in Bertola and Caballero, 1990, Caballero, 1993, Thomas, 2002 and
Gourio and Kashyap, 2007) is to let capital be eroded by depreciation in the case the firm remains inactive.
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adjustment costs thus implies periods of inaction followed by infrequent episodes of large
capital adjustments.
2.3.3 The model with information/planning costs
In this subsection we present and solve an alternative model of capital adjustment based on
the inattentiveness model of limited information à la Reis (2006b). The key assumption
in this model is that information processing and investment planning are costly activities –
rather than adjusting capital stock as it is common in the investment literature. Relatively
to the model described in section 2.3.1, the firm faces one additional constraint: she must
pay a cost in order to update her information sets and to make new plans. This cost can be
interpreted as the cost in money and time of obtaining and assimilating information, or it
could stand for the opportunity cost of taking time to compute optimal plans. Thus, in what
follows we will refer to this cost as information or planning cost interchangeably.
Information costs give rise to rational inattentiveness to information in the sense that the firm
rationally chooses to update her information about the state of the economy and to make
new plans only sporadically at optimally chosen dates. That is, the firm forms expectations
rationally, though she does not do so often. As a consequence, expectations conditional on
old information continue to influence current choices. When the firm decides to incur such a
cost, conditional on the information obtained she decides when next to plan, and the amount
of capital to use during the period of inattentiveness.
The first decision at a planning date is on when to update information and plan again. The
optimal length of inattentiveness trades off the costs of being inattentive to news and the costs
incurred by planning. The firm is aware of the fact that while on the one hand, being inat-
tentive saves on the costs of planning, on the other hand, it implies that decisions sufficiently
far in the future are made with severely outdated information. At some point the costs of fol-
lowing an outdated plan become higher than the costs of updating information, so it becomes
optimal for the firm to make a new plan.
The second decision is the plan for capital adjustments, which represents the path for the
amount of physical capital to use until the next planning date. In between adjustment dates,
the dynamics of capital follows a pre-determined plan, regardless of the news in the econ-
omy. At observation dates instead, information is revealed and optimal choices incorporate
it, therefore it is likely to observe a jump in the stock of capital at those dates.
79
CHAPTER 2. INATTENTIVENESS: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF
INVESTMENT GULPS
Having informally introduced the model of inattentiveness, we now described the formal
problem and derive the optimality conditions describing capital adjustment behavior.
2.3.3.1 The inattentive firm’s problem
Time is continuous and infinite. Let xt be the state vector, which is generated by a continuous
time stochastic process defined on a standard filtered probability space with filtration F =
{Ft , t ≥ 0}. We assume that xt is a first-order Markov process. The state at a given date
t+ τ is then a function of xt and a set of innovations uτ = (ut ,ut+τ ], so that xt+τ =Ψ(xt ,uτ)
denotes the transition between the state at date t and the state at date t+τ , which is assumed
to be differentiable.
The planning dates are denoted by D(i), where i ∈ NO and D(i+1) ≥ D(i) for all i with
D(0) ≡ 0. The periods of inattentiveness are defined recursively as d (i) = D(i+1)−D(i).
The firm’s optimal choice of planning dates defines a new filtration ℑ= {ℑt , t ≥ 0} such that
ℑt = FD(i) for t ∈ [D(i) , D(i+1)).
Whenever the firm decides to update her information and plans, she pays a non-negative
finite planning cost given by θt ≡ θ (xt). She then chooses when to plan again as well as
a plan for capital until the next adjustment, K (t) = K [D(i) ,D(i+1)). Two remarks are
worthwhile. First, note that the firm can choose the next planning date either at the current
planning date or at any future date. However, since she does not observe any new information
while inattentive, her choice will be the same irrespective of when it is made. Second, the
firm’s choices at any time t must be measurable with respect to ℑt . That is, the firm’s capital
choices for time t is conditional on the information she has at time t, which by assumption
coincides with the information available at the last planning date.
The firm maximizes the expected value of operating profits, net of planning costs. The firm’s
problem can be written as:
max
{K(i),D(i)}∞i=0
E
{
∞
∑
i=0
[ˆ D(i+1)
D(i)
e−rtΠtdt− e−rD(i+1)θ
(
xD(i+1)
)]}
(2.4)
s.t. {D(i) ,K (i)} are ℑ−adapted (2.5)
xt+τ =Ψ(xt,uτ) (2.6)
Πt = Z1−αt K
α
t − (r+δ )Kt . (2.7)
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Note that if the costs of planning are always 0, the firm optimally chooses to be always
attentive. The problem (2.4)-(2.7) has a recursive structure between adjustment dates. Let x
denote the state at the current planning date and x′ the state at the next planning date. We can
then rewrite the problem as
V (x) = max
{Kt}dt=0 ,d
{ˆ d
0
e−rt
[
Z1−αt K
α
t − (r+δ )Kt
]
dt+ e−rdE
[
−θ
(
x
′)
+V
(
x
′)]}
sub ject to x
′
=Ψ
(
x,ud
)
(2.8)
where the measurability constraint (2.5) is imposed by having passed the expectation operator
through {K,d}, so that these choices are made conditional on the information available at the
current planning date. The solution to the problem in (2.8) is a pair of functions, K (x, t)
and d (x), determining the optimal plan for capital from time 0 to time d and when the next
planning will take place.
At a first sight, the problem in (2.8) seems similar to the optimal stopping problem in (2.3).
However, recall from section 2.3.2.2 that adjustment in (2.3) – i.e., the choice of T – is state-
contingent. In the inattentiveness model instead, in between adjustments, the firm rationally
chooses not to collect new information. The inattentive firm adjusts at optimally chosen dates
regardless of the state of the economy at those dates. Capital adjustment with inattentiveness
– i.e., the choice of d∗ – is therefore recursively time-contingent, independent of the current
state, but a function of the state at the past planning date.
2.3.3.2 The optimality conditions
The first order condition of (2.8) with respect to d is
Π(x,d) = E
{
r
[
V
(
x
′)−θ (x′)]+[θx(x′)−Vx(x′)] ∂Ψ(x,ud)∂d
}
. (2.9)
By weighting the benefit of adjusting against the costs incurred by planning, equation (2.9)
implicitly defines the optimal length of inattentiveness. On the left-hand side is the value from
extending the inattentiveness interval, which equals the profits from keeping to the outdated
plan for capital. The right hand side captures the value from planning at time d, which is the
sum of two terms. The first term is the present value of having obtained new information and
re-planned, which is the difference between the value of having a new plan and the cost of
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writing it. The second term is the cost from updating the information at date d rather than in
another instant in which the cost and benefit of a fresh plan may change.
Differentiating equation (2.8) with respect to Kt and setting the derivative equal to zero yields
the optimal plan for capital:
KIN (x, t) = M
1
α
[
E
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α . (2.10)
The envelope conditions with respect to each component j of the state vector x are
Vj (x) =
ˆ d
0
e−rtΠ j (x, t)dt+ e−rdE
[(
−θx
(
x
′)
+Vx
(
x
′))
Ψ j
(
x,ud
)]
. (2.11)
Equations (2.8)-(2.11) characterize the value function V (x), the plan for capital KIN (x, t) and
the optimal inattentiveness interval d (x).
2.3.3.3 Model’s predictions
We now derive some theoretical implications of the model by making assumptions that lead
to a closed-form solution.16 We assume that the profitability shock, Zt , follows a trendless
geometric Brownian motion with constant volatility σ > 0, so dZt = σZtdz where dz is the
increment of a standard Wiener process. We further assume that the costs of planning are a
fixed share Θ of profits at the time of planning.
Prediction #1: the length of inattentiveness
Following Reis (2006b), we compute a perturbation approximation of the optimal length of
inattentiveness around the point where planning is costless.17 In this case, the following result
holds:
Proposition 1. An approximation of the optimal inattentiveness interval is given by
d∗ =
√
4Θ
ασ2
.
This results shows the determinants of inattentiveness. First, ∂d
∗
∂Θ > 0: the larger the costs of
16 Appendix E contains the proofs of all the propositions.
17 Results are sensitive to the point around which the approximation is taken. For instance, Jinnai (2007)
solves Reis (2006b) model by approximating around the point where firms have asymmetric information. Over-
all Jinnai’s approximation predicts shorter inattentiveness intervals than Reis’ approximation.
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planning are, the longer is inattentiveness. Second, ∂d
∗
∂σ < 0: more volatile profitability shock
leads the firm to update her information more frequently since it is costly to not pay attention
to news in a world that is quickly changing. Third, ∂d
∗
∂α < 0: the higher the sensitivity of the
profit function, the larger the costs of reacting with a delay to news so the firm avoids being
inattentive for too long.
Prediction #2: capital adjustment dynamics with inattentiveness
Let K∗D(i) denote the capital chosen by an attentive firm at date D(i), which is given by equa-
tion (2.2). The optimal capital chosen by an inattentive firm at planning date D(i), KIND(i),
has to be equal to the capital chosen by an attentive firm, since these decisions are made
conditional on the same information set. Therefore, at adjustment dates, it must hold that
KIND(i) = K
∗
D(i) = M
1
α ZD(i) .
In between adjustment dates, the firm is inattentive and
Proposition 2. The optimal plan for capital between adjustment dates, for D(i) < t <
D(i+1), obeys the equation
KINt = K
∗
D(i)e
{
−α σ22 [t−D(i)]
}
.
The optimal adjustment policy with inattentiveness is thus fully described by the following
equations
KINt =

K∗D(i) = M
1
α ZD(i) ∀i ∈ NO
K∗D(i)e
{
−α σ22 [t−D(i)]
}
∀ D(i)< t < D(i+1)
.
The dynamics of capital adjustment with inattentiveness thus implies periods of relatively
low activity followed by infrequent episodes of possibly large capital adjustments.
Prediction #3: the dynamics of investment
If the firm enters period D(i) with capital stock K−D(i), her capital stock jumps instantly to
K+D(i) = K
−
D(i)+ ID(i), where the superscripts “+” and “−” on KD(i) denote, respectively, the
stock of capital immediately after and immediately before D(i), and ID(i) is the investment
gulp at date D(i). Between planning dates, the firm is inattentive and, in order to keep her
capital stock in line with the optimal plan, she undertakes planned maintenance investment,
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IMt , to fully compensate for depreciation. Therefore optimal investment by inattentive firm is:
ID(i+1) = K
+
D(i+1)−K−D(i+1) = K∗D(i+1)−K∗D(i)e−α
σ2
2 d
∗ ∀i ∈ NO
IMt+1 =
dKINt
dt +δK
IN
t ∀ D(i)< t < D(i+1)
.
2.3.4 Capital adjustment dynamics
Having presented the models, we now compare the capital adjustment dynamics implied by
different adjustment policies. The top graph in figure 2.1 presents an example of a sample
path of the frictionless capital stock and three capital adjustment behavior (partial, state- and
time-dependent adjustment).
At first sight, two distinct capital adjustment patterns emerge. While quadratic adjustment
costs lead to a smooth adjustment, the models with fixed – both adjustment and information
– costs predict discrete and lumpy adjustments: periods of relative low investment activity
(in which capital is constant or slightly decreases) are interrupted by large (both positive and
negative) capital adjustments. In particular, the sizes of such adjustments are much larger
than those implied by the convex adjustment costs model.
Looking more carefully, although adjustments in the models with fixed costs may look simi-
lar, they are actually different in one important respect – the timing of adjustment, i.e. when
the firm decides to adjust. The bottom graph in figure 2.1 details the difference between
state- and time-dependent adjustments. It presents an example of a sample path of the de-
viation between frictionless and actual capital stock in both models with fixed costs. In the
inattentiveness model, full adjustments occur at fixed time intervals d∗, regardless of the state
at those dates. In the (S,s) model, full adjustments instead only occur – at dates T1 and T2
– when the departure from the desired stock of capital becomes too large in absolute value,
reaching the upper level U or the lower level L. That is, whenever there is a cost of gathering
information and planning, and no direct costs of adjusting capital, the optimal adjustment is
time as opposed to state dependent.
This simple example shows that a slightly different interpretation of menu cost – cost of
adjusting versus cost of planning – leads to very different implications for the dynamics of
capital adjustment. The distinction between time- and state-dependent adjustments can have
crucial implications for important economic questions. For instance, monetary policy has
long-lasting effects on the real economy if the firm makes her investment decisions according
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to a time-dependent rule, whereas if the firm adjusts her capital stock according to a state-
dependent rule, then monetary policy may have little real effect.
2.3.5 Aggregation
This subsection aggregates individual investment decisions to obtain the predictions of the
model for the time series of aggregate investment. To do so, we treat Zt as an aggregate prof-
itability shock and we make some assumptions about the distribution of the firms’ decision
dates.
Each inattentive firm in the economy gathers information and recomputes optimal plans
slowly over time. That is, firms respond infrequently – and possibly asynchronously –
to the aggregate shock. For each firm, the sequence of optimally chosen planning dates
D = {D(i)}∞i=0 forms a sequence of stochastic increasing events. The arrival of decision
dates is therefore a stochastic process, whose properties may be described by a set of proba-
bility density functions for the length of the inattentiveness period, conditional on when the
firm last planned. We denote these by fi (t) and assume that
Assumption 1. The densities fi (t) describe random variables that are
i) mutually independent;
ii) independent across firms;
iii) the same for all firms;
iv) uniformly distributed.
Independence of decision dates allows us to only keep track of when the last decision date for
each firm occurred. Parts (ii) and (iii) of Assumption 1 in turn allow us to interpret fi (t) as
the actual fraction of firms that are planning at a given point in time. Let ρ denote the mean
number of planning dates in a unit of time. As a result, (iv) implies that, in each period, the
share of firms planning is constant and equal to ρ = 1E(d∗) . Moreover, at any point in time t,
the fraction of firms not having planned for n periods, t−d∗ < ∀n < t, also equals ρ .18
At a given instant in time, the aggregate capital equals the sum of the capitals chosen by
different firms. If the index of the firms, j, stands for how long it has been since the firm last
18 Caballero and Engel (1991) present a generalized (S,s) model and derive conditions under which the
aggregate distribution is uniform. Reis (2006b) shows that, under some (very strict) conditions, the arrival of
decision dates in the aggregate economy tends to the exponential distribution with parameter ρ = 1/E (d∗).
Here we consider the uniform distribution to keep the computational burden manageable.
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planned, then the aggregate stock of capital is defined by
KIN,At =
ˆ t
t−d∗
1
d∗
M
1
α
[
E j
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α d j .
Aggregate investment at time t is given by
IIN,At =
ˆ t
t−d∗
1
d∗
IINj d j =
1
d∗
It +
ˆ t
t−d∗
1
d∗
IMj−1d j ,
where the first term represents the investment gulp of the 1d∗ firms that are planning at time
t, while the second term represents the maintenance investment of the remaining inattentive
firms. Finally, the aggregate investment rate is defined as the ratio of aggregate investment to
aggregate capital stock.
2.4 How do the models fit the data on investment?
2.4.1 Plant-level data
This subsection evaluates the qualitative ability of the models to match some key moments
characterizing the plant-level investment rates.
The models are calibrated to annual data, since the plant-level evidence is based on annual
surveys. Our preferred choices are r = 0.04, which is the value typically used in the literature
for the discount factor; the depreciation rate δ = 0.14, to match the average investment rate
at the plant-level; and the standard deviation of the profitability shock σ = 0.12, so as to have
(in combination with the planning costs parameter) an average inattentiveness of at least one
year. We also set the degree of monopoly power α to 0.7, consistent with the estimates in
the literature (see e.g. Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). With regard to the convex adjustment
costs model, we set the adjustment costs parameter ϕ to 11.76 so that the size of adjustment
ν is 0.24. The value for ν lies between the one reported by Summers (1981) and the one
estimated by Carlsson and Laséen (2005).19 In the model with fixed adjustment costs, we pick
the threshold values U = L= 0.15, that is, there is no adjustment as long as the current capital
19 The evidence provided by Summers (1981, p. 101) implicitly gives ν = 0.07, while Carlsson and Laséen
(2005, p. 975) report ν = 0.45.
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stock (before adjustment) is within a ±15% band around the frictionless level.20 Finally, we
consider two values for the costs of planning in the inattentiveness model, Θ = 0.010 and
Θ = 0.017, so that the average inattentiveness intervals are, respectively, 4 and 5 quarters.
These planning costs values are in line with the evidence provided in Reis (2006b).21
Using this parametrization, we generate simulated capital and investment data for a panel
of 1000 plants and 16 years.22 As a technical matter, instead of generating one normally
distributed value per year for the profitability shock Z, we divide each year into 240 intervals
(days) and generate a normally distributed shock for each interval. Using a finer time grid
allows us to choose more precise values for planning dates (recall that planning dates in the
inattentiveness model are chosen from a continuous set). Investment rates are computed as
total annual investment – the sum of gulps and maintenance investment in any given year –
divided by the capital stock in the final day of the year.
Table 2.1 reproduces different moments of plants’ investment rates in the U.S. data (second
column) and the models’ predictions (third to sixth column). For the sake of comparison, we
also report the moments from two leading papers in the lumpy investment literature, Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006) (seventh column) and Khan and Thomas (2008) (last column).
Here inaction is defined as a plant-level investment rate less than 1% in absolute value. Posi-
tive investment rates are those at or exceeding 1%, while negative investment rates are those
equal to or below −1%. Finally, as is common in this literature, positive spikes are observa-
tions in which the investment rate exceeds 20%, and negative spikes are episodes in which the
investment rate is less than −20%. The second column of table 2.1, taken from Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006), documents the nature of capital adjustment behavior using data from the
Longitudinal Research Database, a plant-level U.S. manufacturing data set. Clearly, the data
exhibits both periods of inactivity and large positive bursts of investment activity, while little
evidence of negative investment, especially large investment episodes. Also, there is a sharp
asymmetry in positive versus negative investment rates as well as in positive versus negative
investment spikes. For instance, positive spikes are observed 10 times as often as negative
spikes. Finally, autocorrelation in plant-level investment rate is positive but very low.
The model with quadratic adjustment costs cannot produce the bursts of investment and in-
20 Note that the threshold values map one-to-one to the adjustment costs parameter Φ¯. These values can be
obtained solving numerically the non-homogenous system given by (F.7).
21 Extensive sensitivity analysis confirmed that the properties of the inattentiveness model are not sensitive
to variation in the parametrization, as long as the average inattentiveness interval is at least 4 quarters.
22 This is roughly the length of the dataset analyzed by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Adding more plants
does not affect the results.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics, U.S. plant-level data and models
quadratic fixed fixed fixed
dataa adjustment adjustment information information CH06 f KT08g
costs modelb costs modelc costs modeld costs modele
inaction rate (%) 8.1 0 18.3 3.6 2.8 n.a. 7.3
negative investment (%) 10.4 0 8.8 13.8 12.7 n.a. 17.5
positive investment (%) 81.5 100 72.8 82.6 84.5 n.a. 75.2
positive spike (%) 18.6 4.1 19.9 28.3 24.1 13.2 18.5
negative spike (%) 1.8 0 0.18 0.97 1.3 2.3 1
serial correlation 0.058 0.647 -0.058 -0.064 -0.069 0.148 n.a.
Notes. Inaction rate: | i/k | < 1%. Negative investment: i/k ≤ −1%. Positive investment: i/k ≥ 1%. Positive
spike: i/k > 20%. Negative spike: i/k <−20%. Serial correlation: corr
[( i
k
)
t ,
( i
k
)
t−1
]
. For each variable, we
compute the time series average for each plant, and report the average across plants. The baseline parameters
are α = 0.7, r = 0.04, δ = 0.14 and σ = 0.12. a Data are from Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), table 1, sample
period 1972-1988. b ϕ = 11.76. c U = L = 0.15. d Θ= 0.010 (d∗ = 4 quarters). e Θ= 0.017 (d∗ = 5 quarters).
f Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), table 5. g Khan and Thomas (2008), table II. n.a.: not available.
action observed in the data. Moreover, through the smoothing of investment, it creates ex-
cessively positive autocorrelation of investment rates. Not surprisingly, it fits quite well the
persistence of the aggregate investment rate.23 In fact, this model is widely used to describe
the gradual adjustment observed at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, to match the capital ad-
justment observed in plant-level data different models of adjustment need to be considered.
As column 4 shows, even the simple model with fixed adjustment costs considered here is
able to create investment inactivity at the plant-level as well as to produce both positive and
negative investment spikes.
With only one exception, the inattentiveness model does a reasonably good job. It matches
both positive and negative investment of the frequency found in the data. It also produces
some inactivity, although it underestimates the frequency of such episodes. Moreover, it
generates positive and negative spikes. Also, column 6 reports the predictions of the model
when the firm is inattentive for five quarters. Overall, the model’s performance is similar to
the one with four-quarter plans. The exception is that the model creates low negative serial
correlation in investment. This moment of the data however warrants a digression, since the
23 See table 2.2.
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findings in the empirical investment literature are mixed.
On the one hand, one of the key findings in Doms and Dunne (1998) is that large investment
episodes are often spread across few (usually two or three) years, that is, there is a large prob-
ability of having a spike in the period immediately following a spike. In technical language,
adjustment hazard functions – the probability of adjusting – are downward-sloping with re-
spect to the time since the prior spike. The evidence provided by Doms and Dunne (1998)
therefore suggests positive serial correlation of investment at the plant-level and appears sup-
portive of a convex adjustment costs model.
On the other hand, Cooper et al. (1999) argue that unobservable heterogeneity at the plant-
level may yield downward-sloping hazard functions even if the hazard for any individual
plant is upward sloping. In fact, after controlling for unobservable heterogeneity, Cooper
et al. (1999) find evidence of upward-sloping hazard functions: the likelihood of a plant
experiencing a large investment episode is increasing in the time since the previous spike
passes by. Put differently, bursts of investment are followed, on average, by periods of low
investment.24
The fact that the hazard slopes upward provides support for lumpy adjustment behavior.
Therefore the negative serial correlation of the inattentiveness model (and of the non-convex
adjustment costs model as well) is analogous to the upward sloping hazards. Perhaps not
surprisingly, only a hybrid model presented in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), which mixes
both convex and non-convex components of adjustment costs, is able to reproduce this mo-
ment of the data.
Finally, the last column reports the results in Khan and Thomas (2008). Note that the inatten-
tiveness model performs at least as well as the Khan and Thomas model, which is “the first
to succeed in matching the available moments from the cross-sectional distribution of plant
investment rates”, (Khan and Thomas, 2008, p. 408).
2.4.2 Aggregate data
Having established the consistency of the inattentiveness model with essential features of the
microeconomic data, we now test the implications of the model with aggregate data. We use
the same parametrization as before and generate simulated aggregate capital and investment
data for a panel of 500 economies and 52 years.
24 Gelos and Isgut (2001) provide support for the evidence in Doms and Dunne (1998), while Nilsen and
Schiantarelli (2003) and Fennema et al. (2006) obtain results consistent with those of Cooper et al. (1999).
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics, U.S. aggregate data and models
data data fixed information fixed information KT08e
1954-2005a 1984-2005a costs model b,c costs model b,d
serial correlation 0.797 0.846 0.210 0.172 0.210
standard deviation 0.010 0.011 0.104 0.102 0.085
skewness 0.465 0.730 0.222 0.198 1.121
excess kurtosis -0.094 -0.446 -0.078 -0.268 2.313
Notes. For each moment, we compute the time series average for each economy, and report the average across
economies. a Data are annual private fixed nonresidential investment-to-capital ratio, computed using Bureau
of Economic Analysis tables and following the procedure described in Bachmann et al. (2010), appendix B1. b
The baseline parameters are α = 0.7, r = 0.04, δ = 0.14 , σ = 0.12 andΘ= 0.010 (d∗ = 4 quarters). c Statistics
are based on a 52-year simulated sample. d Statistics are computed using the last 22 years of the 52-year sample.
e Khan and Thomas (2008), table III.
Table 2.2 shows the second and higher order moments of annual aggregate investment rate
in the post-war U.S. data (1954-2005, second column) and in the Great Moderation period
(1984-2005, third column). It also displays the inattentiveness model’s predictions consider-
ing both the entire 52-year sample and the last 22 years of the full sample (fourth and fifth
column, respectively). For the sake of comparison, the sixth column reports the moments of
the Khan and Thomas (2008) partial equilibrium lumpy investment model.
The serial correlation of aggregate investment is about 0.8 in the data, much higher than that
observed at the plant-level. Aggregate investment also exhibits near zero standard deviation,
positive skewness and negative excess kurtosis. Note also that, while the second order mo-
ments are nearly the same in both periods, the higher moments are larger (in absolute value)
during the Great Moderation period.25
The performance of the inattentiveness model at the aggregate level is not quite as successful
as that at the plant-level. Although aggregation smooths out investment spikes and helps to
generate positive serial correlation of investment rate, the model still predicts far too little
persistence relative to the aggregate data. The model also overestimates (roughly 10 times)
the variability of the investment rate. Nevertheless, over the other dimensions, the model
25 The aggregate investment rate moments reported in table 2.2 are different from those reported by Khan
and Thomas (2008). Examining annual private investment-to-capital ratio over the period 1954:2005, Khan and
Thomas find persistence, standard deviation, skewness and excess kurtosis of 0.695, 0.008, 0.008 and −0.715,
respectively.
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does a better job. In fact, it matches well the excess kurtosis and it predicts about the right
amount of skewness. Note also that the model fits the post-war data slightly better than the
data for the Great Moderation period.
Despite the mixed performance of the inattentiveness model, one should note that the Khan
and Thomas (2008) partial equilibrium lumpy investment model is also not successful in
matching the moments of aggregate investment rate. In fact, the Khan and Thomas model pre-
dicts roughly the same serial correlation and standard deviation as the inattentiveness model,
and it also sharply overstates the skewness and kurtosis. It is worthwhile to point out that
Khan and Thomas improve the fit of their model when they include the effects of general
equilibrium in the lumpy investment environment. In particular, their general equilibrium
model yields an aggregate investment rate with persistence and volatility close to that ob-
served in the data. In chapter 3 we embed capital investment decisions with inattentiveness
in a general equilibrium framework and analyze whether (and to what extent) such a model
improves the fit at the aggregate level.
2.5 Applying the inattentiveness model to Tobin’s Q and
cash flow
Regressions of investment on Tobin’s Q and cash flow typically yield small positive coeffi-
cients on Q and larger coefficients on cash flow (see, for example, Moyen, 2004). The small
coefficient on Q has traditionally been interpreted as evidence of very high adjustment costs,
and the positive cash flow effect on investment has first been interpreted by Fazzari et al.
(1988) as evidence that firms face financial constraints. Abel and Eberly (2008) cast doubts
about these traditional interpretations of empirical investment equations. In fact, they show
that investment may remain sensitive to both Tobin’s Q and cash flow even when adjustment
costs and financing constraints are absent from the model.26
In the following subsection we briefly describe the main assumptions and results of the the-
oretical model of Abel and Eberly (2008). Then we evaluate how the assumptions made
by Abel and Eberly affect the predictions of the inattentiveness model. Finally we analyze
the effects of Tobin’s Q and cash flow on the investment rate in both models by means of
26 The interpretation of cash flow effects as evidence of financing constraints has also been called into ques-
tion by, among others, Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cooper and Ejarque (2003) and
Eberly et al. (2008).
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regression analysis.
2.5.1 How Q and cash flow may affect investment without frictions: the
Abel and Eberly (2008) model
2.5.1.1 Functional form assumptions
The theoretical model is the same as the one presented in section 2.3.1. In order to derive
an analytical relationship among investment, Tobin’s Q and cash flow, Abel and Eberly make
the following assumptions about the stochastic processes.
The profitability shock, Zt , follows a geometric Brownian motion with a time-varying drift,
µt , and a constant variance, σ2:
dZt = µtZtdt+σZtdz .
The drift µt in turn follows a regime-switching process and remains constant for a random
length of time. A new value of µt is drawn from an unchanging distribution F (µ˜) with finite
support [µL,µH ] with constant probability λ . The draws of new values of µt are i.i.d. and are
independent from the realizations of the other stochastic processes in the model.
Next, variable Mt , defined as
Mt ≡
(
r+δt
α
)− α1−α
,
follows a trendless geometric Brownian motion with a constant variance σ2M:
dMt = σMMtdzM ,
where dzM is the increment of a standard Wiener process.
2.5.1.2 Cash flow and Tobin’s Q
From section 2.3.1, recall that Π˜t = Z1−αt Kαt represents revenue net of labor costs, hence Π˜t
also represents cash flow before investment expenditure. Let ct = Π˜t/Kt denote the cash flow
before investment, normalized by the capital stock. Then the optimal cash flow per unit of
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capital, c∗t , is given by
c∗t =
Π˜∗t
K∗t
=
r+δt
α
= M
− 1−αα
t . (2.12)
That is, cash flow exhibits time-series variation because of the assumption that the deprecia-
tion rate (through the variable Mt) varies stochastically over time.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the value of the firm – the present value of current and expected
future operating profits – to the replacement cost of the firm’s capital stock. In this model
Tobin’s Q is given by
Q∗t = 1+
(1−α)ω∗
r−µt +λ c
∗
t , (2.13)
where ω∗≡
{
E
[
r−µt
r+λ−µt
]}−1
> 1. Three remarks are in order. First, Q∗t is a measure of aver-
age Q, rather than marginal Q, which equals one in this model. This distinction is noteworthy
because average Q is readily observable, whereas marginal Q is not directly observable. Sec-
ond, Tobin’s Q exceeds one – even without any adjustment costs – for a firm that earns rents
from monopoly power (α < 1). Third, Tobin’s Q exhibits time-series variation (that is not
perfectly correlated with contemporaneous cash flow) because of the assumption that the
growth rate of Zt varies stochastically.
2.5.1.3 The effects of Tobin’s Q and cash flow on investment
Gross investment I∗t is the sum of net investment, dK∗t , and depreciation, δtK∗t dt. Therefore
gross investment rate is
I∗t
K∗t
dt =
dK∗t
K∗t
+δtdt =
[
µt +δt +
1−α
2
(σM
α
)2]
dt+σdz+
1
α
σMdzM .
The expected value of the investment-capital ratio at time t, ι∗t , is
ι∗t = µt +δt +
1
2
1−α
α2
σ2M . (2.14)
Using equation (2.13) to express the growth rate µt in terms of the Q∗t and c∗t , and equation
(2.12) to express δt in terms of c∗t , then equation (2.14) may be rewritten as
ι∗t (Q
∗
t ,c
∗
t ) =
[
α− (1−α)ω
∗
Q∗t −1
]
c∗t +λ +
1−α
2
(σM
α
)2
. (2.15)
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Equation (2.15) shows the main result of the Abel and Eberly model: that Tobin’s Q and
cash flow can help account for movements in investment, even in a model in which there
are no frictions whatsoever. These effects arise because of the fact that Tobin’s Q reflects
expectations about future revenue growth, while cash flow reflects the effects of the user cost
of capital. Since both of these shocks (revenue growth and the user cost of capital) drive
investment, investment turns out to be correlated with both Q and cash flow.
To analyze the effects of these variables on investment, let βQ∗ =
∂ ι∗t (Q∗t ,c∗t )
∂Q∗t
and βc∗ =
∂ ι∗t (Q∗t ,c∗t )
∂c∗t
denote, respectively, the response of the investment-capital ratio to a variation in Q∗t and c∗t .
Then
βQ∗ =
(1−α)ω∗c∗t
(Q∗t −1)2
> 0 ,
that is, investment is an increasing function of Q∗t even though there are no convex costs of
adjustment. Similarly,
βc∗ = α− (1−α)ω
∗
Q∗t −1
> 0
as long as µt+δt > λ ∀t, which is assumed to be the case. Thus cash flow has a positive effect
on investment even though capital markets are perfect and there are no financing constraints.
2.5.2 Extending the inattentiveness model
Having modified the stochastic structure of the model, we first describe the new implications
of the inattentiveness model. Then we examine the relationship among investment, Tobin’s
Q and cash flow in this framework.
2.5.2.1 Model’s predictions
Proposition 3. With stochastic depreciation, the optimal inattentiveness interval approxi-
mately equals
d∗ =
√
4αΘ
(ασ)2+σ2M
.
This results shows that optimal inattentiveness falls with the volatility of the depreciation rate
shocks ( ∂d
∗
∂σM
< 0). That is, the firm adjusts her plans more frequently when the depreciation
rate is more volatile since the cost of being inattentive is higher in a world that is rapidly
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changing.27
Proposition 4. The optimal plan for capital between adjustment dates, for D(i) < t <
D(i+1), obeys the equation
KINt = K
∗
D(i)e
{[
µD(i)−α σ
2
2 − 12(
σM
α )
2
]
[t−D(i)]
}
.
In this case, the value of the drift of the profitability shock at planning date, as well as the
volatility of the depreciation rate, affects the plan for capital during the intervals of inat-
tentiveness. The optimal adjustment policy with inattentiveness is thus described by the
following equations
KINt =

K∗D(i) = M
1
α
D(i)ZD(i) ∀i ∈ NO
K∗D(i)e
{[
µD(i)−α σ
2
2 − 12(
σM
α )
2
]
[t−D(i)]
}
∀ D(i)< t < D(i+1)
.
2.5.2.2 Cash flow, Tobin’s Q and investment
Proposition 5. Cash flow per unit of capital and Tobin’s Q are given by, respectively,
cINt =

c∗D(i) =
[
MD(i)
]− 1−αα ∀i ∈ NO
c∗D(i)e
{[
1−α
2 (
σM
α )
2
]
[t−D(i)]
}
∀ D(i)< t < D(i+1)
QINt =

1+ (1−α)ω
∗
r−µD(i)+λ c
∗
D(i) ∀i ∈ NO
1+ (1−α)ω
IN
r−µD(i)−c1+λ c
IN
t ∀ D(i)< t < D(i+1)
,
where c1 ≡−α σ22 − 12
σ2M
α and ω
IN ≡
{
E
[
r−µt−c1
r−µt−c1+λ
]}−1
. Note that, during periods of inat-
tentiveness, cINt and Q
IN
t do not exhibit time-series variation. In particular, neither Q
IN
t is a
function of the current growth rate, nor is cash flow related with the depreciation rate.
Finally, investment with inattentiveness combines investment gulps and maintenance invest-
27 Similarly to the case analyzed in section 2.3.3, it also holds that ∂d
∗
∂Θ > 0 and
∂d∗
∂σ < 0, while the prediction
∂d∗
∂α < 0 now holds if and only if α >
σM
σ .
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ment and is described by
ID(i+1) = K∗D(i+1)−K∗D(i)e
{[
µD(i)−α σ
2
2 − 12(
σM
α )
2
]
d∗
}
∀i ∈ NO
.
IMt+1 =
dKINt
dt +δtK
IN
t =
[
µD(i)−α σ
2
2 − 12
(σM
α
)2+δt]Kt ∀ D(i)< t < D(i+1)
During intervals of time between consecutive planning dates, maintenance investment IMt
varies continuously over time to fully compensate for depreciation and does not respond
to possible variations of the growth rate. From this and the results above, it follows that
investment during period of inattentiveness is not correlated neither with Tobin’s Q , nor with
cash flow.
Thus, since it is not possible to derive an analytical relationship between these variables, we
analyze the effects of Tobin’s Q and cash flow on the investment rate by means of regression
analysis.
2.5.3 Simulation results
We simulate the models by first choosing a set of baseline parameters. As in section 2.4,
we pick r = 0.04, δ = 0.14, σ = 0.12 and α = 0.7. The drift µt of the profitability shock
follows a regime-switching process with finite support [µL,µH ]. Condition 1 in Abel and
Eberly (2008) states that the value of the firm is finite if r > µH . To satisfy this condition, we
set µH = 0.03 and µL = 0, that is, the growth rate varies between 0 and 3 percent per year.28
We use the estimates of Eberly et al. (2008) to calibrate the parameter λ , which represents the
probability of changing regime. Eberly et al. (2008) estimate alternative investment models
in which the demand (or productivity) shock follows a regime-switching process and find
that the probability of a regime switch is approximately 7% per year. This implies an average
regime duration of 14.2 years. We thus set λ = 114.2 . Next, in the inattentiveness model,
the condition ∂d
∗
∂α < 0 holds if and only if σM < ασ (see footnote 27). Given our baseline
parameters for α and σ , we pick σM = 0.057 so as to satisfy this condition. Finally we set
Θ= 0.016 implying an average inattentiveness of 1 year.
Using this parametrization, we generate simulated capital, investment, Tobin’s Q and cash
flow data for a panel of 1000 firms and 15 years. We then use these simulated data to run OLS
28 Appendix E shows that the condition for the inattentiveness model is less restrictive.
97
CHAPTER 2. INATTENTIVENESS: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF
INVESTMENT GULPS
regressions of the investment-capital ratio on Tobin’s Q and normalized cash flow. Following
the literature (e.g. Alti, 2003), we estimate the regression specification
It
Kt
= β0+β1Qt +β2
ct
Kt
+ εt , (2.16)
where gross investment It is the sum of investment gulps and maintenance investment in year
t, Kt is the capital stock at the beginning of year t, Qt is the beginning-of-the-year t value of
Tobin’s Q, ct is the sum of cash flows during year t, and εt is the error term.
Table 2.3 reports the sample means of the estimated regression coefficients, the standard
errors, and the adjusted R2. We report the results of investment regressions without and with
cash flow (columns labelled, respectively, “univariate” and “multivariate”).
Columns 2 and 3 show the results from the U.S. data. We report the results for two classes of
firms, those identified by Fazzari et al. (1988) as financially constrained (left side) and those
that are less financially constrained (right side). In the univariate regression, the coefficient
on Q is quantitatively small – suggesting high adjustment costs – with modest explanatory
power. Adding cash flow to the investment regression improves the fit – the adjusted R2
increases – and reduces the effect of Q on investment. In the multivariate regression, the
estimated coefficient on cash flow is much larger than the coefficient on Q, that is, investment
is very sensitive to cash flow. Furthermore, investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms
that are identified to be more financially constrained. This is the main finding of Fazzari et al.
(1988).
Columns 4 and 5 report the results for the Abel and Eberly (2008) model. The overall picture
is consistent with the data and confirm the main theoretical prediction of the model: that
Tobin’s Q and cash flow do explain investment, even when adjustment costs and financing
constraints are removed from the model.
The results for the inattentiveness model are shown in columns 6 and 7. There are two
important results. First, the estimated coefficients are larger than in the data. This result
should be not surprising since the optimal investment decision in the inattentiveness model
involves infrequent and lumpy changes in investment rates. Therefore, due to the highly
nonlinear nature of investment decisions, the estimated coefficients on the linear equation
(2.16) turn out to be rather uninformative. Given these shortcomings, Gomes (2001) chooses
the adjusted R2 as indicator of additional informative content of the cash flow regressor in
such nonlinear models. Thus, following Gomes (2001), the second result of this exercise is
that the cash flow regressor significantly improves the predictive power of the regression as
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Table 2.3: Investment regressions, U.S. data and models
dataa Abel and Eberly (2008)b Inattentiveness modelb
coefficient univariate multivariate univariate multivariate univariate multivariate
β1 0.0045 / 0.0044 0.0008 / 0.0020 0.055 0.014 0.344 -0.329
(0.0004) / (0.0002) (0.0004) / (0.0003) (0.023) (0.003) (0.406) (0.138)
R2 0.23 / 0.11 0.297 0.035
β2 0.464 / 0.230 0.589 6.141
(0.027) / (0.010) (0.021) (0.552)
R2 0.46 / 0.19 0.979 0.900
Notes. The fixed term effect β0 is not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. a Data are from Fazzari
et al. (1988), table 5, class 1 (low dividend) / class 3 (high dividend), sample period 1970-1984. b The baseline
parameters are α = 0.7, r = 0.04, δ = 0.14, σ = 0.12, µL = 0, µH = 0.03, λ = 114.2 , σM = 0.057 and Θ= 0.016
(d∗ = 4 quarters).
the adjusted R2 also improves substantially when cash flow is included. The inattentiveness
model therefore still finds a role for cash flow in explaining investment.
To better understand the large cash flow sensitivity of investment implied by the inattentive-
ness model, we run the following experiment. We consider a sudden and permanent rise in
the plant-level productivity. We then derive the path for normalized cash flow and investment
rate generated by the inattentiveness model and compare it with the path generated by the
Abel and Eberly model.
The productivity shock Zt is assumed to be constant at its steady state level and then, at year
4, unexpectedly rises by 10 percent and remains at this new level thereafter. The top graph
in figure 2.2 shows the path of normalized cash flow predicted by the two models. In both
models, a positive shock to productivity leads to increased cash flow in the period following
the shock, and cash flow returns to its new steady state two periods after the shock. The
models also exhibit similar dynamic paths.29
Differences among the models become apparent examining the response of investment rate
in the bottom graph of figure 2.2. The inattentiveness model predicts an investment rate
response that is much larger than that in the frictionless model. Thus, since the cash flow re-
sponses are almost the same in both models, the message from figure 2.2 is clear: investment
29 This result comes from the fact that the depreciation rate is held constant throughout this experiment (i.e.
variable Mt is constant).
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Figure 2.2: Dynamic paths after a 10 percent rise in the plant-level productivity at year 4
rate is much more sensitive to cash flow variations in the inattentiveness model. The intuition
behind this is that the inattentive firm responds only infrequently, and by large amounts, to
shocks. Inattentiveness thus enhances the cash flow sensitivity of investment.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a novel microfoundation for the lumpiness of micro-level capital
adjustment. Traditional explanations are based on fixed costs of adjusting the stock of capi-
tal. In this chapter capital adjustment is frictionless. Instead, the new explanation proposed
here is inattentiveness, whereby firms make infrequent investment decisions due to a cost
of gathering and processing information. Introducing such information/planning costs into
an otherwise frictionless model is enough to induce infrequent and possibly lumpy capital
adjustments. On the one hand, in between adjustment dates, the firm is inactive and only
undertakes planned maintenance investment. On the other hand, when the firm does update
her information and plan, the stock of capital immediately jumps to its optimal level. It is
therefore likely to observe an investment gulp at those planning dates.
We have found that the inattentiveness model does a good job in matching key features of
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micro-investment, and it also fits some (but not all) features of investment at the aggregate
level. We have also shown that the inattentiveness model still finds a role for cash flow in
explaining investment and that inattentiveness exacerbates the cash flow sensitivity of invest-
ment.
Overall, we believe these results are encouraging for at least two reasons. First, the model
developed here represents the first attempt to apply inattentiveness to the behavior of firms
accumulating physical capital, while the literature that analyzes lumpy capital adjustments
due to non-convex adjustment costs is much more mature. Second, the calibration is not
fully optimized. It is likely that by changing some parameters, the inattentiveness model
might match the moments more closely. In any case, the model does not seem to perform
noticeably worse than one of the leading models in the literature.
The model so far is to some extent stylized and leaves much room for improvements. For
example, in this chapter we have treated information/planning costs as a pure alternative to
adjustment costs. As it is well known, whenever there is a cost of gathering information
and planning, and no direct costs of adjusting capital, the optimal adjustment rule is time
as opposed to state dependent. More recent work on information frictions in monetary eco-
nomics integrates both state and time-dependent adjustment rules in one framework. Abel
et al. (2009) and Alvarez et al. (2010a) study financial investment decisions with information
and transaction costs, Alvarez et al. (2010b) analyze the price setting problem of a firm facing
both observation and adjustment costs, and Woodford (2009) builds a hybrid model of ratio-
nal inattention (state-dependent adjustment) and inattentiveness (time-dependent adjustment)
to study the optimal price-setting decision of a firm. Therefore, it would be a worthy pursuit
to follow this literature and extend this model to include adjustment costs. Furthermore,
the model abstracts from general equilibrium considerations. In the next chapter we embed
capital accumulation with inattentiveness into the Mankiw and Reis (2006, 2007) sticky in-
formation general equilibrium model and analyze whether such a model can account for key
features of the business cycle.
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Appendix E - Inattentiveness model
E1. Quick review of the solution of continuous-time stochastic processes (Brownian mo-
tions)
Let St be a geometric Brownian motion defined by the following stochastic differential equa-
tion:
dSt = µStdt+σStdWt , (E.1)
where dWt is a Wiener process, and µ and σ are, respectively, the drift and the variance
parameter. The behavior of St can be derived by applying Ito’s lemma to d lnSt :
d lnSt =
1
St
dSt− 12
1
S2t
(dSt)
2 =
1
St
[µStdt+σStdWt ]− 12
1
S2t
S2t σ
2dt ,
where the last equality follows from (E.1) and from the fact that (dWt)
2 = dt and (dt)2 =
dt dWt = 0. Thus
d lnSt =
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
dt+σdWt . (E.2)
Integrating (E.2) and applying the fundamental theorem of calculus yields
St = S0e
{(
µ−σ22
)
t+σWt
}
.
One can also easily derive the following relationships, which hold ∀k:
Skt = S
k
0e
{
k
(
µ−σ22
)
t+kσWt
}
(E.3)
E0
(
Skt
)
= Sk0e
{
k
[
µ+(k−1)σ22
]
t
}
(E.4)[
E0
(
Skt
)] 1
k = S0e
{[
µ+(k−1)σ22
]
t
}
(E.5)
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E2. The inattentive firm’s problem - Section 2.3.3
Applying the above properties to the stochastic processes for Zt (dZt = σZtdz) yields:
Zt = ZD(i)e
{
−σ22 [t−D(i)]+σzt
}
ED(i) (Zt) = ZD(i)e
[t−D(i)] (E.6)[
ED(i)
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α = ZD(i)e
{
−α σ22 [t−D(i)]
}
(E.7)
The first order condition with respect to Kt is:
E
[
αZ1−αt K
α−1
t − (r+δ )
]
= 0⇔ Kα−1t E
(
Z1−αt
)
=
r+δ
α
⇔
Kt =
[
r+δ
α
]− 11−α [
E
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α = M
1
α
[
E
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α . (E.8)
Proof of proposition 2
Substituting (E.7) into (E.8) gives the result in the proposition. q
Proof of proposition 1
Using (E.8) to evaluate the profit function shows that expected optimal operating profits are
Π(x, t) = (1−α)
(
r+δ
α
)− α1−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ξ
[
E
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α = ΞZ0 exp
(
−ασ
2
2
t
)
,
where the second equality follows from (E.7). In this case the Bellman equation (2.8) may
be rewritten as
V (x0) = max
d
{ˆ d
o
e−rtΞZ0e−btdt+ e−rdE [−ΘΠ(x,d)+V (x,d)]
}
,
where b = α σ
2
2 . Given that Π(x,0) = ΞZ0, we make the (educated) guess that the value
function is linear: V (x) = AZ, where A is a coefficient to be determined. The Bellman
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equation then becomes
AZ0 = max
d
ΞZ0
(
1− e−(r+b)d
)
r+b
+ e−rd
[
−ΘΞZ0e−bd +AE (Zd)
] .
From (E.6), E (Zd) = Z0 , then cancelling terms yields
A = max
d
Ξ
(
1− e−(r+b)d
)
r+b
+ e−rd
[
A−ΘΞe−bd
] . (E.9)
The first-order condition from the maximization problem is
∂A
∂d
= e−rd
{
Ξe−bd [1+Θ(r+b)]− rA
}
= 0 . (E.10)
At the optimum d∗, (E.9) gives the solution for A:
A =
Ξ
(
1− e−(r+b)d∗
)
r+b
+ e−rd
∗ [
A−ΘΞe−bd∗
]
⇔
A =
Ξ
(
1− e−(r+b)d∗
)
−ΘΞ(r+b)e−(r+b)d∗
(r+b)
(
1− e−rd∗) .
Using (E.10) and rearranging then yields the condition
Γ(b,Θ,d∗) = rebd
∗− [1+Θ(r+b)]
(
r+b−be−rd∗
)
= reα
σ2
2 d
∗−
[
1+Θ
(
r+α
σ2
2
)](
r+α
σ2
2
−ασ
2
2
e−rd
∗
)
.
Next, we check the second-order conditions for the maximization problem in (E.9). Note that
∂ 2A
∂d2
= −re−rd
{
Ξe−bd [1+Θ(r+b)]− rA
}
−bΞe−(r+b)d [1+Θ(r+b)] .
At the optimal d∗, equation (E.10) implies that the first term in the sum is 0, while the second
term is always negative. Therefore, ∂
2A
∂d2 < 0, which guarantees that the zero of the function
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Γ(b,Θ,d∗) corresponds to a maximum.
The optimal choice of inattentiveness d∗ is the zero of Γ(·). For Θ > 0, Γ(b,Θ,0) =
−rθ (r+b)< 0,
ΓΘ =−(r+b)
[
r+b−be−rd∗
]
< 0 ∀d
Γd (·) = br
{
ebd
∗− [1+Θ(r+b)]e−rd∗
}
Γd (b,Θ,0) =−Θbr (r+b)< 0;Γd (b,Θ,+∞) = +∞; Γd (b,Θ,d∗)> 0
Γb (·) =−1−2Θ(r+b)+ rdebd∗+ e−rd∗ [1+Θr+2θb]
Γb (b,Θ,0) =−Θr < 0;Γb (b,Θ,+∞) = +∞;Γb (b,Θ,d∗)> 0 .
For d∗ > 0, the implicit function theorem implies that
ΓΘ (b,Θ,d∗)+Γd (b,Θ,d∗)
∂d∗
∂Θ
= 0⇔ ∂d
∗
∂Θ
=−Γθ (b,Θ,d
∗)
Γd (b,Θ,d∗)
> 0
Γb (b,Θ,d∗)+Γd (b,Θ,d∗)
∂d∗
∂b
= 0⇔ ∂d
∗
∂b
=−Γb (b,Θ,d
∗)
Γd (b,Θ,d∗)
< 0 .
Finally, to obtain the approximation, let define Θ˜=
√
Θ so that
Γ
(
b,Θ˜,d∗
)
= rebd
∗− [1+ Θ˜2 (r+b)](r+b−be−rd∗)
and note that Γ(b,0,0) = 0, Γd (b,0,0) = 0 and ΓΘ˜ (b,0,0) = 0. The implicit function the-
orem, ΓΘ˜+Γd
∂d∗
∂ Θ˜ = 0 therefore does not apply since ΓΘ˜ = Γd = 0, so the point Θ˜ = d = 0
is a bifurcation point. One further round of differentiation plus the fact that ΓdΘ˜ (b,0,0) = 0
lead to the conclusion that
ΓΘ˜Θ˜+Γdd
(
∂d
∂ Θ˜
)2
= 0⇒ ∂d
∂ Θ˜
=
√
−ΓΘ˜Θ˜
Γdd
.
Since ΓΘ˜Θ˜ (·) =−2(r+b)
(
r+b−be−rd∗) and Γdd (·) = br{bebd + r [1+ Θ˜2 (r+b)]e−rd},
then ΓΘ˜Θ˜ (b,0,0) =−2r (r+b) and Γdd (b,0,0) = br (r+b), therefore
∂d
∂ Θ˜
=
√
−ΓΘ˜Θ˜
Γdd
=
√
2
b
.
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Since a first-order Taylor approximation of d∗ around Θ˜= 0 is given by d∗ = ∂d
∗
∂ Θ˜
√
Θ, then
d∗ =
√
4Θ
ασ2
. q
E3. The inattentive firm’s problem - Section 2.5.2
Proof of proposition 4
The first order condition with respect to Kt is:
E
[
αZ1−αt K
α−1
t − (r+δt)
]
= 0⇔ Kt =
[
E
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α
[
E (r+δt)
α
]− 11−α
.
Since Mt ≡
(
r+δt
α
)− α1−α , then E (r+δt)/α = E(M− 1−ααt ) and the first order condition be-
comes
Kt =
[
E
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α
[
E
(
M
− 1−αα
t
)]− 11−α
.
Given the stochastic processes for Zt (dZt = µtZtdt + σZtdz) and Mt (dMt = σMMtdzM ),
applying the properties (E.3)-(E.5) gives the result in the proposition. q
Proof of proposition 3
Abel and Eberly (2008) show that the optimal capital stock (K∗t ) and the optimal operating
profit (Π∗t ) are given by, respectively, K∗t = ZtM
1/α
t and Π∗t = (1−α)ZtMt , while optimal
cash flow is c∗t = M
− 1−αα
t . Inheriting the stochastic properties of Zt and Mt , optimal capital
stock and operating profits follow a geometric Brownian motion with time-varying drift:
dK∗t
K∗t
=
[
µt +
1−α
2
(σM
α
)2]
dt+σdz+
1
α
σMdzM (E.11)
and
dΠ∗t
Π∗t
= µtdt+σdz+σMdzM , (E.12)
while cash flow inherits the stochastic property of Mt and follows a geometric Brownian
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motion with constant drift:
dc∗t
c∗t
=
1−α
2
(σM
α
)2
dt+
α−1
α
σMdzM .
For the processes in (E.11)-(E.12), it is easy to show that the expected value of capital and
profits are, respectively,
ED(i) (K
∗
t ) = KD(i)e
[
µD(i)+ 1−α2 (
σM
α )
2
]
[t−D(i)] (E.13)
and
ED(i) (Π∗t ) =ΠD(i)e
µD(i)[t−D(i)] . (E.14)
Let function G(x, t) denote the expected difference between profits earned with full informa-
tion and profits earned while following a pre-determined plan (ΠINt ). To obtain an approx-
imation of the optimal length of inattentiveness, we use the result in Proposition 4 in Reis
(2006b), that states that a perturbation approximation of the optimal inattentiveness around
the situation when planning is costless is
d∗ =
√
2Θ
Gt (x,0)
. (E.15)
For an inattentive firm, optimal profits are
ΠINt = (1−α)
[
E
(
Z1−αt
)] 1
1−α
[
E
(
M
− 1−αα
t
)]− α1−α
.
Given the stochastic processes for Zt and Mt , applying the properties (E.3)-(E.5) gives
ΠINt =ΠD(i)e
{[
µD(i)−α σ
2
2 − 12
σ2M
α
]
[t−D(i)]
}
,
where ΠD(i) = (1−α)ZD(i)MD(i). Using (E.13) and (E.14), G(x, t) results
G(x, t) = ED(i) (Π∗t )−ΠINt = eµD(i)[t−D(i)]
{
1− e
{
−
(
α σ
2
2 +
1
2
σ2M
α
)
[t−D(i)]
}}
. (E.16)
Taking the derivative of (E.16) with respect to t and evaluating at (x,0) yields Gt (x,0) =(
α σ
2
2 +
1
2
σ2M
α
)
=
[
(ασ)2+σ2M
2α
]
. Substituting this result in (E.15) gives the result in the proposition. q
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Proof of proposition 5
For an inattentive firm, optimal cash flow is given by cINt = E
(
M
− 1−αα
t
)
. Applying the
properties (E.3)-(E.5) gives the expression for cINt in the proposition.
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the value of the firm to the firm’s capital stock: Qt =Vt/Kt .
To compute the value of the inattentive firm, we follow the steps in Abel and Eberly (2008).
The value of the firm can be derived by viewing the firm as composed of two divisions –
a capital-owning division that owns Kt at time t and a capital-operating division that rents
capital to produce and sell output at time t. On the one hand, capital can be instantaneously
and costlessly bought or sold at a price of one at time t, so that the value of the capital-owning
division at time t is Kt . On the other hand, the value of the capital-operating division is the
present value of current and expected future operating profits.
The value of the firm at time t is thus given by
V INt = K
IN
t +
ˆ ∞
t
Πt+τe−rτdτ ,
where
Πt+τ =Πt exp

µt−ασ22 − 12 σ2Mα︸ ︷︷ ︸
µt+c1
(t+ τ)
 ; c1 ≡−ασ22 − 12 σ2Mα < 0 .
Let Pt = P(µt ,Πt) ≡
´ ∞
t Et (Πt+τ)e
−rτdτ be the price of a claim on the infinite stream of
profits Πt+τ for τ ≥ 0. Because the path of future growth rates of Πt is independent of the
current value of Πt , P(µt ,Πt) may be rewritten as p(µt)Πt , where
p(µt)≡ Et
[ˆ ∞
t
Πt+τ
Πt
e−rτdτ
]
.
Let p(µt ,T ) be the value of p(µt) conditional on the assumption that the growth rate of Πt
remains equal to µt until time t +T , and after that a new value of the growth rate is drawn
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from the unconditional distribution. Therefore
p(µt ,T ) =
ˆ T
0
e−(r−µt−c1)τdτ+ e−(r−µt−c1)T Et
[ˆ ∞
T
Πt+τ
Πt+T
e−r(τ−T )dτ
]
=
1− e−(r−µt−c1)T
r−µt− c1 + e
−(r−µt−c1)T Et
[ˆ ∞
0
Πt+T+τ
Πt+T
e−rτdτ
]
.
Condition 1 The value of the firm is finite if r > µH + c1.
Since c1 < 0, then Condition 1 is less restrictive than that in Abel and Eberly (2008).
Let p∗ be the expectation of p(µt) when µt is drawn from its unconditional distribution, so
that the last equation can be rewritten as
p(µt ,T ) =
1− e−(r−µt−c1)T
r−µt− c1 + e
−(r−µt−c1)T p∗ . (E.17)
Since a new regime arrives with constant probability λ , the density of T is
f (T ) = λe−λT (E.18)
and
p(µt) =
ˆ ∞
0
p(µt ,T ) f (T )dT . (E.19)
Substituting (E.17) and (E.18) into (E.19) yields
p(µt) =
ˆ ∞
0
[
1− e−(r−µt−c1)T
r−µt− c1 + e
−(r−µt−c1)T p∗
]
λe−λT dT
=
λ
r−µt− c1
{ˆ ∞
0
[
e−λT +(rp∗−µt p∗− c1 p∗−1)e−(r−µt+λ )T
]
dT
}
=
1+λ p∗
r−µt− c1+λ . (E.20)
Since p∗ = E [p(µt)], taking the unconditional expectation of (E.20) gives
p∗ = (1+λ p∗)E
[
1
r−µt− c1+λ
]
,
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which can be rearranged to obtain
p∗ = ω INE
[
1
r−µt− c1+λ
]
since
ω IN ≡
{
E
[
r−µt− c1
r−µt− c1+λ
]}−1
.
Therefore ω IN = (1+λ p∗), so
p(µt) =
ω IN
r−µt− c1+λ .
Consequently
P(µt ,Πt)≡
ˆ ∞
t
Et (Πt+τ)e−rτdτ =
ω IN
r−µt− c1+λΠt
and the value of the firm is given by
V INt = K
IN
t +
ω IN
r−µt− c1+λΠ
IN
t .
Tobin’s Q for an inattentive firm is therefore given by
QINt =
V INt
QINt
= 1+
(1−α)ω IN
r−µD(i)− c1+λ
cINt . q
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Appendix F - Partial and state-dependent (lumpy) adjust-
ment models
Convex adjustment costs and partial adjustment
Let us suppose that the firm incurs in two types of costs – a cost whenever the current capital
stock differs from the frictionless level and one to adjust the current level of capital. Putting
these two costs together in a loss function and using a discrete time setup, the dynamic pro-
gramming problem is given by
Vˆ (Kt−1,K∗t ) = minKt
(Kt−K∗t )2
2
+
ϕ
2
(Kt−Kt−1)2+βEtVˆ
(
Kt ,K∗t+1
)
, (F.1)
where ϕ > 0 is the adjustment costs parameter. The first-order condition of the optimization
problem is
Kt−K∗t +ϕ (Kt−Kt−1)−βϕEt (Kt+1−Kt) = 0 , (F.2)
where the last term comes from using (F.1) to solve ∂Vˆ/∂Kt . Given that the problem is
quadratic, we make the (educated) guess that the the control variable (Kt) is linearly related
to the two elements of the state vector (Kt−1,K∗t ):
Kt = ν1K∗t +ν2Kt−1 ,
where ν1 and ν2 are coefficients to be determined. Using this conjecture in (F.2) and taking
expectations of the future value of Kt yields
Kt−K∗t +ϕ (Kt−Kt−1)−βϕ [ν1K∗t +(ν2−1)Kt ] = 0 , (F.3)
where we use the fact that EtK∗t+1 = K
∗
t for a geometric Brownian motion. Solving (F.3) for
Kt gives the solution for ν1 and ν2:
ν1 =
1+βϕν1
1+ϕ−βϕ (ν2−1)
and
ν2 =
ϕ
1+ϕ−βϕ (ν2−1) .
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It is easy to check that ν2 = 1−ν1. The optimal adjustment is thus given by
Kt = νK∗t +(1−ν)Kt−1 ,
where ν ≡ ν1 is the (positive) solution of the following quadratic equation
βϕν2+(1+ϕ−βϕ)ν−1 = 0 . (F.4)
Non-convex adjustment costs and state-dependent (lumpy) adjustment
The firm has a stock of capital Kt and a strictly positive desired (or target) stock K∗t . Let the
adjustment cost incurred when changing the capital stock at any given time T be proportional
to the current capital stock (before adjustment): Φ¯KT− . At any normalized time 0, the firm’s
problem is to minimize the present value cost:
V˜ (K0,K∗0 ) = infKT ,T
E0
{
e−rT Φ¯KT−+ e−rTV˜ (KT ,K∗T )
}
, (F.5)
where T is the first stopping time. Let wt ≡ Kt −K∗t denote the departure from the desired
optimum. Then it is possible to write V˜ (Kt ,K∗t ) as KtJ (wt). If one assumes that the firm
keeps the level of the capital stock constant by undertaking maintenance investment to fully
compensate for depreciation, and defines N ≡ infw ewJ (w), then the problem can be written
in terms of a single state variable:
J (w0) = inf
T
E0
{
e−rT Φ¯+ e−rT e−wT−N
}
.
Since K∗t = M
1
α Zt , then the target stock level inherits the stochastic properties of Zt and thus
follows a geometric Brownian motion: dK∗t = σK∗t dz. Then dwt = dKt − dK∗t = −σdz.
After repeated application of Ito’s lemma, one can show that J (w) satisfies the following
linear homogenous ordinary differential equation:
σ2
2
J
′′− rJ = 0 . (F.6)
The optimal policy consists of lower and upper trigger levels, denoted by L and U , respec-
tively, and a common target point denoted by c, with L≤ c≤U . The general solution of (F.6)
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is
J (w) = A1eα1w+A2eα2w ,
where α1 =
√
2r/σ , α2 = −α1 and A1 and A2 are constants of integration to be determined
simultaneously with L, U and c from the boundary conditions of the problem. The latter
are given by the value matching and smooth pasting conditions that, after some rearranging,
yield the following non-homogenous full-rank system:
J’ (L)+ J (L) = Φ¯
J’ (U)+ J (U) = Φ¯
J’ (c)+ J (c) = 0
J’ (L)+ e(c−L)J (c) = 0
J’ (U)+ e(c−U)J (c) = 0 ,
(F.7)
which can be solved numerically. It is well known that the inaction range is generally in-
creasing with respect to σ and Φ¯.
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Lumpy investment in sticky information
general equilibrium1
This chapter introduces lumpy micro-level investment into a sticky information general equi-
librium model. Lumpy investment arises because of sticky information in capital decisions
instead of the more popular assumption of non-convex adjustment costs. The only source of
rigidity in the model is inattentiveness, which is pervasive to all markets and decisions. The
model yields aggregate dynamics substantially different from those of an otherwise identical
model with frictionless investment, and much closer to the empirical evidence. In delivering
these results this model strengthens the case for the relevance of lumpy micro-level invest-
ment for the business cycle.
1 I am extremely grateful to Ricardo Reis for his invaluable guidance, to Alper Çenesiz for helpful comments,
and to Manuel M. F. Martins for extensive and critical comments on an early draft of this chapter which have
considerably improved its content and readability. I would also like to thank professor Bachmann for providing
the data on quarterly investment rates, Assia Ezzeroug and Maik Wolters for discussions on the implementation
of sticky information models in Dynare, and the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia for financial support
(Ph.D. scholarship). Any errors are my own.
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3.1 Introduction
Figure 3.1 plots output and investment over the U.S. business cycle. The figure shows that
aggregate investment is strongly procyclical, very persistent and much more volatile than out-
put. Underlying such smooth aggregate investment dynamics are nevertheless infrequent and
large, or lumpy, capital adjustments at the microeconomic level. Doms and Dunne (1998)
show that about 50% of an average plant’s cumulative investment over 15 years is concen-
trated in a period of two or three (contiguous) years.
Figure 3.1: Output and investment over the U.S. business cycle
Note. The figure displays detrended quarterly real GDP and real private domestic investment in the U.S. over
the period 1950-2005. The trends have been computed using the band-pass Baxter-King filter. Red line: output.
Blue line: investment. Grey bars denote NBER recessions.
The volatility of investment is a prime contributor to aggregate fluctuations. According to
Barro (1997, table 9.1), private investment accounts for about 93% of the fluctuations in
GDP, and thus “as a first approximation, explaining recessions amounts to explaining the
sharp contractions in the private investment components”.2 Notwithstanding the importance
of investment in explaining the business cycle (as well as, obviously, in determining eco-
nomic long-term growth), capital accumulation has somewhat been ignored in canonical ver-
sions of the New Keynesian model (e.g. Galí, 2008). By now, however, standard DSGE
2 Barro’s findings come from analyzing the role of investment during five U.S. recessions (namely, those
ending in 1961Q1, 1970Q4, 1975Q1, 1982Q4 and 1991Q4).
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models do feature endogenous capital accumulation (e.g. Levin et al., 2005 and Smets and
Wouters, 2007). Developing a microfounded model able to explain aggregate investment
dynamics has nevertheless kept economists busy for years. To reproduce smooth aggregate
investment dynamics, these DSGE models introduce convex investment adjustment costs. In
doing so, however, the lumpy nature of plant-level investment is simply brushed away, and
so these models’ microfoundations for investment behavior seem rather weak. More recent
theoretical research (e.g. Caballero, 1999) has proposed an alternative source for the smooth
aggregate investment dynamics, suggesting that it may result from aggregation of infrequent,
asynchronous and lumpy micro-level capital adjustments, which can be generated by fixed
costs of capital adjustment.
An important debate running through the recent general equilibrium literature is whether
micro-level lumpy capital adjustments have important implications for aggregate investment
and, more generally, for the business cycle. The origin of the debate over the (ir)relevance
of lumpy investment for aggregate dynamics dates back to Thomas (2002). Previously, par-
tial equilibrium state-dependent lumpy adjustment models (Caballero et al., 1995, Doms and
Dunne, 1998, Caballero and Engel, 1999, Cooper et al., 1999 and Doyle and Whited, 2001)
had stressed important amplification and propagatory effects arising from infrequent plant-
level investment activities. Thomas (2002) reassessed the impact of lumpy micro-level invest-
ment in a general equilibrium framework and concluded that firm-level investment lumpiness
plays no important role for the aggregate dynamics of the model economy. In fact, her lumpy
investment model generates business cycle dynamics and moments that are alike to those
generated by an otherwise identical model characterized by frictionless investment. Accord-
ing to Thomas (2002, pag. 508), the irrelevance result arises because of the influence of
general equilibrium forces: “in general equilibrium, households’ preference for relatively
smooth consumption profiles offsets changes in aggregate investment demand implied by the
introduction of lumpy plant-level investment”. Subsequently Gourio and Kashyap (2007) and
Bachmann et al. (2010), among others, contrasted the Thomas result and found that lumpy in-
vestment matters for aggregate dynamics. Gourio and Kashyap (2007) re-calibrated Thomas’
(2002) model and found that the recalibrated model has properties that differ from those of
the standard RBC model. This result led them to conclude that the irrelevance result does not
come only from general equilibrium effects, but also depends on how the model is calibrated.
Bachmann et al. (2010) show that synchronization of plant-level investment activity in re-
sponse to shocks can produce large effects on aggregate investment demand, so they argue
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that microeconomic investment lumpiness is relevant for macroeconomic analysis.3
Against this background, this chapter evaluates the relevance of lumpy investment in a sticky
information general equilibrium environment. In chapter 2 we have shown that lumpy cap-
ital adjustment behavior arises naturally when firms face costs of gathering, absorbing, and
processing information. We also have found that such partial equilibrium model is success-
ful in fitting quantitative facts on plant-level investment rates. In this chapter we embed this
theoretical framework into the Mankiw and Reis (2006, 2007) sticky information general
equilibrium (SIGE) model. Specifically, we augment the SIGE model with a set of firms that
make capital investment decisions with inattentiveness. In the capital-augmented version of
the SIGE model, as in the original SIGE model, the only source of rigidity is inattentiveness,
which is a pervasive feature of all markets and decisions – consumption, wages, prices and
capital investment decisions are all made, to some degree, based on outdated information
sets.
This chapter provides two main contributions.
First, enhancing the SIGE model with capital and investment overcomes one of its weak-
nesses pointed out in Reis (2009b). Such improvement narrows the gap between the sticky-
information DSGE approach and the workhorse sticky-prices DSGE framework (e.g. Smets
and Wouters, 2003 and Christiano et al., 2005), which have included capital and investment
from the beginning. We provide a fully fledged microfounded DSGE model that relies only
on pervasive inattentiveness to mimic the inertia present in the data, rather than on a large
set of nominal and real rigidities as put forth by the sticky-prices approach – e.g. staggered
price and wage setting with partial indexation, habit persistence in consumption, investment
(or capital) adjustment costs and variable capital utilization.
Second, embedding into the SIGE model lumpy investment that is consistently microfounded
on inattentiveness in capital adjustment decisions, reconciles general equilibrium modelling
with the recent developments in the microeconomic theories of investment. As a conse-
quence, this model also allows us to provide further contributions to the debate over the
(ir)relevance of lumpy investment for the business cycle.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the capital-augmented sticky in-
formation general equilibrium (SIGEK) model, section 3.3 presents the key log-linearized
3 Other papers supporting the relevance result include Bayer (2006a), Sveen and Weinke (2007), Iacoviello
and Pavan (2007) and Fiori (2010). Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) and House (2008) in turn provide additional
robustness analysis in favor of the irrelevance result. A similar irrelevance result has been obtained in Veracierto
(2002), who analyzes the role of plant-level irreversibilities in investment for aggregate fluctuations.
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equations, and section 3.4 analyzes the business cycle implications of the model. Finally,
section 3.5 concludes. Technical details are relegated to appendix G.
3.2 The capital-augmented sticky information general equi-
librium model
There are three sets of agents: firms, households and government.
Within the firms sector, there are two types of firms, intermediate- and final-good firms, and
there is a continuum of each indexed by i and f , respectively, in the unit interval. Monopo-
listic competitive intermediate-good firms have two departments: a hiring department that is
always attentive and chooses how much of each variety of labor to hire, and a pricing/sales
department that is only sporadically attentive and sets the price of the firm’s output. Perfectly
competitive final-good firms also have two departments: a purchasing department that is al-
ways attentive and chooses how much of each variety of intermediate goods to buy, and an
inattentive producing department that produces the final good by combining its firm-specific
capital with a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of varieties of intermediate goods.
Each household is made up of a consumer and a worker, and there is a continuum of each
type of individual indexed by j and k, respectively, in the unit interval. Consumers consume,
save and borrow by trading bonds between themselves. Each worker provides differentiated
labor services to intermediate-good firms. Both consumers and workers are inattentive and
make optimal decisions only sporadically.
Finally, monetary and fiscal policy follow exogenous rules and close the model.
Figure 3.2 sketches the structure of the model. Compared to the original SIGE model, the
SIGEK model features a new set of agents, the final-good firms. To lay down the model
formally, we start by describing the market clearing conditions and policy processes and then
set out the agents’ problems.
3.2.1 Market clearing conditions and economic policy
The total output produced by final-good firms, Y FINt , is divided into consumption, investment
and government goods. Market clearing in the final goods market thus requires that:
Y FINt = Gt (Ct + INVt) ,
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Figure 3.2: Structure of the model
where 1−1/Gt is the fraction of output consumed by the government, and Ct =
´ 1
0 Ct, jd j and
It =
´ 1
0 INVt, f d f represent, respectively, total consumers consumption and total final-good
firms investment. Government consumption Gt is financed by lump-sum taxes to households
that keep the budget balanced at all dates. The fraction Gt is stochastic and shocks to it can
be interpreted as aggregate demand shocks. The government also sets the nominal interest
rate it according to:
it ≡ log [Et (Πt+1Pt+1/Pt)] = φpi log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
− εt ,
where Pt denotes the price level, Πt+1 the real interest rate between t and t + 1, and εt a
discretionary monetary policy shock. The definition of the nominal interest rate follows the
Fisher relation, whereas policy is set according to a Taylor rule that only reacts to inflation.
There is an intermediate goods market for each variety i, in which all final-good firms f are
buyers and the seller is the intermediate-good firm that has the monopoly over its variety i .
In equilibrium:
Y INTt,i =
ˆ 1
0
Y INTt, f (i)d f , (3.1)
where Y INTt,i is the total production of intermediate good i at time t, and Y
INT
t, f (i) is the demand
by final-good firm f of variety i at time t.
There is a labor market for each variety of labor k. The intermediate-good firms i demand
labor, which is supplied by the household k that has the monopoly over its labor services.
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Market clearing requires:
Lt,k =
ˆ 1
0
Nt,i (k)di , (3.2)
where Lt,k is the total labor supply of variety k at time t, and Nt,i (k) is the labor demand
by intermediate-good firm i of variety k at time t. Total output and labor are defined by
aggregating across all varieties: Y FINt =
´ 1
0 Y
FIN
t, f d f and Lt =
´ 1
0 Lt,kdk.
Finally, nominal bonds are in zero net supply so the condition for the bond market to clear is´ 1
0 Bt, jd j = 0.
3.2.2 Final-good firms
3.2.2.1 Attentive purchasing departments
The purchasing department of the f−the firm buys a continuum of varieties i of intermediate
goods in the amount Y INTt, f (i) at price Pt,i, and combines them into a final input Yt, f accord-
ing to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator with a random and time-varying elasticity of substitution
vˆt . Each department solves the following problem, given current prices and a total desired
amount of inputs Yt, f :
min{
Y INTt, f (i)
}
i∈[0,1]
ˆ 1
0
Pt,iY INTt, f (i)di
sub ject to Yt, f =
[ˆ 1
0
Y INTt, f (i)
vˆt−1
vˆt di
] vˆt
vˆt−1
.
Optimal behavior implies that the demand for each variety i by firm f is:
Y INTt, f (i) = Yt, f
[
Pt,i
Pt
]−vˆt
,
where Pt =
[´ 1
0 Pt,i
1−vˆt di
] 1
1−vˆt is the static price index. Integrating over the continuum of
departments f and using the market clearing condition (3.1) gives the total demand for the
intermediate-good of variety i:
Y INTt,i =
(
Pt,i
Pt
)−vˆt
Yt , (3.3)
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where Yt ≡
´ 1
0 Yt, f d f .
3.2.2.2 Inattentive producing departments
The final good is the composite of two inputs – a homogeneous input Yt , resulting from a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of varieties of intermediate goods, and the installed firm-specific
capital, Kt−1, f . The producing department of the f−th firm produces the final good Y FINt, f
according to the following technology:
Y FINt, f = ZtY
1−α
t K
α
t−1, f , (3.4)
where α < 1 represents the share of capital in the firm’s production function and Zt an ag-
gregate shock to the final goods production. The timing in (3.4) implies that capital becomes
productive with a one-period delay.
The firm can purchase or sell capital instantaneously and frictionlessly, without any adjust-
ment costs, at a constant price normalized to one. When the price of capital is constant, the
Jorgensonian user cost of capital – i.e. the opportunity cost of holding one unit of capital for
a period – is simply the sum of the discount rate of the firm and the depreciation rate.
Let us consider the problem faced by the producing department that last updated its informa-
tion τ periods ago. Following the SIGE tradition, we assume that, in each period, a fraction
η of firms, randomly drawn from the population, updates their information, so there are
η (1−η)τ firms in this situation. Each of these firms chooses the stock of capital Kt,τ to
maximize expected real profits:
max
Kt,τ
Et−τ
[
Y FINt,τ − (Πt +ρ)Kt−1,τ
]
sub ject to Y FINt,τ = ZtY
1−α
t K
α
t−1,τ ,
where ρ is the real depreciation rate and (Πt +ρ) represents the user cost of capital. The
first-order condition is
Et−τ
[
αZt+1Y 1−αt+1 K
α−1
t,τ
]
= Et−τ (Πt+1+ρ) .
If the firm observed all variables, this condition would state that the firm accumulates capital
up to the point where the marginal product of capital equals the user cost of capital. After
121
CHAPTER 3. LUMPY INVESTMENT IN STICKY INFORMATION GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM
some rearrangements, the desired stock of capital is
Kt,τ =
[
Et−τ
(
Πt+1+ρ
α
)]− 11−α [
Et−τ
(
Zt+1Y 1−αt+1
)] 1
1−α .
To attain the stock Kt,τ in period t +1, the firm demands the quantity INVt,τ of final good in
period t given by
INVt,τ = Kt,τ − (1−ρ)Kt−1,τ .
3.2.3 Intermediate-good firms
3.2.3.1 Attentive hiring departments
Each of the intermediate-good firms has a department that hires a continuum of labor varieties
indexed by k in the amount Nt,i (k) at price Wt,k. Labor services are combined into the labor
input Nt,i according to a Dixit-Stiglitz function with a random and time-varying elasticity of
substitution γˆt . The hiring department of the i−th firm solves the following problem, taken
as given current wages and a total desired amount of inputs Nt,i:
min
{Nt,i(k)}k∈[0,1]
ˆ 1
0
Wt,kNt,i (k)dk
sub ject to Nt,i =
[ˆ 1
0
Nt,i (k)
γˆt−1
γˆt dk
] γˆt
γˆt−1
.
The solution to this problem is:
Nt,i (k) = Nt,i
(
Wt,k
Wt
)−γˆt
,
where Wt =
[´ 1
0 Wt,k
1−γˆt dk
] 1
1−γˆt is the static wage index. Summing over all firms i and using
the market clearing condition (3.2) gives the total demand for labor of variety k:
Lt,k =
(
Wt,k
Wt
)−γˆt
Nt ,
where Nt ≡
´ 1
0 Nt,idi.
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3.2.3.2 Inattentive pricing/sales departments
Let us consider now the problem faced by the pricing department of an intermediate-good
firm that last updated its information τ periods ago. Each period, a randomly drawn fraction
of firms λ updates their information, so there are λ (1−λ )τ firms in this situation. They
choose a nominal price Pt,τ to maximize expected real profits:
max
Pt,τ
Et−τ
[
Pt,τY INTt,τ
Pt
−WtNt,τ
Pt
]
sub ject to Y INTt,τ = AtN
β
t,τ
Y INTt,τ =
(
Pt,τ
Pt
)−vˆt
Yt
The first constraint is the production function, where β measures the degree of returns to
scale and aggregate productivity At is stochastic. The second constraint is the total demand
for the firm’s product in (3.3). The first order condition is:
Pt,τ =
Et−τ [vˆtWtNt,τ/Pt ]
Et−τ
[
β (vˆt−1)Y INTt,τ /Pt
] .
If the firm observed all the variables on the right-hand side, this condition would state that the
nominal price charged, Pt,τ , is equal to a markup, vˆt/(vˆt−1), over nominal marginal costs,
which corresponds to the cost of an extra unit of labor, Wt , divided by its marginal product,
βY INTt,τ /Nt,τ .
3.2.4 Households
Households live forever and discount future utility by a factor ξ ∈ (0,1). They obtain utility
each period from consumption and leisure according to:
U
(
Ct, j,Lt,k
)
= lnCt, j−
χL1+1/ψt,k
1+1/ψ
,
where Ct, j is consumption by consumers j at date t, Lt,k is the labor supplied by worker k
at date t, ψ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and χ captures relative preferences for
consumption versus leisure.
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At each date t, the household faces a budget constraint given by:
At+1 =Πt+1
(
At−Ct, j +Wt,kLt,k +TtPt
)
,
where At+1 denotes the real resources of households at the beginning of period t + 1 and Tt
are lump-sum transfers. These transfers comprise the profits received from intermediate-good
firms, lump-sum taxes paid to the government, and payments for an insurance contract that
households sign at the beginning of each time period so that they begin each period with the
same wealth.
In the savings market, consumers face a probability δ of revising their plans every period,
so at each period there are δ (1−δ )τ of consumers in this situation. They choose a plan for
current and future consumption, {Ct+τ,τ}∞τ=0, which is a sequence
{
Ct,0 ; Ct+1,1 ; Ct+2,2 ; · · ·
}
where Ct,τ is the time-t expenditure of a consumer who last updated her information τ periods
ago. The optimality conditions for consumers are:4
1
Ct,0
= ξEt
[
Πt+1
1
Ct+1,0
]
and
1
Ct,τ
= Et−τ
[
1
Ct,0
]
.
The first equation is the Euler equation for an attentive agent. It states that the marginal utility
of consuming today equals the expected discounted marginal utility of consuming tomorrow
times the return on savings. The second equation states that marginal utility of consumption
for inattentive consumers equals the one they would expect in case there was full information.
In the labor market, a randomly drawn fraction of workers ω updates their plans each pe-
riod, so at each period there are ω (1−ω)τ of workers in this situation. They choose a plan
for current and future wages, {Wt+τ,τ}∞τ=0, which is a sequence
{
Wt,0 ; Wt+1,1 ; Wt+2,2 ; · · ·
}
where Wt,τ is the time-t wage set by a worker who last updated the information τ periods ago.
The optimality conditions for workers are:
γˆt
γˆt−1
PtL
1/ψ
t,0
Wt,0
= ξEt
Πt+1 γˆt+1γˆt+1−1 Pt+1L
1/ψ
t+1,0
Wt+1,0

4 The dynamic problem solved by consumers and workers is more complicated than those solved by firms.
We refer the reader to appendix G for details.
124
CHAPTER 3. LUMPY INVESTMENT IN STICKY INFORMATION GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM
and
Wt,τ =
Et−τ
[
γˆtL
1+1/ψ
t,τ
]
Et−τ
[
γˆtLt,τL
1/ψ
t,0 /Wt,0
] .
The first equation is the intertemporal labor supply Euler equation for an attentive worker.
If γˆt was constant, the equation states that the marginal disutility of supplying labor today
(L1/ψt,0 ) divided by the real wage (Wt,0/Pt) is equal to the discounted marginal disutility to-
morrow (L1/ψt+1,0) divided by the corresponding real wage (Wt+1,0/Pt+1) times the real interest
rate. With a time-varying γˆt , the Euler equation takes into account the change in the markup
charged by the monopolistic worker. The second condition notes that workers who are not
perfectly informed set wages so that their expected disutility from working mirrors the disu-
tility from working expected by the attentive workers.
3.3 The sticky information equilibrium
The detailed presentation of the model log-linearization is presented in appendix G. In this
section we discuss the key reduced-form relations.
We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state. Small
caps denote the log-deviations of the respective large-cap variable from this steady state,
with the exceptions of the following variables: vt and γt , which are the log-deviations of vˆt
and γˆt , respectively; rt , which is the log-deviation of the short real interest rate Et [Πt+1]; and
Rt , which is the log-deviation of the long real interest rate defined as limT→∞Et
[
Π¯t,t+1+T
]
,
where Π¯t+l,t+1+k = ∏t+kz=t+lΠz+1 is the compound return between two dates. Small letters
with no subscript denote parameters and steady-state values.
The aggregate capital stock is:
kt = η
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−η)τ Et−τ
[
yFINt+1 −αkt
1−α −
r
(r+ρ)(1−α)rt
]
. (3.5)
The level of capital stock (kt) is positively related to the expected value of the firm’s produc-
tion (yFINt+1 ) and negatively related to the current level of capital stock because of decreasing
return to scale in production (α < 1). A lower real interest rate (rt) implies a lower op-
portunity cost of holding capital and therefore an incentive to increase the stock of capital.
If many firms are informed (η is high), capital is instantly responsive to changes in these
125
CHAPTER 3. LUMPY INVESTMENT IN STICKY INFORMATION GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM
determinants, whereas otherwise capital adjustment takes place gradually over time.
Aggregate investment (invt) is:
invt =
1
ρ
kt− 1−ρρ kt−1 . (3.6)
The Phillips curve (or aggregate supply) is:
pt = λ
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−λ )τ Et−τ
[
pt +
β (wt− pt)+(1−β )yt−at
β + v(1−β ) −
β
(v−1) [β + v(1−β )]vt
]
.
(3.7)
The price level (pt) depends on past expectations of its current value, real marginal costs
and the desired markup. Marginal costs are larger the higher are the real wages paid to
workers (wt − pt), the more is produced (yt)(because of decreasing returns to scale, β < 1),
and the lower is aggregate productivity (at). The desired markup falls with the elasticity of
substitution across the varieties of goods (vt). Unexpected shocks to any of these variables
only raise prices by λ because only this share of price-setting firms is attentive and, thus,
aware of the news.
The IS curve is:
ct = δ
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−δ )τ Et−τ (cnt −Rt) , (3.8)
where cnt = limτ→∞Etct+τ is a measure of consumers’ wealth and Rt =∑∞τ=0 (it+τ −∆pt+1+τ)
is the long real interest rate. Higher expected future wealth increases current spending,
whereas higher expected interest rates encourage savings and lower spending. The higher
is δ , the larger is the share of informed consumers who respond to shocks as they occur,
therefore the more responsive consumption is to changes in these variables.
The wage curve is:
wt =ω
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−ω)τ Et−τ
[
pt +
γ
γ+ψ
(wt− pt)+ ltγ+ψ +
ψ
γ+ψ
(cnt −Rt)−
ψ
(γ+ψ)(γ−1)γt
]
.
(3.9)
Wages (wt) increase one-to-one with the price level, as workers care about real income; they
increase with real wages in the economy, since higher real wages push up the demand for a
particular labor variety through substitution; they increase with labor supplied (lt), because
of the increasing marginal disutility of working; they increase with wealth, since leisure is a
normal good; they decrease with interest rates, since lower interest rates decrease the return
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on savings and the incentive to work; and they fall as the elasticity of substitution across labor
varieties increases (γt) since workers’ desired markup falls. As ω increases, a larger fraction
of workers is informed so wages become more responsive to changes in these determinants,
whereas otherwise wages only respond gradually over time.
The aggregate resource constraint is
yFINt = αcct +αiinvt +gt , (3.10)
where αc = c/(c+ inv) and αi = inv/(c+ inv).
The policy rules are
rt = it−Et (∆pt+1) (3.11)
and
it = φpi∆pt− εt . (3.12)
Intermediate output is given by
yt =
yFINt − zt−αkt−1
1−α (3.13)
and labor is given by
lt =
yt−at
β
. (3.14)
Equations (3.5)-(3.14) characterize the equilibrium for yFINt (final output), ct (consump-
tion), wt (wage), pt (price), invt (investment), kt (stock of capital), rt (real interest rate),
it (nominal interest rate), yt (intermediate output) and lt (labor) given exogenous shocks to
εt (monetary policy), ∆at (aggregate intermediate-good productivity growth), gt (aggregate
demand), vt (intermediate-good markup), γt (labor markup) and zt (aggregate final-good pro-
ductivity). Each of these shocks follows an independent AR(1) process: εt = ρεεt−1 + eεt ,
∆at = ρ∆a∆at−1+e∆at , gt = ρggt−1+e
g
t , vt = ρvvt−1+evt , γt = ργγt−1+e
γ
t and zt = ρzzt−1+ezt ,
where the shocks est ∼ N
(
0 , σ2s
)
are i.i.d. with E
[
est e
s
t+k
]
= 0 for k 6= 0 and E
[
est e
s
′
t
]
= 0 for
s 6= s’.
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3.4 Is lumpy investment relevant for the business cycle?
Having presented the SIGEK model’s key relations, we now study the impact of lumpy micro-
level investment on the aggregate business cycle. Through this section, we analyze and con-
trast the behavior of four models:
1. the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness;
2. the SIGEK model with frictionless investment, which is obtained setting η = 1;
3. a classical model, i.e. the model when η = δ = λ = ω = 1 so that all agents are
attentive;
4. the SIGE model.
Recall that the Thomas’ (2002) irrelevance conclusion arises from the fact that her lumpy
investment model generates business cycle dynamics (both impulse response functions and
second moments) that are alike to those generated by an otherwise identical model charac-
terized by frictionless investment. Accordingly, comparing the results from model 1 with
those from model 2 allows for gauging whether lumpy investment consistently founded on
inattentiveness is relevant for the business cycle.
Model 3 is used here as the simplest benchmark, with which all models with some source of
informational inertia could be compared. Finally, comparing the results obtained with model
1 to those obtained with model 4 allows for assessing whether the inclusion of capital and
investment in the SIGE model, developing the SIGEK model, modifies the performance of
the sticky-information general equilibrium approach.5
We calibrate the model assuming that a period is a quarter. The share of consumption in total
output αc is assumed to be 0.85, so that the share of investment is αi = 1−αc = 0.15. The
steady state real depreciation rate and real interest rate, ρ and r, are set to 0.035 and 0.01,
respectively, which implies a user cost of capital of 18%/year. The share of capital in the
final-good firm’s production function α is set to 0.33. The inattentiveness parameter η is
5 All simulations have been conducted with Dynare. The results for the SIGE model have been obtained by
simulating the Reis (2009a) model using the calibration in table 3.5. To make results comparable with those of
other models, the simulation of the SIGE model has been conducted setting αy = 0 in the monetary policy rule,
that is, dropping the interest rate response to the output gap, so that the nominal interest rate only responds to
inflation.
128
CHAPTER 3. LUMPY INVESTMENT IN STICKY INFORMATION GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM
assumed to be 0.1, which implies that final-good firms are inattentive on average for 10 quar-
ters.6 The serial correlation and the standard deviation of the final-good productivity shock,
ρz and σz, are set to 0.75 and 0.5, respectively. The values for the remaining parameters are
taken from table 2 in Reis (2009b). Those values have been obtained from the estimation of
the SIGE model using Bayesian methods on post-86 U.S. data. Table 3.5 shows the baseline
parameter values for the SIGEK model.
In what follows we first analyze the impulse responses to the various structural shocks as well
as the contribution of those shocks to the forecast error variance of the endogenous variables,
and then we investigate the ability of the models to match some second order moments of
U.S. aggregate data.
3.4.1 Impulse response functions and variance decomposition
Figures 3.8 to 3.13 plot the impulse response functions to one-standard-deviation impulses to
the six shocks. In all figures presented, variables are reported as percentage deviation from
their steady state values, and the horizontal axis represents time on a quarterly scale. Blue-
circle and blue-diamond lines represent the responses of the SIGEK model with pervasive
inattentiveness and with frictionless investment, respectively, while red-cross lines represent
the responses of the SIGE model. For the sake of clarity, we do not report the impulse
responses of the classical model, which are way too large and essentially have no persistence.
We first describe the dynamics of the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness, and then
we compare it with the dynamics of the SIGEK model with frictionless investment and of the
SIGE model.
Figure 3.8 plots the effects of a positive (expansionary) monetary policy shock. The model
with pervasive inattentiveness predicts that output, consumption, investment, capital, hours
worked, real wage and inflation all increase in the short run in response to a monetary expan-
sion. The responses however do not show any hump-shaped pattern and, with few exceptions,
they also converge rapidly to their steady state levels. The fast reaction of macroeconomic
variables to monetary policy is due to the fact that the policy shock is short-lived (ρε = 0.29).
Figure 3.9 displays the responses to a positive intermediate-good productivity shock. By
construction, the impact of this technology shock on output, consumption, investment and
6 The value for η lies within the empirically plausible range for the lumpiness parameter indicated by Sveen
and Weinke (2007). After analyzing the micro evidence reported by Doms and Dunne (1998), Sveen and Weinke
suggest that the lumpiness parameter should take values between 0.06 and 0.12.
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the real wage can be permanent. A positive productivity shock in fact permanently raises
these variables but lowers hours worked and the output gap on impact, consistently with the
findings in Galí (1999). Figure 3.10 displays the responses to a positive final-good productiv-
ity shock. Although the effect of this shock is transitory, the dynamics is qualitatively similar
to that of the intermediate-good productivity shock.
Turning to the aggregate demand (government spending) shock, figure 3.11 shows that a
positive innovation to aggregate demand raises inflation, output, and hours worked. While
increasing investment significantly, this shock has a negative wealth effect that induces con-
sumption to fall.
Figure 3.12 displays the effects of a positive shock to the price markup. The shock makes the
economy more competitive (the desired price markup decreases) and so inflation falls while
output, consumption and investment increase on impact. However, all variables respond
quickly because the price markup shock is also quite short-lived (ρν = 0.28).
Figure 3.13 shows the effects of a positive wage markup shock (which corresponds to a fall in
the desired markup). The real wage falls and there is an expansion in output, hours worked,
consumption and investment. The fall in wages induces a fall in prices, so inflation falls and
the central bank reduces the nominal interest rate over time to gradually push inflation back
to its steady state value. Noticeably, the responses of most variables are both hump-shaped
and delayed.
Even though the shape of the impulse response functions of the SIGEK model with friction-
less investment is qualitatively similar to that of the model with pervasive inattentiveness,
there are visible differences between them. As one would expect, the main quantitative dif-
ference is that the responses of some variables, especially those of capital and investment, are
much larger because attentive final-good firms make their capital investment decisions every
period, so they react instantly to shocks. Interestingly, a positive intermediate-good produc-
tivity shock in this economy raises hours worked instead of lowering them. The intuition
is that, with capital fully flexible, final-good firms invest much more because they expect to
produce more. However, in order to expand their production, they have to both accumulate
more capital and purchase more intermediate goods (recall that these goods are one input in
the final-good production function). This pushes up the production of intermediate goods
(see equation 3.13), which more than compensates the increase in productivity and leads
intermediate-good firms to hire more labor (see equation 3.14).
Figures 3.8-3.9 and 3.11-3.13 also report the impulse response functions implied by the SIGE
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model. Overall, the dynamics does not change significantly when the SIGE model is aug-
mented by a microfounded lumpy investment model. The impulse responses of the SIGE
model are in fact qualitatively, and in most cases also quantitatively, similar to those of the
SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness.
Finally, table 3.1 presents the variance decompositions at different horizons for the SIGEK
model with pervasive inattentiveness.7 The monetary policy shock plays a small role in the
variance of the error in forecasting most macroeconomic variables, with the exception of the
nominal interest rate.8 The aggregate intermediate-good productivity shock is important to
explain consumption and investment, while the final-good productivity shock does not play a
significant role. The demand shock is by far the most important shock and accounts for most
of the variance of the error in forecasting output, investment and hours at all horizons. This
persistent long-run effect arises because the demand shock is highly persistent (ρg = 0.99).
Finally, while the labor markup shock is quite important to explain inflation, real wage and
nominal interest rate especially at long horizons, the goods markup shock explains little of
the variance of any of the variables, with the exception of inflation at very short horizon.
Overall, in contrast with Thomas’ findings, this analysis seems to indicate that lumpy invest-
ment is relevant for the business cycle, since there are substantial quantitative differences
between the models’ responses with lumpy and with frictionless investment.
3.4.2 Second moments: models versus U.S. aggregate data
We now examine whether the SIGEK model yields empirically reasonable aggregate dynam-
ics by comparing the model’s predictions with some key second order moments characteriz-
ing the post-86 U.S. economy. In particular, we focus on the volatility and autocorrelations
of output, investment, consumption, hours, real wage and inflation, as well as on the cross-
correlation of output with the other variables.
3.4.2.1 Output and investment
Table 3.2 and figure 3.3 display output and investment moments in the U.S. data as well
as the corresponding models’ predictions. The main features of the data are well-known.
7 The variance decomposition for the SIGE model is similar to the one in table 3.1.
8 This result is consistent with the evidence in Bernanke et al. (2005) and Christiano et al. (2005).
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Table 3.2: Aggregate output and investment, models vs data in the post-86 U.S.
Standard coefficients of
Series deviation autocorrelation (order)
relative
absolute to output 1 2 3 4
data 0.90 1.00 0.93 0.76 0.52 0.29
output classical 3.16 1.00 0.60 0.51 0.48 0.46
SIGEK (η = 1) 4.34 1.00 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.29
SIGEK 2.67 1.00 0.90 0.83 0.79 0.75
data 4.33 4.84 0.93 0.75 0.51 0.27
investment classical 24.61 7.78 0.14 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
SIGEK (η = 1) 23.39 5.39 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01
SIGEK 6.41 2.40 0.71 0.56 0.46 0.40
Note. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass filter to the logarithm
of the original series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters.
Both output and investment are very persistent, with a first order serial correlation above 0.9.
Investment is procyclical, with no phase shift, and is about 5 times as volatile as output.9
The classical model overestimates the volatility of output and investment and underestimates
their persistence. It also does not perform well when it comes to fitting the lead-lag relation
with output. The SIGEK model with frictionless investment (η = 1) does not perform much
better than the classical model. In particular, the absence of sticky information in capital
decisions makes investment too volatile (in both absolute and relative terms) with no persis-
tence whatsoever. Even though the contemporaneous correlation with output is close to that
observed in the data, all cross-correlations at lags other than zero are almost null. Pervasive
inattentiveness, in turn, improves the ability of the model to fit the facts on output and in-
vestment. Output is less volatile and more persistent than in the classical model as well as
in the frictionless investment model.10 Although the model predicts that investment is only
about two and a half times as volatile as output, it improves promisingly as regards fitting
investment autocorrelations (even at high lags) and the shape of the cross-correlation curve
(see figure 3.3).
In table 3.3 we report two moments of the aggregate investment rate. Columns 2 and 3 are
9 All data have been taken from the FRED database available through the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The cyclical components of each series have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass filter and they
are similar to those obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
10 The SIGE model yields similar moments for output.
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Figure 3.3: Cross-correlation of investment with output at lag K, K = {−2,−1,0,1,2}
Note. The figure reports the cross-correlation of the cyclical component of investment with the K−quarter lag
of the cyclical component of output. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying the Baxter-King
bandpass filter to the logarithm of the original series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters. U.S. data: black line.
SIGEK model: blue-circle line. SIGEK model (η = 1): red-square line. Classical model: black-asterisk line.
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Table 3.3: Aggregate investment rate, U.S. data and models
annual data partial equilibrium quarterly data SIGEK
1984-2005a,b model b post-86c model d
serial correlation (corr
[( i
k
)
t ,
( i
k
)
t−1
]
) 0.846 0.210 0.970 0.724
standard deviation 0.011 0.104 0.137 0.07
a Data are annual private fixed nonresidential investment-to-capital ratio. b See table 2.2 in chapter 2. c Data
are quarterly private fixed investment-to-capital ratio. d Baseline parameters: see table 3.5.
taken from table 2.2 in chapter 2 and show the moments in the data (annual values) and the
respective moments implied by the partial equilibrium model with lumpy investment, while
columns 4 and 5 report the moments in the data (quarterly values) and the respective moments
implied by the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness. Table 3.3 shows that there is an
unambiguous improvement in the model fit moving from the partial equilibrium lumpy in-
vestment model to its general equilibrium counterpart with pervasive inattentiveness. In fact,
while in a partial equilibrium framework the aggregate investment rate is less persistent and
much more volatile than in the data, its persistence increases sharply (although still remain-
ing lower than in the data) and its excessive volatility is virtually eliminated when lumpy
investment is included in general equilibrium.11
By now, the results indicate that the SIGEK model is capable of delivering a plausible aggre-
gate role for lumpy investment – the model’s implied second moments of output and invest-
ment are significantly different from and closer to the data than those implied by an otherwise
identical model with frictionless investment. We now analyze whether the quantitative dif-
ferences in the models’ output and investment moments extend to other key macroeconomic
variables.
3.4.2.2 Consumption, hours, real wage and inflation
Table 3.4 reports the variabilities and autocorrelation coefficients of consumption, hours, real
wage and inflation, and figure 3.4 plots the cross-correlations of these variables with output
at different lags and leads.12
11 Khan and Thomas (2008) obtain a similar result using a state-dependent lumpy investment model. They
find that their general equilibrium model matches the data on aggregate investment rates much better than its
partial equilibrium counterpart.
12 The SIGE model yields similar predictions.
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Table 3.4: Aggregate variables, models vs data in the post-86 U.S.
Standard coefficients of
Series deviation autocorrelation (order)
relative
absolute to output 1 2 3 4
data 0.79 0.88 0.95 0.81 0.61 0.41
consumption classical 3.09 0.98 0.56 0.45 0.41 0.38
SIGEK (η = 1) 1.96 0.45 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.79
SIGEK 2.00 0.75 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.80
data 1.39 1.55 0.96 0.86 0.70 0.52
hours classical 6.42 2.03 0.43 0.32 0.29 0.27
SIGEK (η = 1) 9.48 2.18 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.15
SIGEK 5.33 2.00 0.83 0.73 0.65 0.60
data 1.00 1.11 0.91 0.69 0.44 0.25
real wage classical 2.22 0.70 0.44 0.31 0.27 0.26
SIGEK (η = 1) 1.45 0.33 0.86 0.72 0.63 0.57
SIGEK 1.56 0.59 0.88 0.77 0.69 0.63
data 0.23 0.26 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.57
inflation classical 2.03 0.64 0.23 0.08 0.04 0.03
SIGEK (η = 1) 0.94 0.22 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.36
SIGEK 0.70 0.26 0.88 0.81 0.74 0.67
Note. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass filter to the logarithm
of the original series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters.
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Figure 3.4: Cross-correlation of other variables with output at lag K, K = {−2,−1,0,1,2}
Note. The figure reports the cross-correlation of the cyclical component of the respective variable with the
K−quarter lag of the cyclical component of output. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying
the Baxter-King bandpass filter to the logarithm of the original series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters. U.S.
data: black line. SIGEK model: blue-circle line. SIGEK model (η = 1): red-square line. Classical model:
black-asterisk line.
The results still exhibit interesting differences, both qualitatively and quantitatively, between
the lumpy and the frictionless investment model. In particular, the inclusion of lumpy in-
vestment adjustment does improve and affect the model’s performance along these dimen-
sions. The crucial conclusion is that the model that overall best captures the moments of
consumption, hours, real wage and inflation is the SIGEK model with pervasive inatten-
tiveness. Hence, pervasive sticky information improves the ability of the SIGEK model to
overall mimic the dynamics of key macroeconomic data (although some moments, especially
the cross-correlations of consumption and real wage with output, seem hard to mimic).
We can thus conclude that, overall, the business cycle is clearly affected by lumpy investment
at the micro-level.
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3.4.2.3 How sensitive are the second order moments of investment to changes in the
degree of inattentiveness η?
The previous results have been obtained by setting the degree of information stickiness η to
0.10 for final-good firms, in line with the suggestion of Sveen and Weinke (2007). To check
for robustness, figures 3.5-3.7 contrast the SIGEK model’s investment moments (our crucial
variable) with their empirical counterparts, for different values of the parameter η .
Recall that the stickier information is, the smaller is the fraction of updating firms (smaller
η) and the smaller is the impact of shocks on capital and investment. Thus, as the degree
of information stickiness increases (η decreases), investment should become less volatile
and more persistent. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 confirm this conjecture. The standard deviation
decreases and the autocorrelation function shifts upward as η decreases.
The figures further show that the SIGEK model has difficulties in simultaneously mimicking
the volatility and the persistence of investment. On the one hand, the model is able to match
the high volatility of investment observed in the data only when firms are often attentive,
updating their information on average once every eight months (η ' 0.4). One the other hand,
a high degree of information stickiness (η < 0.1) is required to match the high persistence of
investment.
While it remains true that the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness is superior to the
alternatives here studied in fitting the dynamic behavior of investment, it suffers from a trade-
off between fitting the volatility and fitting the persistence of investment. It seems difficult to
solve this trade-off by only fine-tuning one parameter – the degree of inattentiveness η – in
the economy.
Finally, figure 3.7 plots the cross-correlation of investment with output at different lags and
leads. As η increases, the model becomes better at matching the contemporaneous corre-
lation with output but performs worse when it comes to matching cross-correlations at lags
other than zero. Lower values of η (higher degrees of inattentiveness in investment) seem to
improve the ability of the model to fit the overall lead-lag relation of investment with output.
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Figure 3.5: Standard deviation of investment (sensitivity analysis for different values of η)
Note. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model: black-circle line. Other parameters than η : see table 3.5.
Figure 3.6: Autocorrelation of investment at lags 1 to 4 (sensitivity analysis for different
values of η)
Note. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model (η = 0.1): black-asterisk line. SIGEK model (η = 0.2): blue-square
line. SIGEK model (η = 0.3): red-diamond line. SIGEK model (η = 0.4): green-plus line. SIGEK model
(η = 0.5): cyan-circle line. Other parameters than η : see table 3.5.
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Figure 3.7: Cross-correlation of investment with output at lag K, K = {−2,−1,0,1,2} (sen-
sitivity analysis for different values of η)
Note. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model (η = 0.1): black-asterisk line. SIGEK model (η = 0.2): blue-square
line. SIGEK model (η = 0.3): red-diamond line. SIGEK model (η = 0.4): green-plus line. SIGEK model
(η = 0.5): cyan-circle line. Other parameters than η : see table 3.5.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the (ir)relevance of micro-level lumpy investment for the business
cycle.
In chapter 2 we had shown that lumpy capital adjustment behavior arises naturally when
firms face costs of gathering, absorbing, and processing information. In this chapter we
have embedded that theoretical framework into the Mankiw and Reis (2006, 2007) SIGE
model. Specifically, we have augmented the SIGE model with a set of firms that make capital
investment decisions with inattentiveness. In the SIGEK model, as in the original SIGE
model, inattentiveness is a pervasive feature of all markets and decisions, and it is the only
feature that leads to a deviation from a classical model.
We have found that the model with lumpy investment yields business cycle dynamics (both
impulse response functions and second moments) that are significantly different from those
of its frictionless investment counterpart. We have also found that the model with pervasive
inattentiveness is better at matching business cycle moments than is either a classical model
or an otherwise identical SIGEK model with frictionless investment.
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The SIGEK model has allowed for addressing how far inattentiveness alone affects macroe-
conomic dynamics. The findings are promising and confirm the Mankiw and Reis (2006)
claim that pervasive inattentiveness is necessary to explain business cycle dynamics in sticky-
information models. Moreover, in delivering these results this model has strengthened the
case in favor of the relevance of lumpy micro-level investment for the business cycle. In-
troducing lumpy investment, with a microeconomic foundation based on inattentiveness, in
a sticky information general equilibrium model seems to be a fruitful approach for further
business cycle and monetary policy analysis.
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Appendix G - Technical appendix
Inattentive consumers
Consumers, who revise their plans every period with a probability δ , have a value function
V (At) conditional on date t being a planning date. Consumers choose a plan for current
(τ = 0) and future (τ ≥ 1) consumption all the way into infinity {Ct+τ,τ}∞τ=0 considering that
with a vanishingly small probability they may never update again:
V (At) = max{Ct+τ,τ}∞τ=0
{
∞
∑
τ=0
ξ τ (1−δ )τ lnCt+τ,τ +ξδ
∞
∑
τ=0
ξ τ (1−δ )τ Et [V (At+1+τ)]
}
sub ject to At+1+τ =Πt+1+τ
(
At+τ −Ct+τ,τ +Wt+τ,τLt+τ,τ +Tt+τPt+τ
)
f or τ = 0,1,2, ...
The first term in the Bellman equation equals the expected discounted utility if the consumer
never updates her information again. The second term includes the sum of the continuation
values over all of the possible future dates at which the agent may plan again, each occurring
with a probability δ (1−δ )τ . Since preferences are additively separable in consumption and
leisure, and since consumers do not control labor supply, then the term in leisure drops out of
the problem.
The optimality conditions are:
ξ τ (1−δ )τ 1Ct+τ,τ
=
ξδ ∑∞k=τ ξ k (1−δ )k Et
[
V
′
(At+1+k)Π¯t+τ,t+1+k
]
f or τ = 0,1,2, ... (G.1)
where
Π¯t+τ,t+1+k =
t+k
∏
z=t+τ
Πz+1
is the compound return between t+ τ and t+1+ k.
The envelope theorem condition is:
V
′
(At) = ξδ
∞
∑
k=0
ξ k (1−δ )k Et
[
V
′
(At+1+k)Π¯t,t+1+k
]
. (G.2)
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Combining (G.1) for τ = 0 with (G.2) yields 1/Ct,0 =V
′
(At), that is, the marginal utility of
an extra unit of consumption equals the marginal value of an extra unit of wealth. Writing
(G.2) recursively and using the last result gives
1
Ct,0
=V
′
(At) = ξEt
[
Πt+1V
′
(At+1)
]
= ξEt
[
Πt+1
1
Ct+1,0
]
.
Then considering (G.1) for τ ≥ 1 and (G.2) for date t+ τ yields
1
Ct+τ,τ
=V
′
(At+τ) = Et
[
1
Ct+τ,0
]
⇔ 1
Ct,τ
= Et−τ
[
1
Ct,0
]
.
Inattentive workers
Workers, who revise their plans every period with a probability ω , have a value function
Vˆ (At) conditional on date t being a planning date. Workers choose a plan for current (τ =
0) and future (τ ≥ 1) wage all the way into infinity {Wt+τ,τ}∞τ=0, considering that with a
vanishingly small probability they may never update again:
Vˆ (At) = max{Wt+τ,τ}∞τ=0
{
−
∞
∑
τ=0
ξ τ (1−ω)τ Et
[
L1+1/ψt+τ,τ +1
1+1/ψ
]
+ξω
∞
∑
τ=0
ξ τ (1−ω)τ Et
[
Vˆ (At+1+τ)
]}
sub ject to At+1+τ =Πt+1+τ
(
At+τ −Ct+τ,τ +Wt+τ,τLt+τ,τ +Tt+τPt+τ
)
f or τ = 0,1,2, ...
Lt+τ,τ =
(
Wt+τ,τ
Wt+τ
)−γˆt+τ
Nt+τ f or τ = 0,1,2, ...
The first term in the Bellman equation equals the expected discounted utility if the worker
never updates her information again. The second term includes the sum of the continuation
values over all of the possible future dates at which the agent may plan again, each occurring
with a probability ω (1−ω)τ .
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The optimality conditions are:
ξ τ (1−ω)τ Et
(
γˆt+τL
1+1/ψ
t+τ,τ
)
/Wt+τ,τ
=
ξω∑∞k=τ ξ k (1−ω)k Et
[
Vˆ
′
(At+1+k)Π¯t+τ,t+1+k (γˆt+τ −1)Lt+τ,τ/Pt+τ
]
(G.3)
f or τ = 0,1,2, ...
The envelope theorem condition is:
Vˆ
′
(At) = ξω
∞
∑
k=0
ξ k (1−ω)k Et
[
Vˆ
′
(At+1+k)Π¯t,t+1+k
]
. (G.4)
Combining (G.3) for τ = 0 with (G.4) gives
Wt,0 =
γˆt
γˆt−1
PtL
1/ψ
t,0
Vˆ ′ (At)
⇒Wt+τ,0 = γˆt+τγˆt+τ −1
Pt+τL
1/ψ
t+τ,0
Vˆ ′ (At+τ)
Writing (G.4) recursively yields
Vˆ
′
(At) = ξEt
[
Vˆ
′
(At+1)Πt+1
]
.
Combining these results implies
γˆt
γˆt−1
PtL
1/ψ
t,0
Wt,0
= ξEt
Πt+1 γˆt+1γˆt+1−1 Pt+1L
1/ψ
t+1,0
Wt+1,0
 .
Condition (G.3) for τ ≥ 1 and (G.4) for date t+ τ then imply
Wt,τ =
Et−τ
[
γˆtL
1+1/ψ
t,τ
]
Et−τ
[
γˆtLt,τL
1/ψ
t,0 /Wt,0
] .
The log-linear sticky-information equilibrium
Log-linearizing the aggregate resource constraint and policy rules yields:
yFINt = αcct +αiinvt +gt , (G.5)
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rt = it−Et (∆pt+1) (G.6)
and
it = φpi∆pt− εt . (G.7)
From the attentive agents’ problems:
yINTt,τ = yt− v(pt,τ − pt) (G.8)
and
lt,τ = lt− γ (wt,τ −wt) . (G.9)
From the inattentive consumer’s problem:
ct,τ = Et−τ [ct+1,0− rt ] . (G.10)
From the inattentive worker’s problem:
wt,τ = Et−τ
[
pt +
1
ψ
lt,τ − 1γ−1γt− rt +wt+1,0− pt+1−
1
ψ
lt+1,0+
1
γ−1γt+1
]
. (G.11)
From the inattentive pricing department’s problem:
yINTt,τ = at +β lt,τ (G.12)
and
pt,τ = Et−τ
[
ωt−
(
yINTt,τ − lt,τ
)− vt
v−1
]
. (G.13)
From the inattentive producing department’s problem:
yFINt,τ = zt +(1−α)yt +αkt−1,τ , (G.14)
kt,τ = Et−τ
[
yt+1− r(r+ρ)(1−α)rt +
1
1−α zt+1
]
(G.15)
and
invt,τ =
1
ρ
kt,τ − 1−ρρ kt−1,τ . (G.16)
Aggregating (G.12) gives the aggregate intermediate-good production function
yINTt = at +β lt , (G.17)
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and the market clearing condition implies that yINTt = yt .
Aggregating (G.16) and (G.14) over τ gives aggregate investment and the aggregate final-
good production function:
invt =
1
ρ
kt− 1−ρρ kt−1 (G.18)
yFINt = zt +(1−α)yt +αkt−1 . (G.19)
Finally, the log-linearized definitions of price, wage, consumption and capital indices are:
pt = λ
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−λ )τ pt,τ (G.20)
wt = ω
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−ω)τ wt,τ (G.21)
ct = δ
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−δ )τ ct,τ (G.22)
kt = η
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−η)τ kt,τ (G.23)
This set of 19 equations (G.5 - G.23) provides the competitive equilibrium solution for the
set of 19 variables (yFINt , y
FIN
t,τ , yt , y
INT
t,τ , y
INT
t , ct , ct,τ , lt , lt,τ , wt , wt,τ , pt , pt,τ , invt , invt,τ , kt ,
kt,τ , rt , it) as a function of six exogenous shocks (∆at , gt , εt , zt , vt and γt).
The reduced-form sticky-information equilibrium
Leading (G.19) one period and replacing for yt+1 in equation (G.15) gives
kt,τ = Et−τ
[
yFINt+1 −αkt
1−α −
r
(r+ρ)(1−α)rt
]
.
Replacing for kt,τ in (G.23) gives the expression for aggregate capital stock:
kt = η
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−η)τ Et−τ
[
yFINt+1 −αkt
1−α −
r
(r+ρ)(1−α)rt
]
. (G.24)
Combining equations (G.8), (G.12) and (G.13) to replace for pt,τ , lt,τ and yINTt,τ in equation
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(G.20) gives:
pt = λ
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−λ )τ Et−τ
[
pt +
β (wt− pt)+(1−β )yt−at
β + v(1−β ) −
β
(v−1) [β + v(1−β )]vt
]
.
Using (G.19) to replace for yt in the previous equation gives the aggregate supply relation:
pt = λ
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−λ )τ Et−τ
[
pt +
β (wt− pt)+ 1−β1−α
(
yFINt − zt−αkt−1
)−at
β + v(1−β )
− β
(v−1) [β + v(1−β )]vt
]
. (G.25)
Iterating forward on equation (G.10) yields
ct,τ =−
T
∑
i=0
Et−τ (rt+1)+Et−τ (ct+T+1,0) .
Next, take the limit as T → ∞. As time elapses to infinity all agents become aware of past
news so limi→∞Et (rt+i) = limi→∞Et
(
rnt+i
)
= 0. Moreover, since the probability of remain-
ing inattentive falls exponentially with the length of the horizon, one can approach this limit
fast enough to ensure that the sum in the first term converges. As for the second term,
limi→∞Et (ct+i,0) = limi→∞Et
(
cnt+i
)
= cnt . The first equality holds because consumers are
fully insured every period and in the limit all are informed. The second equality holds be-
cause cnt follows a random walk. Using the definition of the long rate Rt , the expression above
becomes:
ct,τ = Et−τ (cnt −Rt) .
Replacing for ct,τ in (G.22) gives the IS curve:
ct = δ
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−δ )τ Et−τ (cnt −Rt) . (G.26)
Performing analogous step, iterating forward on (G.11) and using the fact that
(
wnt − pnt − l
n
t
ψ
)
=
cnt results in
ψwt,τ = Et−τ
[
ψ pt + lt,τ − ψγtγ−1 −ψRt
]
+ψcnt .
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Using (G.9) to replace for lt,τ and replacing wt,τ in (G.21) gives the wage curve:
wt = ω
∞
∑
τ=0
(1−ω)τ Et−τ
[
pt +
γ
γ+ψ
(wt− pt)+
+
(yFINt −zt−αkt−1)
1−α −at
β (γ+ψ)
+
ψ
(γ+ψ)
(cnt −Rt)−
ψ
(γ+ψ)(γ−1)γt
 . (G.27)
Equations (G.24)-(G.27), together with aggregate investment (G.18), the aggregate budget
constraint (G.5), the Fisher equation (G.6) and the Taylor rule (G.7) characterize the equilib-
rium for yFINt , ct , wt , pt , invt , kt , rt and it given exogenous shocks to ∆at , εt , γt , vt , zt and
gt .
The classical equilibrium
In the classical economy, λ =ω = δ = η = 1 so all agents are attentive. The model collapses
into the following system of 9 equations in 9 variables (yFINt , yt , ct , invt , wt , pt , kt , rt and it ):
ct = Et [ct+1− rt ]
β (wt− pt)+(1−β )yt−at− β(v−1)vt = 0
ψ (wt− pt) = yt−atβ +
ψ
θ
ct− ψ(γ−1)γt
yFINt = αcct +αiinvt +gt
kt = Et
[
yt+1− r(r+ρ)(1−α)rt +
1
1−α zt+1
]
invt =
1
ρ
kt− 1−ρρ kt−1
yFINt = zt +(1−α)yt +αkt−1
rt = it−Et (∆pt+1)
it = φpi∆pt− εt .
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Defining:
Ω1 = 1−β + 1ψ ; Ω2 =
r
(r+ρ)(1−α) ; Ω3 = αc+
(1−α)β
Ω1
Ω4 =−αiρ
(
Ω2+
β
Ω1
)
; Ω5 =Ω3+
αiΩ2
ρ
−
(
Ω2+
β
Ω1
)[
α− αi (1−ρ)
ρ
]
Ω6 =Ω2
[
α− αi (1−ρ)
ρ
]
,
then ct is the solution of the following expectational difference equation:
Ω4Et (ct+1)+Ω5ct +Ω6ct−1 = f (at−1,at ,γt−1,γt ,vt−1,vt ,gt ,zt ,zt−1) .
Using the solution for consumption, one can show that the solutions for all the other real vari-
ables (yFINt , yt , invt , wt − pt , kt and rt) are determined as a function only of the exogenous
real shocks (∆at , γt , vt , zt and gt), independently of the monetary policy shock εt . The clas-
sical dichotomy holds in this economy. The monetary policy shock determines the nominal
interest rate and inflation through the Taylor rule and the Fisher equation.
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